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CANDID REASONS

FOR

RENOUNCING THE PRINCIPLES

OF

ANTIPÆDOBAPTISM.

ALSO,

AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING A SHORT METHOD WITH THE BAPTISTS.

By PETER EDWARDS,
Several years Pastor of a Baptist Church, at Porsea, Hants.

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TO THE

CHURCH AND CONGREGATION

MEETING IN WHITE'S ROW, PORTSEA, HANTS.

DEARLY BELOVED,

AFTER officiating among you, as Paſtor and Miniſter, between ten and eleven years, it ſeemed natural to addreſs you in a publication intended to account for that change of ſentiment in me, which has proved the occaſion of our ſeparation.

Two eminent writers, Mr. Booth and Dr. Williams, have both contributed to this: The latter has my acknowledgments; the former my animadverſions. As Mr B. had no deſign to diſcover the fallacy of the Baptiſt ſcheme, I thought it proper to ſhow in what way his book has operated, and is likely ſtill to operate, contrary to the deſign of the author.

I have preſented the whole ſcheme to the reader in the ſame point of view in which it was exhibited to my own mind. In compoſing it I have endeavoured to avoid every thing foreign and bitter; that, as the truth has been my object, I wiſhed to ſay nothing that ſhould divert the attention of the reader from it. Wiſhing that you and I may grow in grace and in the knowledge of Chriſt, I remain, in the ſame eſteem and love,

Yours, in our common Lord,

PORTSEA,
Jan. 12, 1795.

PETER EDWARDS.

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NOTE—In the English Edition there were a number of Greek words, which, for want of a Greek Type, are now printed in *Italicks*.

☞ Wherever *i. e.* occur in this work, they mean, *that is*, and *e. g. for example*.

THE INTRODUCTION:

CONTAINING A FAIR STATEMENT OF THE INQUIRY.

THESIS I.

THE only thing which, in any diſpute, ſhould engage our attention, is this : "What is truth ?" And he who wiſhes to find it, will endeavour to adopt that plan which will bring him ſooneſt to that he ſeeks. There are two things, in all matters of controverſy, which greatly facilitate our ſearch : Firſt, that we ſet aſide all thoſe things about which we are agreed, and fix our attention to that only on which a difference of opinion may fall; and, ſecondly, that this difference be ſtated in a manner the moſt plain and ſimple. To either of which, no perſon who ſeeks the truth can form the leaſt objection.

THESIS II.

As this inquiry lies between thoſe who paſs under the denomination of Pædobaptiſts and Antipædobaptiſts, it will be proper, in order to aſcertain wherein they differ on the ſubject of baptiſm, to give the ſentiments of each. Antipædobaptiſts

conſider thoſe perſons as meet ſubjects of baptiſm, who are ſuppoſed to poſſeſs faith in Chriſt, and thoſe only. Pædobaptiſts agree with them in this, that believers are proper ſubjects of baptiſm; but deny that ſuch only are proper ſubjects. They think, that, together with ſuch believing adults who have not yet been baptized, their infants have a right to baptiſm as well as their parents.

I have lately converſed with many Baptiſts, who knew ſo little of the ſentiment of their brethren, that they ſuppoſed adult baptiſm was entirely rejected by Pædobaptiſts; and when I endeavoured, from their confeſſions of faith, &c. to convince my Baptiſt friends that they held adult baptiſm as well as themſelves, ſome believed and marvelled, but others remained in doubt.

THESIS III.

From this view of the ſentiments of each, it appears that both parties are agreed on the article of adult baptiſm, which muſt therefore be ſet aſide as a matter entirely out of diſpute; for it can anſwer no good purpoſe for one to prove what the other will not deny. Now ſeeing they are ſo far of one mind (I ſpeak of the ſubject, not of the mode), the difference between them concerns infants only; and the ſimple queſtion which remains to be decided, is this, Are infants fit ſubjects of baptiſm, or are they not? On this queſtion the whole turns. The Pædobaptiſts affirm, and Antipædobaptiſts deny.

THESIS IV.

The ſimple queſtion being as I have now ſtated it, Are infants fit ſubjects of baptiſm, or are they not? it will clearly follow, that all thoſe places

which relate to believers' baptism, can prove nothing on the side of Baptists; and the reason is, they have no relation to the question. To illustrate this, I ask a Baptist: Is an infant a fit subject of baptism? No, says he. Wherefore? Because the Scriptures say, Repent and be baptized.----If thou believest, thou mayest---I interpose, and say, Your answer is not in point. I asked, Is an infant a fit subject of baptism? You answer by telling me that a penitent adult is such. But as I asked no question concerning an adult, the answer is nothing at all to the purpose. If I should ask whether an infant were a creature of the rational kind, would it be a good answer, if any person should say that adults were of that description? No answer can be good, if it do not directly relate to the question proposed; for then, properly speaking, it is no answer to the question. And therefore, if I ask whether an infant is a proper subject of baptism, and another should bring twenty places to prove the propriety of baptizing adults; as all this would be nothing to the question, so nothing would be proved thereby, either for or against.

We may from hence estimate the neat strength of each party, as they respect one another. The Pædobaptist has just so much strength against a Baptist, as his arguments weigh on the affirmative, and no more; and the Baptist has no more strength against him, but as his arguments weigh on the negative. Whatever arguments a Baptist may bring to evince infant baptism to be wrong, whether they be many or few, good or bad, it is all his strength; he has not a grain more on his side. For as it lies on neither of these to prove adult baptism (it being a thing professed and used

by both, and is therefore no ſubject of diſpute), thoſe arguments that prove it can have no place here. This being carefully obſerved, we ſhall ſee which of theſe has the faireſt pretenſion to truth.

THESIS V.

Whatever may, in reality, be the force of argument on either ſide, reſpecting this queſtion, there can be no doubt but that ſide is the true one, on which the arguments are found to preponderate. If the arguments for infant baptiſm are ſtronger than any that can be produced againſt it, then infant baptiſm muſt be right; and ſo the eaſy and ſure way of coming to a deciſion is, to collect the arguments on both ſides, try their validity, and compare them together. This, in the fear of God, I ſhall endeavour to do. Firſt, I will ſet down the arguments againſt infant baptiſm, and examine them as I proceed; and then thoſe which make for it; and after that I will compare them together in oppoſite columns. By this proceſs, which is the faireſt I am acquainted with, we ſhall ſee whether Baptiſts or Pædobaptiſts have the truth on their ſide.

The whole import of theſe propoſitions is—That both parties agree about adult baptiſm—That when a Baptiſt has proved adult baptiſm, he has proved nothing againſt a Pædobaptiſt—That the only queſtion being this, Are infants fit ſubjects of baptiſm, or are they not? it is evident that thoſe paſſages of Scripture, which prove adult baptiſm, will not anſwer this queſtion—And, that arguments for and againſt being compared, that ſide is the true one, on which they preponderate.

If any thing can make this matter plainer, and I wish it to be made plain, perhaps the introduction of a short familiar dialogue may do it. We will therefore suppose a conversation between a Baptist and a Pædobaptist; the Baptist speaking as follows:

Bap. I wonder very much you should not agree with me in sentiment, respecting the subjects of baptism.

Pædo. There is nothing in this to wonder at, since we all see but in part; it is our happiness to believe to the saving of the soul.

Bap. That which makes me wonder is this, that the sentiment I hold is so clearly revealed in Scripture.

Pædo. What sentiment is that you hold, and which you say is so clearly revealed in Scripture?

Bap. I hold what is commonly called believers' baptism; or, that it is right to baptize a person professing faith in Christ.

Pædo. If that be your sentiment, I grant it is clearly revealed; but in this we are agreed, it is my sentiment as well as yours.

Bap. But this is not the whole of my sentiment. I meant to have said, that it is wrong to baptize infants.

Pædo. Then you and I differ only about infants.

Bap. If you grant adult baptism to be right, it is only about infants we differ.

Pædo. I do grant it. And then do you mean to say, that it is clearly revealed in Scripture that it is wrong to baptize infants.

Bap. I do mean to say that.

Pædo. How do you prove it?

Bap. I prove it by Acts viii. 37. If thou believeſt with all thine heart, thou mayeſt.

Pædo. You have indeed proved believers' baptiſm to be right; but I aſked you, how you proved infant baptiſm to be wrong?

Bap. Muſt not infant baptiſm be wrong, if believers' baptiſm be right?

Pædo. No more than believers' baptiſm muſt be wrong, if infant baptiſm be right. Would you think I had proved that infants would be loſt, by proving that believing adults would be ſaved?

Bap. Certainly I ſhould not.

Pædo. Why?

Bap. Becauſe the queſtion would be only about infants; and we cannot infer the loſs of an infant from the ſalvation of a believing adult.

Pædo. Very true. Then that which proves infant baptiſm wrong, muſt not be the ſame that proves adult baptiſm to be right.

Bap. I grant it, and think there is ſufficient proof againſt it beſide.

Pædo. This is the very point. You produce your proof againſt it, and I will produce mine for it. If your proof be found ſtronger againſt, than mine for, you have truth on your ſide; if not, the truth is on mine.

Bap. Nothing can be more fair; and I am willing to put it to the teſt.

CHAPTER I.

THIS CHAPTER WILL CONTAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST INFANT BAPTISM.—OF THESE, THERE ARE TWO ONLY; FOR WHATEVER MAY BE URGED, WILL FALL UNDER ONE OR OTHER OF THESE.

::::::::::::

ARGUMENT I.

A perſon who has a right to a poſitive inſtitute muſt be expreſsly mentioned as having that right; but infants are not ſo mentioned, therefore they have not that right.

AS the whole force of this argument turns upon the words expreſs and explicit, which Baptiſt writers commonly uſe, the reader, in order to form a juſt opinion upon the ſubject, ſhould clearly underſtand their import. And ſince I ſhall often have occaſion to uſe them, the reader will meet with an explanation of the term 'explicit' in another place. At preſent it will be ſufficient to ſay, that both theſe terms ſtand oppoſed to inference, analogy, and implication. And when the Baptiſts ſay there is no expreſs command for infant baptiſm, they mean there is no command 'in ſo many words,' as 'thou ſhalt baptize infants,' or ſomething equivalent. This being premiſed, I ſay of the argument, it is aſſuming—contracted—falſe. It is very aſſum-

ing, becauſe it ſeems to dictate to the ever-bleſſed God in what manner he ought to ſpeak to his creatures. Since it is no where contained in his word, and he knows beſt how to communicate his mind to men, it little becomes ſuch creatures as we are, to lay down rules by which he ſhall proceed. To ſuch who thus aſſume, it may properly be ſaid, "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counſellor?" For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: To whom be glory for ever. Amen.

It is very contracted, becauſe it ſuppoſes we cannot underſtand what God ſays, but when he ſpeaks to us in one particular way. Certain it is that the moſt important things are ſet forth in Scripture, in many different ways; and we may come at the truth by an indirect, as certainly as by a direct expreſſion: *e. g.* "When the Apoſtle ſays he was caught up into the third heaven, I certainly know there is a firſt and a ſecond, though I no where had read expreſsly of any ſuch thing. But what is moſt material, I affirm that

It is very falſe: Becauſe (to wave other inſtances, and fix on one only) a ſubject is admitted to a poſitive inſtitute, and that admiſſion is according to truth, and ſo held and practiſed by all, who uſe Chriſtian rites; when yet there is no expreſs law or example to ſupport it, in all the word of God. It is the caſe of women to which I allude, and their admiſſion to the Lord's table.

I acknowledge it is right to admit them, and ſo do all, who uſe the Lord's Supper; but as to expreſs law or example, there is no ſuch thing in Scripture. If it be ſaid, that women are fit ſubjects of baptiſm—that they are capable of religious

advantages—that they have a right to church-membership, and therefore a right to the Lord's Supper, I grant it—And then the argument is false; for if women are admitted because they are fit subjects of baptism, &c. they are admitted by something, which is not express law or example. But the argument I am opposing says, "A person who has a right to positive institutes, must be expressly mentioned as having that right." Now, if women are not so mentioned with respect to the supper, the practice of admitting them is wrong, or this argument is false. This argument indeed is false; the practice is by no means wrong. And to show the fallacy of the Baptist system at large, I will undertake, in the sequel, to prove that, upon the principles and reasonings of the Baptists, a woman, however qualified, can have no right whatever to the Lord's table.

There is no express command or example for infant baptism! This being a favourite argument with Baptists, and the case of women, in this respect, being the same as that of infants, they will not suffer an instance, so fatal to their system, to pass by, without making an effort to overturn it. They know very well, I mean the thinking part, especially those who write, that they cannot maintain this argument against infants, without producing an explicit warrant for female communion. They therefore affirm, that the Scriptures afford such a warrant, and that it is found in 1 Cor. xi. 28. "Let a man [*Anthropos*] examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, &c." It is certainly here, or no where. I have known many who took this for an express word for women. I did so my-

ſelf for ſome years, till Mr. Booth's attempt to prove it convinced me of the contrary.

An expreſs word, in the preſent caſe, muſt be one that ſpecifies the ſex; as Acts viii. 12. "they were baptized, both men and women." [*Andres kai-gunaikes*]. But I aſk, is *Anthropos* an expreſs word for a woman? Mr. Booth affirms it is. Take it in his own words, vol. ii. page 73. "In regard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply by demanding, Does not Paul, when he ſays, Let a man examine himſelf, and ſo let him eat, enjoin a reception of the ſacred ſupper? Does not the term *Anthropos*, there uſed, often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies, without regard to ſex? Have we not the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of common ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in that paſſage? When the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *Anthropos*, but *Aneer*." This is all about the word, except a quotation, which is not material.

The reader is deſired to obſerve, that, as Mr. B. has undertaken to produce an explicit warrant for female communion, he can derive no help from analogy, or inference, or any thing of that kind. The words he brings for proof muſt contain their own unequivocal evidence, independent of every other conſideration. If this be not the caſe, his explicit warrant is a mere fiction.

Now for the explicit warrant. Mr. B. ſays "Does not Paul, when he ſays, Let a man examine himſelf, and ſo let him eat, enjoin a reception of the ſacred ſupper?" True. "Does not the term *Anthropos*, there uſed, often ſtand as a name of

our ſpecies, without regard to ſex?" True again. Obſerve this, OFTEN STAND! Not always. Does Mr. B. take this for an explicit warrant? What a demonſtration! And how full to the point! But Mr. B. ſays it ſtands ſo in the text. How does he know it? Why, he has two evidences of this; a lexicographer, *i. e.* a dictionary-maker, and common ſenſe. Common ſenſe, he ſays, is the beſt of the two. However, I will take them together, and proceed to aſk, How do they know that the term *Anthropos* ſtands in this text as a name of our ſpecies? They muſt know it either from the word itſelf, or from ſome other ground. That they cannot know it from the word itſelf, is evident by this ſingle conſideration, that a boy, who reads his Greek teſtament, may meet with the word a hundred times, where the female ſex can by no means be intended; nay he may find it uſed ſeveral times, though Mr. B. could not, to diſtinguiſh the male from the female. Where then is its explicitneſs? He ſays it is often uſed as a name of our ſpecies. And is not our Engliſh word, 'Man,' uſed in the ſame way? Would Mr. B. take that to be an explicit word for a woman? If the word 'man' be often uſed for a name of our ſpecies, as well as *Anthropos*, then one is juſt as explicit a word for a woman as the other; and ſo Mr. B. might as well have fixed on the Engliſh word for an explicit one, as the Greek. But had he done this, it would have ruined his book; and he has only eſcaped under the covert of a Greek term. If then, it cannot be known from the word itſelf, that females are intended, it matters not, in what other way we know it, the Baptiſt argument is entirely ruined and loſt.

But Mr. B. in the next sentence, will urge the matter further, and boldly affirm, that, "When the sexes are distinguished and opposed, the word for a man is not *Anthropos*, but *Aneer*." I know not what Mr. B. expected to prove by this assertion; for if it were true, I see not how it is to help him in respect to his explicit warrant; but as it is false, it cannot help him in any form, except it be to make him more cautious in future. This assertion, if it proceeded from ignorance, is, in a reader and writer like Mr. B. far too bad; if it did not proceed from ignorance, it is far worse. I am willing to suppose the former, and acquit him of the latter.

Against this assertion of Mr. B. I will now place nineteen instances; in every one of which there is a distinction and opposition of the sexes, and the word for a man is not *Aneer*, but *Anthropos*. Some of these are in the Septuagint, and others in the New Testament. Gen. ii. 24. "Therefore shall a man [*Anthropos*] leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife." Gen. xxvi. 11. "And Abimelech charged all his people, saying, He that toucheth this man [*Anthropou*] or his wife, shall surely be put to death." Gen. xxxiv. 14. "And Simeon and Levi, the brethren of Dinah, said, We cannot do this thing, to give our SISTER to one [*Anthropo*] that is uncircumcised." Deut. xx. 7. "And what man [*Anthropos*] is there that hath betrothed a wife, and hath not taken her?" Deut. xvii. 5. "Then shalt thou bring forth that man, [*Anthropon*] or that WOMAN." Jer. xliv. 7. "Wherefore commit ye this great evil against your souls, to cut off from you man [*Anthropon*] and WOMAN, child and sucking?" For other instances

in the Sept. see Gen. ii. 18. Lev. xix. 20. Num. xxv. 8. Deut. xxi. 15—22. 30. Esther, iv. 11.

Matt. xix. 10. "His disciples say unto him, If the case of the man [*Anthropou*] be so with his WIFE, it is not good to marry." Matt. xix. 3. "The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man [*Anthropo*] to put away his WIFE for every cause?" Mark, x. 7. "For this cause shall a man [*Anthropos*] leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife." 1. Cor. vii. 1. "Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote unto me, it is good for a man [*Anthropo*] not to touch a woman." Matt. xix. 5. "For this cause shall a man [*Anthropos*] leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his *wife*." Rev. ix. 7, 8. "And their faces were as the faces of men [*Anthropôn*]; and they had hair as the hair of *women*." Eph. v. 31. "For this cause shall a man [*Anthropos*] leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his *wife*." See likewise 1 Cor. vii. 1. Matt. xix. 5. Eph. v. 31. Rev. ix. 7, 8.

After I had collected some of these instances, which I have here set down, I mentioned the sentence of Mr. B. and likewise the instances which lay against it, to a Baptist minister, who happened to be at my house. He thereupon took the Greek Testament, and read those places to which I directed him. When he had done this, he was greatly surprised at the incautiousness of Mr. B. and at the same time, made the best apology for him, which the case would admit of. I then observed, that, had Mr. B. affirmed that *Aner* was more commonly used to distinguish the sexes than *Anthropos*, he would have been right. Yes, said he, but that would not have answered Mr. B.'s pur-

poſe. Which indeed was very true; for he, having all through his book inſiſted that infants ſhould not be baptized, becauſe there was no expreſs warrant for it, was compelled, by his own reaſoning, to bring forward an explicit warrant for female communion. And when he comes to prove that there is ſuch a warrant in Scripture for female right to the Lord's ſupper, he firſt of all falls upon preſumptive proof, "Does not the term *Anthropos* often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies?" As if he had ſaid, If this word often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies, I preſume it is poſſible it may ſo ſtand in this text. In the next place he falls upon inferential proof, and ſets a lexicographer and common ſenſe to infer (for they could do no other) that ſo it muſt mean in the text. And laſtly, to make it ſtill worſe, he falls upon an evident falſehood, when he ſays, that, when the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *Anthropos*, but *Aner*. This is all Mr. B. is pleaſed to give the reader, inſtead of an explicit warrant, preſumption, inference, and falſehood; and if either he, or any of his readers can ſatisfy themſelves with ſuch an explicit warrant as this, they can neither of them be eſteemed very nice in this article.

But, to ſet Mr. B. and his explicit warrant in a clear point of light, the reader has only to contemplate thoſe two facts, which have juſt paſſed under his eye; namely, that *Anthropos* is often uſed as a name of our ſpecies, as Mr. B. affirms; and likewiſe that it is often uſed to diſtinguiſh one ſex from the other. Now with theſe two facts in view [*viz.* *Anthropos* is often uſed as a name of our ſpecies, and often it is not ſo uſed], if a queſtion be ſtarted

concerning its meaning in any text, let it be 1 Cor. xi. 28. the reader will see at once that it is no explicit word, because he will stand in need of a third thing, to determine in what sense it is used there; whereas, if the word were explicit, nothing else would be necessary to fix the sense. Now as the facts weigh on both sides, OFTEN against OFTEN, and as the reader wants a third thing to settle the import of the word in this text, I ask, What is this third thing? Lexicographers and common sense, says Mr. B. Nay, no ambiguity, Sir, we are now talking of explicitness. Why did you not say, analogy and inference? Shocking! What! give up the cause at once! But what, I say again, is this third thing? Is Mr. B. afraid of telling? I wish, however, he would write again, and say in plain terms what it is. Is it what you speak of in the latter part of the defence, *viz.* 'that women have the same pre-requisites as men, and that male and female are one in Christ?' Very good.—Proceed.—Therefore—I say, go on, do not be afraid, this will bring you safe to your conclusion; for it is only analogy and inference. Inference and analogy! and upon a positive institute too! I cannot bear the terms; I would much rather call them lexicographers and common sense; for were I to call them inference and analogy, it would ruin my whole book. It is very true, Mr. B.; but at the same time, is it not better your book should be ruined by plain dealing, than that your reputation should seem to be stained by acting an artful part? But after all, here is a third thing wanting to settle the meaning of this ambiguous word. And what in the world does it signify by what name we call this third thing? For whether

we name it analogy, or inference, or lexicographer, or common ſenſe (which two laſt are Mr. B's names, as he could not bear the others on a poſitive inſtitute), it comes ſtill to the ſame thing; it ſhows that this is no explicit word for females, and conſequently, as there is no other, this argument is ruined.

What I have now animadverted upon is all Mr. B. ſays, that can even pretend to evince an explicit warrant. But ſince the whole of it, upon his principles, is as curious a defence of female right to the Lord's table as ever was preſented to the public, I will pay him the compliment of ſurveying it, and taking it to pieces, in due time and place. In the mean time I do not blame Mr. B. for not being able to produce an explicit warrant for women; it is what no man is able to do; but I do blame him for uſing ſuch reaſoning as he has done, and then paſſing it upon the public under the colour of explicit proof.

It is a common opinion that Baptiſts and Pædobaptiſts do reaſon differently on poſitive inſtitutes; that the former invariably inſiſt upon expreſs proof, while the latter admit the force of inferential reaſoning. It is true they profeſs to reaſon differently, and they actually do ſometimes; but then it is only according to the mood they may be in, and the matter they may have in hand. Let the matter of debate be a little varied, and they reaſon on poſitive inſtitutes preciſely in the ſame way.

I have taken the liberty, in time paſt, to aſk Pædobaptiſts why they baptized their infants? One has told me, that infants were circumciſed, and therefore ſhould now be baptized; inferring their baptiſm from circumciſion. Another has told me,

that our Lord took infants into his arms, and bleſſed them, and ſaid they were of the kingdom of heaven; ſo inferring their baptiſm from the language and conduct of Chriſt. At hearing this the Baptiſts ſmile, and think it very fooliſh reaſoning.

I have alſo taken the liberty to aſk Baptiſts, why they admitted women to the Lord's table? One informed me, that women were partakers of the grace of God; inferring their right to communicate from their grace. Another told me, that women had been baptized; and inferred their right to the ſupper from their baptiſm. A third gave me to underſtand, that women did eat of the paſchal lamb, and from thence inferred their right to the Lord's table. A fourth told me that women were creatures of God as well as men; and ſo inferred their right from their creation. Theſe Baptiſts did all infer, and, as Mr. B. ſays of Pædobaptiſts, not feeling the ground on which they ſtood, they agreed in one concluſion, but did not agree in the premiſes from which it ſhould be drawn.

It may perhaps be ſaid, that theſe perſons did not poſſeſs logical exactneſs; that they were not aware of the impropriety of demanding plain, expreſs, unequivocal proof; and then, as it ſuited their convenience, flying directly to inference, implication, and analogy; and that too on a poſitive ordinance. I grant they were plain perſons, and did not ſee the inconſiſtency of this conduct. Well, we will betake ourſelves to men of ſkill, to thoſe who are acquainted with logical preciſion; and then let us ſee how they act in this buſineſs. What think you of Mr. Booth, as a man of erudition and logical attainment? Does Mr. B., ſay you, employ inferential reaſoning on a poſitive inſtitute? No-

thing in the world more certain. What! M. B.; he who has written so many hundred pages with a view to expose it! Yes, that identical Mr. B. to the reproach of all consistency, does, in that very work, when sad necessity compels, even deal in this same inferential reasoning. I will not evidence this now, since I have promised to notice his whole defence of women in a more proper place.

All I am concerned to do in this place, is to show that this argument of the Baptists is false. The argument is this: "A person who has a right to a positive institute, must be expressly mentioned as having that right; but infants are not so mentioned, &c." That the argument is false, appears from these facts:

I. The Scriptures do not countenance it. For as it is not proved by any part of the word of God, being neither set down in the words, nor yet in the sense of holy writ, and therefore a fiction, invented by men to support a particular opinion; so it stands directly against God's holy word. And this is evident from hence; that though women are expressly said to have been baptized, they are never said to have received the Lord's supper. The Scriptures, therefore, in plain opposition to this false argument, leave us to conclude their right to the Lord's supper from their baptism, together with other grounds. Thus it has no support from Scripture.

II. The Baptists themselves do not countenance it; for though they have written whole books on the strength of it, they are compelled to desert it, and do desert it the moment the subject is varied. For after they have vapoured ever so long, and ever so loud, about "no express law—no explicit

warrant for infant baptiſm—infant baptiſm is no where mentioned in Scripture;" let any one put it upon them to prove the right of women to the ſupper, and I will anſwer for it he will hear no more of expreſs law on that head. He will find that all this hollow ſound, which ſignifies nothing, will die away, and each will ſhift for himſelf the beſt way he can, and fly for aid to analogy and inference. Women, ſay they, may be gracious.—Women were baptized—Women did eat of the paſchal lamb—Women are creatures of God, as well as men, and therefore,—Therefore what? Why therefore they ſhould receive the Lord's ſupper. What now is become of their expreſs law? It is deſerted, completely deſerted; nor will they adopt it again till infant baptiſm is reſumed.—The Baptiſts, therefore, do not countenance it.

III. Mr. Booth himſelf does not countenance it; I mean, not always countenance it: For though he has demanded explicit proof for infant baptiſm, and has contended that if ſuch proof cannot be adduced, the baptiſm of infants muſt be wrong, yet, when he comes to produce an explicit warrant for female communion, he is content.—Nay, ſtop—I cannot ſay he is content—but he is compelled to fly to preſuming—to implication—to analogy—to inference—to make out an explicit warrant! All this we engage to prove, and to make a proper uſe of in the ſequel. And I cannot help obſerving, that if female communion cannot be ſupported on the principle of this argument, how idle a thing it is to forge a rule to operate againſt infants only.

Finally, as this argument militates againſt female communion, as well as infant baptiſm, they muſt either both be wrong, or the argument itſelf muſt

be falſe. That the argument is falſe, is ſufficiently evident, as it not only has no ſupport from Scripture, but lies directly againſt it; and from what I have obſerved, in many recent converſations, I do not ſuppoſe there is a ſingle Baptiſt in the kingdom that will even dare to ſtick to it. For after they had urged this argument upon me, I have turned the queſtion from infant baptiſm to female communion, and I do not recollect one, either miniſter or private perſon, but has, in little more than a quarter of an hour, entirely given up the argument. And if Mr. B. ſhould think proper to take up his pen once more on this ſubject, I have not a doubt but I ſhould be able to compel even him, as well as many of his brethren, to relinquiſh it as a falſe argument; and I hope he will take up his pen once again, and vindicate his defence of female communion.

I have been the longer on this argument, becauſe, as it is very frequently urged, ſo it contains preciſely one half of the Baptiſt ſtrength. This argument, therefore, being deſtroyed, juſt half their ſtrength is gone. And if any one ſhould be inclined to cry out, "There is no explicit example —there is no expreſs law for infant baptiſm, &c." any perſon has it in his power to quiet him almoſt in an inſtant, ſhould he only aſk him to produce his explicit law, &c. for female communion.—Thus much for this bad argument; and I paſs to the other.

ARGUMENT II.

The Scriptures require faith and repentance as requiſite to Baptiſm; but as infants cannot have theſe, they are not proper ſubjects of baptiſm.—Infants, ſay the Baptiſts, cannot believe, cannot repent; and none ſhould be baptized without faith, &c.

THE moſt expeditious way of deſtroying this argument, would be this. They ſay the Scriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptiſm. I aſk, Of whom? The anſwer muſt be, Of adults; for the Scriptures never require them of infants, in order to any thing. Then frame the argument thus:—The Scriptures require faith and repentance of ADULTS, in order to baptiſm.—Now you ſee infants are gone, they have nothing to do with the argument;—or if they muſt be brought in, the argument will run thus:—The Scriptures require faith and repentance of ADULTS, in order to baptiſm; but as INFANTS cannot have theſe, they are unfit ſubjects of that ordinance. Now it is a glaring ſophiſm; with adults in one propoſition, and infants in the other. Were I only to leave the argument thus, and ſay no more upon it, it would not be poſſible to ſave it from perdition; but ſince it is the only remaining half of the Baptiſt ſtrength, I will examine it more at large.

In order to judge of the real worth of an argument, I lay down this rule: "Every argument that will prove againſt an evident truth; or, which is the ſame thing, every argument which will ſupport a falſehood, is clearly a bad argument." This

rule is self evident; for that must needs be false which tends to prove a falsehood.

I will proceed by this rule, and attempt to show, I. That this argument is entirely fallacious. II. Point out wherein its fallacy consists.

I. Of the fallacy of this argument. The principle of it is, that infants are excluded from baptism, because something is said of baptism which will not agree to infants. To see therefore the tendency of this argument, whether it will prove on the side of truth or error, I will try its operation on these four subjects.

1. On the circumcision of infants.—That infants were circumcised, is a fact.—That they were circumcised by the express command of God, is a proof of right.—They were actually circumcised, and it was right they should be so.—Therefore that they were proper subjects of that institute, is an evident truth. Now on this truth I mean to try the argument, to see if it will prove for, or against it.

Circumcision, as it was a solemn entering into the Church of God, did fix an obligation on the circumcised to conform to the laws and ordinances of that church. Hence that speech, Acts, xv. 24. "Ye must be circumcised, and keep the law;" which would have been just, if circumcision had not been abolished. The Apostle says, Gal. v. 3. "Every man who is circumcised, is a debtor to do the whole law." His meaning is, if circumcision be in force, so must its obligation too. And Rom. ii. 25. he says, "Circumcision profiteth if thou keep the law; but, if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision. The

fum of this is, he that was circumcifed became a debtor; if he kept the law to which he was bound, his circumcifion would profit; but if he violated it, his circumcifion became a nullity.

Now I afk, Did it agree to an infant to become a debtor? Did it agree to an infant to break or keep the law? Mr. Booth fhall anfwer both. To the firft he fays, vol. ii. page 151, "Infants are not capable of contracting either with God or man. That, to fuppofe any fuch thing, infults the underftanding and feelings of mankind. For, as Bifhop Sanderfon obferves, In perfonal obligations no man is bound without his own confent." To the other he anfwers, "The minds of mere infants are not capable of comparing their own conduct with the rule of duty; they have, properly fpeaking, no conficience at all." Infants therefore could not become debtors; they could not keep the law. Very well. Then it is clear there was fomething faid of circumcifion which did no more agree to infants, than if it had been faid, Repent, and be baptized.

In this refpect baptifm and circumcifion are upon a level; for there is fomething faid concerning both, which will by no means agree to infants. Infants, on the one hand, can neither believe nor repent; and thefe are connected with baptifm; and, on the other hand, infants cannot become debtors, they cannot keep the law; and thefe are connected with circumcifion. And then if we fay, as the Baptifts do, that infants, fince they cannot believe or repent, muft not be baptized, becaufe faith and repentance are connected with baptifm; we muft fay likewife, infants cannot become debtors, they cannot keep the law; and becaufe thefe are

connected with circumcision, they must not be circumcised. And then it follows that this argument, by proving against a known truth, appears a fallacious argument.

But it may be said, circumcision of infants was commanded of God, and was therefore certainly right. To this I answer, that that is the very principle on which I proceed, and it is that very thing which proves fatal to this argument; for the circumcision of infants being an evident truth, and the argument before us proving against it, it is a plain demonstration of its absurdity and fallacy. Now if this argument be such, that had it been used by a Jew in the land of Canaan, it would have proved against an ordinance of God, I would fain know, if its nature can in any measure be changed, merely on its being used by a Baptist, and in a different climate? I proceed to try it,

2. On the baptism of Jesus Christ. The baptism of Christ is a known fact; and that he was a fit subject, is an acknowledged truth. It is likewise certain, that, as he was no sinner, he could have no repentance; and since he needed no salvation from sin, he could not have the faith of God's elect; that is, he could not have that faith which the Scriptures require to baptism.

Now the tendency of this argument being to prove that those who cannot have faith and repentance are unfit subjects of baptism; and Scripture informing us that our Lord Jesus was baptized, who could have neither, the dilemma therefore will be this; either the baptism of Christ was wrong, or else this argument is false. It is impossible to suppose the first, that the baptism of Christ was wrong; we must therefore affirm the last, that this

argument is falſe: Becauſe that argument muſt be falſe which proves againſt an evident truth.

Again, when it is ſaid in the argument, that the Scriptures require faith and repentance, in order to baptiſm; I aſk, Do they require them of all, or of ſome only? If it is ſaid, they are required of all; then, as before noted, it proves againſt the baptiſm of Jeſus Chriſt. If it be ſaid, they require them of ſome only; then the argument has no force: For, in that caſe, it would run thus—Faith and repentance are required only of ſome, in order to baptiſm: And now the conſequent will be, that ſome may be baptized without them. And nothing would remain then, but that it be determined, who ſhould be baptized without faith, and who with.

View it which way we will, the argument is miſerably bad. The Baptiſts however, in this caſe, fly to its relief by ſaying, "that Jeſus Chriſt, on account of the dignity of his perſon, was exempted from this rule." How this will mend the matter I ſee not; for now it is acknowledged to be a rule which will admit of exception. And then I have only to aſk, how many exceptions does it admit, and what are they? Neither would it be better to ſay, that Chriſt was baptized, to ſet us an example. For then we ſhould have an example of one, who, being incapable of faith and repentance, was baptized without them. And in this view, his example will weigh in favour of infant baptiſm. I will try it again,

3. On the ſalvation of infants. That infants may be the ſubjects of ſalvation is univerſally admitted; that thoſe, who die in infancy, are actually glorified, is alſo granted: And yet there is ſome-

thing ſaid concerning ſalvation, which will by no means agree to infants—"He that believeth ſhall be ſaved; he that believeth not ſhall be damned," &c.

What ſhall we ſay in this caſe? Why, the ſame as before. If infants muſt not be baptized, becauſe ſomething is ſaid of baptiſm, which does not agree to infants; then, by the ſame rule, infants muſt not be ſaved, becauſe ſomething is ſaid of ſalvation, which does not agree to infants. And then, the ſame conſequence again follows, that this argument, by proving againſt an acknowledged truth, proves itſelf to be fallacious.

And now, ſince it falls in with my preſent deſign, and may ſerve to relieve and inform the reader, I will preſent him with two ſpecimens of reaſoning on the ſame text; one of which concludes againſt infant baptiſm, and the other for it. The reader may adopt that which pleaſes him beſt.

The firſt ſpecimen ſhall be that of Mr. B. vol. ii. page 309, where he adopts the remark of Mr. Chambers: "What they [the German Baptiſts] chiefly ſupported their great doctrine on, was thoſe words of our Saviour; 'He that believeth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved.' As none but adults are capable of believing, they argued, that no others are capable of baptiſm."—If theſe had gone one ſtep farther, their argument would have been loſt. *e. g.* As none but adults are capable of believing, none but adults are capable of being ſaved. This with the Baptiſts is a favourite text; and they argue upon it from the order of the words: If, ſay they, faith goes before baptiſm, then infants muſt not be baptized, becauſe they have no faith.

The other is that of Dr. Walker, out of his Modeft Plea, page 179. His words are thefe: "If none muft be baptized but he that believes, becaufe believing is fet firft; then none muft be faved but he that is baptized, becaufe baptizing is fet firft. And then, what better argument can be made for infant baptifm? They muft be baptized if we will have them faved; becaufe they cannot be faved without being baptized; for baptizing goes before faving. And yet from the fame text, and by the fame way of arguing, it may be proved, that no infants are faved, but thofe that believe; becaufe believing is fet before faving: And not only fo, but whereas it is not faid, he that believeth not fhall not be baptized; it is faid, he that believeth not fhall be damned."

The difference between the reafoning of thefe two, lies in this: The Baptifts reafon on a part of the text only, and the Doctor reafoned on the whole. And to fhow how miferably fallacious the reafoning of the Baptifts is, I will lay down a plan of their logic on this text, which will produce more conclufions than there are principal words in that part of the verfe. The place is, Mark, xvi. 16. "He that believeth, and is baptized, fhall be faved." Now as the Baptifts reafon from the order of the words, I will mark them with figures—believeth—baptized—faved.

The logic is as follows: Take the firft and fecond—believeth—baptized—and fay with the Baptifts—

1. None are to be baptized but fuch as believe, becaufe believing muft be before baptizing.—

"Believeth"—"baptized."

This will conclude againſt infant baptiſm.

Next, take the firſt and third—believeth—ſaved—and ſay in the ſame way:

2. None are to be ſaved, but ſuch as believe, becauſe believing muſt be before ſaving.—"Believeth"—"ſaved."

This concludes againſt infant ſalvation.

Now take the ſecond and third—baptized—ſaved—and argue in the ſame manner:

3. None are to be ſaved but ſuch as are baptized, becauſe baptizing muſt go before ſaving.—"Baptized"—"ſaved."

This will conclude on the ſide of infant baptiſm, they muſt be baptized, or they cannot be ſaved. As Dr. Walker reaſons.

Laſtly, take all three—believeth—baptized—ſaved—and ſay:

4. None are to be ſaved but ſuch as believe and are baptized, becauſe believing and baptizing muſt be before ſaving.—"Believeth"—"baptized"—"ſaved."

This concludes againſt the ſalvation of believers in Jeſus Chriſt, if they have not been baptized. And ſo upon the principle of the Baptiſts, it concludes againſt the ſalvation of all Pædobaptiſts.

All theſe concluſions, ariſing from the ſame way of reaſoning, may ſerve as a ſpecimen to ſhow the fallacious mode of arguing againſt infant baptiſm, adopted by the Baptiſts.

Let it be tried once more,

4. On the temporal ſubſiſtence of infants. As the reader may perceive the drift of the reaſoning,

on theſe inſtances, I will uſe but few words on the preſent one. Now that infants ſhould be ſupported, not only Scripture, but Nature itſelf teaches. And yet, if we form the Baptiſt argument, on a few places of Scripture, it may be proved, in oppoſition to Nature and Scripture both, that infants ſhould actually be left to ſtarve.

We have nothing to do but to mention the texts, and apply their reaſoning to them. Iſaiah, i. 19. "If ye be willing and obedient, ye ſhall eat the good of the land." 2 Theſſ. iii. 10. "If any would not work, neither ſhould he eat." Take the firſt, and ſay with the Baptiſt in another caſe: Willingneſs and obedience are required of thoſe who are to eat the good of the land; but ſince infants can neither will nor obey, they muſt not eat the good of the land.—In the ſame way let the other be taken: He that will not work, neither ſhall he eat; infants cannot will to work, then infants muſt not eat.

This argument, in whatever way it is viewed, proves againſt the truth. Is it a truth, that infants ſhould ſubſiſt? This argument proves againſt it. Is it a truth, that infants may be ſaved? This argument will prove the contrary. Was Chriſt rightly baptized? According to this argument it could not be. Were infants proper ſubjects of circumciſion? This argument will prove they were not.—Then, if it invariably ſupport a falſehood, we are compelled to ſay it is a falſe argument.

II. I will point out wherein this fallacy conſiſts. As this argument, notwithſtanding it is falſe, is uſed by the Baptiſts in general, both learned and unlearned, I will attempt to lay open its fallacy; and thereby put thoſe perſons upon their guard,

who may be in danger of being seduced by it. The judicious reader may have observed, that I slightly hinted, at the outset, wherein its fault consisted; but to make it yet more evident what that fault is, of which it is guilty, I will take the liberty of saying a few words more.

That particular rule, against which this argument offends, is this: "*Non debet plus esse in conclusione quam erat in premissis. Ratio manifesta est, quia conclusio educenda est ex premissis.*" That is, "There should not be more in the conclusion than was in the premises. The reason is plain, because the conclusion is to be drawn from the premises." We will try to make this plain, by examples both of true and false reasoning.

1. In the Baptist way of reasoning.—When the Scriptures say, "Repent and be baptized;" and, "If thou believest thou mayest," &c. they address only sinful adults; and then, an argument formed upon them should reach no farther than adults of the same description. But the Baptists form their fallacious argument on these passages, by bringing infants into the conclusion, who, as they are not addressed, are not at all concerned in the premises. This will appear plain by three instances on the Baptist plan.

The Baptist argument runs thus: The Scriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptism; but infants have not faith and repentance; therefore they are not to be baptized. Now as the Scriptures require faith and repentance only of adults, we must place that word in the argument, and then it will stand in this form: The Scriptures require faith and repentance of ADULTS in order to baptism; but INFANTS cannot have these:

Therefore infants are not fit subjects of baptism. In the same way, we may form the two following instances, *viz.* The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to salvation; but infants cannot have these: Therefore infants cannot be saved. Again, He [an adult] who will not work, neither should he eat; but an infant cannot will to work, therefore an infant should not eat.—The reader may perceive, that by placing the word adults in one proposition, and infants in the other (which makes it a sophism), there are three things proved in the same way, *viz.* That infants cannot be saved—that infants should not eat—that infants should not be baptized. And so, for the same reason, that an infant cannot be saved, that an infant should not eat; it will follow, that an infant should not be baptized. For all these are equally true, and supported by the same reasoning. And it is in the same way, that this argument proves against the baptism of Christ, and the circumcision of infants. We will now view these three instances,

2. In the Pædobaptist way of reasoning.—We will place the same word in each proposition, thus: The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to baptism; but some adults have no faith, no repentance; therefore some adults are not to be baptized. Again, The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to salvation; but some adults do not believe nor repent; therefore some adults will not be saved. Once more—He [an adult] who will not work, neither should he eat; but some adult will not work; therefore some adult should not eat.—Now, by placing the word adult in each proposition,

without which it would be a ſophiſtical argument, the reader may ſee, that as infants can have no place in either, there is nothing to forbid their ſupport, their ſalvation, or their baptiſm. They only prove, that an idle adult ſhould not be ſupported; that an impenitent adult will not be ſaved; and, that he has no right at all to baptiſm.

Once more.—As I have nothing in view, ſo much as truth, I have a great deſire to make this matter plain to the meaneſt capacity. For if I am clearly underſtood in this part, my end, on the preſent argument is attained; and what I have before advanced upon it will be, in a great meaſure, uſeleſs. The reader, therefore, is deſired to obſerve, that the deſign of this argument is to conclude againſt the baptiſm of infants. Then, as infants are to be in the concluſion, they muſt alſo be in the premiſes; for the rule ſays, "there ſhould not be more in the concluſion than was in the premiſes; becauſe the concluſion is to be drawn from the premiſes.

Now to make the argument of the Baptiſts conſiſtent with itſelf, we muſt place infants in the premiſes as well as in the concluſion; and then the argument will ſtand thus: The Scriptures require faith and repentance of infants in order to baptiſm; but infants have not faith, &c.; therefore infants are not to be baptized. The reader may diſcern an agreement, in the parts of the argument, with each other; it has infants in each part, as well in the premiſes, as in the concluſion. But, then, the fallacy of it is more ſtrikingly evident than before: For the error, which before crept into the middle, does here ſtand in front; it is in this propoſition, the Scriptures require faith

and repentance of infants in order to baptiſm, which is not true; for infants are never required to repent or believe in order either to baptiſm or ſalvation. Whereas before, when it was ſaid the Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to baptiſm; but infants have not faith, &c. the error conſiſted in putting in the word 'infants,' who have no concern at all in the requirement.

By placing one thing in the premiſes, and another in the concluſion, which is done by the Baptiſts, in this argument, we may be able to evince any abſurdity, however glaring. This being the manner of the Baptiſt argument, nothing more is neceſſary to take off its force againſt infants, but to make the premiſes and concluſion to correſpond with each other. That is, while it continues to be a ſophiſm, it proves againſt infants; but it ceaſes to prove againſt them, as ſoon as it is made a good argument. *e. g.* Faith and repentance are required of adults in order to baptiſm; but infants have not theſe: Therefore infants are not to be baptized. This is nothing more than a pure ſophiſm, and, as ſuch, it concludes againſt infants; but all its force againſt infants is ſet aſide by making it good, thus: Faith and repentance are required in adults in order to baptiſm; but ſome adults have not faith and repentance: Therefore ſome adults are not to be baptized. The reader may ſee, that now it is a fair argument, all its force againſt infants is gone.

Having ſaid thus much on the fallacy of this argument, I ſhall only add one ſpecimen of its mode of operation; and that is a ſpecimen, in which it will conclude two contrary ways, on one place of

Scripture, Rom. ii. 25. "For circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keep the law; but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision."

Now the baptist argument, on the first member of this text, will operate thus: Circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keep the law; but infants could not keep the law: Therefore their circumcision must be unprofitable, that is, as no circumcision, a mere nullity; and this reflects on the wisdom of God. But if we form the same argument on the other member, it will be no nullity neither, for thus it will run; If thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision: But infants could not break the law; therefore their circumcision could not be made uncircumcision, *i. e.* a nullity. Such is this baptist argument, that it will prove infant circumcision to be something, or nothing, according to that part of the text on which it is formed; and it is therefore evidently no more than a sophism.

I have endeavoured to make the reader see, not only that this argument is false, but wherein that fallacy consists. That it is false, appears in this, that in every instance it opposes a known truth; it opposes the circumcision of infants—the baptism of Jesus Christ—the salvation of infants—and, their temporal fulfilment. The nature of the fallacy is the placing of adults in the premises, and infants in the conclusion; which any person, who has the least knowledge of the art of reasoning, must see instantly to be repugnant to the laws of truth. If the method I have taken to show wherein the fault consists, should not be familiar to any

reader, it is poſſible he may not apprehend me; if ſo, I would adviſe him to read it repeatedly, and with ſerious attention; for I am not without hope, that even the moſt common capacity, with due attention, will clearly comprehend my meaning. On the other hand, I have no doubt, but many will readily enter into the method, and ſee what a fallacious argument is made uſe of to ſupport an opinion, I am compelled to deſert.

Theſe too arguments being taken away, a Baptiſt has nothing left to place againſt infant baptiſm. I have not met with a ſingle perſon, who, when deſired to produce the ſtrongeſt arguments againſt infants, could advance any thing more than what is contained in theſe two. While I thought it right to oppoſe the baptiſm of infants, I made uſe of them againſt it; but when they appeared, as they really are, very erroneous and bad, I gave them up; and from that time have never been able to preach a baptizing ſermon. I ſaw that the whole ſtrength of a Baptiſt was gone.

By the removal of theſe two arguments, thus much is gained; that whatever can be advanced, on the part of infants, will ſtand with undiminiſhed force. For it will now avail nothing to ſay, with the firſt argument, there is no expreſs law for infant baptiſm; nor will it be of any uſe to affirm, according to the ſecond, that infants have no faith, no repentance: Becauſe the arguments themſelves being fallacious, whatever may be urged from them, will be entirely devoid of force againſt infant baptiſm.

Having now finiſhed what I intended on the arguments, on one ſide, I proceed to thoſe on the other. I am well perſuaded, that the Scriptures cannot favour both ſides; and had the arguments againſt infant baptiſm been good, I am convinced that nothing in the word of God would have given it any countenance. But ſince the truth muſt be either for or againſt the baptiſm of infants, and the arguments againſt being futile, it is certain the truth muſt lie on the other ſide.

CHAPTER II.

CONTAINING ARGUMENTS ON THE SIDE OF INFANT BAPTISM.

INFANT baptifm is to be proved, in the fame way, as female communion. In the cafe of female communion, all the Baptifts I have ever converfed with, on that fubject, make ufe of inference and analogy; and, though in them it is ridiculous, they are not able to prove it in any other way. And this method is even adopted by Mr. Booth, as I fhall more plainly evince in another place; though glaringly inconfiftent with his own principles.

As I am now to advance proof in favour of infant baptifm, the fimple method I mean to adopt will be the following. In the firft place, it is a fact acknowledged by the Baptifts themfelves, that infants were at an early period conftituted members of the church of God. In the next place, I fhall produce proof, that they have a right to be fo now; and that the conftitution of God by which they were made members, has not been altered to this day. In the laft place, I fhall lay down this dilemma, which will conclude the whole bufinefs, namely: As infants by a divine and unaltered conftitution have a right to be received as church

members, they muſt be received either with baptiſm or without it. If they are not to be received without baptiſm, then, the conſequent is, that they muſt be baptized, becauſe they muſt be received. —I now requeſt the reader's attention to each of theſe in their order.

ARGUMENT I.

God has conſtituted in his Church the memberſhip of infants, and admitted them to it by a religious rite.

In this argument it is proper to take notice of two parts.

I. The church-memberſhip of infants.——A church is a ſociety that ſtands in ſpecial relation to God, being inſtituted for religious purpoſes. When the perſons compoſing this ſociety appear openly in ſuch relation to God, it is called a viſible church; and of ſuch an one I now ſpeak. The relation, between God and this ſociety, is formed by God himſelf, by declaring he is, and will be their God. This declaration of God which conſtituted that relation, which indeed did exiſt from the beginning, had an equal regard to adults and infants; "I will be a God unto thee, and to thy ſeed after thee." And hence both young and old, who had been duly entered, were conſidered as children of the covenant and the kingdom, that is, of the church. The rite of circumciſion being performed, the circumciſed was preſented to the Lord; which is a mode of expreſſion to ſignify a public entering into church-fellowſhip.

The caſe as now ſtated, is, I ſuppoſe, commonly admitted. It is granted by Baptiſts, who are the moſt likely of any to deny it, that infants were members of the Jewiſh church. Mr. Booth grants it, vol. ii. 224. So does Mr. Keach, Gold refined, page 113, "That children were admitted members of the Jewiſh church is granted." And indeed it is not poſſible to deny this, without denying that adults themſelves were members, which would be the ſame as denying that God had a church in the world. Infants, therefore, were conſtituted by God himſelf, members of his own viſible church.

II. Infants, in order to viſible memberſhip, were the ſubjects of a religious rite. That circumciſion was a religious rite, is as eaſily proved, as that baptiſm and the Lord's ſupper are ſuch. Mr. Booth, in this caſe, is in a ſtrait betwixt two; he is not willing flatly to deny it, nor yet can he prevail on himſelf to acknowledge it. He is very tender upon the ſubject, as if he ſaw ſome formidable conſequence lurking beneath it. See what he ſays, vol. ii. 250. "Baptiſm is an appointment purely religious, and intended for purpoſes entirely ſpiritual: But circumciſion, beſides the ſpiritual inſtruction ſuggeſted by it, was a ſign of carnal deſcent, a mark of national diſtinction, and a token of intereſt in thoſe temporal bleſſings that were promiſed to Abraham." Now can any living ſoul tell from whence Mr. B. had all this? Was it from the Koran, or Talmud? To ſhow he never took his notion from the Bible, I will ſet the Bible againſt him, and him againſt it.—*Booth.* It was a token of intereſt in temporal bleſſings.—*Bible.* It was a token of the covenant between God and

Abraham, to be a God to him and his feed.—*Booth.* It was a ſign of carnal deſcent.—*Bible.* It was a ſign of circumciſion, *i. e.* of the heart and ſpirit.—*Booth.* It was a mark of national diſtinction.—*Bible.* It was a ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith. Now compare Mr. B. with fact. *Booth.* It was a token of intereſt in temporal bleſſings.—*Fact.* Many had the intereſt without the token, and many had the token without the intereſt.—*Booth.* It was a mark of national diſtinction.—*Fact.* Many other nations had the ſame mark. So it was a diſtinction which did not diſtinguiſh.—*Booth.* It was a ſign of carnal deſcent.—*Fact.* All Abraham's made ſervants, and many proſelytes, were circumciſed. Either theſe were deſcended from Abraham, or Mr. B.'s ſign was, as one call's it, a ſign of a lie.—See what the love of hypotheſis can do! Could any man have given a poorer account of circumciſion than Mr. B. has done?

But was it not, after all, a truly religious inſtitute? Mr. B. is not willing to deny this altogether. He ſeems to grant, at leaſt by implication, that it was *not* a religious rite. "Baptiſm," ſays he, "is an appointment purely religious, for purpoſes entirely ſpiritual." By leaving the words *purely* and *entirely* as applied to baptiſm, and then comparing it to circumciſion, he ſeems to admit that circumciſion was *purely* a religious rite. All he will grant in plain terms, concerning the religious nature of this inſtitute, is, that it "ſuggeſted ſpiritual inſtruction;" which is not peculiar to any rite either Jewiſh or Chriſtian. I am ſorry to ſee a man, of Mr. B.'s ability, trifle after this ſort. He certainly knew not what to make of it; he ſaw ſomething in its aſpect dreadfully formi-

dable to his fyftem, and was afraid of its appearing, in that form, in which it is fet forth in the word of God. Thefe ftrokes in Mr. B.'s book, and fuch as thefe, which I intend to notice, convince me more than any thing I have ever read, of the fallacy of the Baptifts' fcheme.

Leaving Mr. B.'s diftorted account of this ordinance, we will view it as repreſented in the word of God. To fee, then, whether it is a religious rite, we have only to view it, in its various relations to religion; and circumcifion thus viewed will appear to have been of that defcription, as truly as baptifm, or the Lord's fupper. Let it be confidered in its inftitution—in its application—in its obligation—and connexion with religious things.

1. In its inftitution. In this view of it, it was a token of God's covenant made with Abraham, in which he promifed to be a God unto him, and his feed after him. And then, as an appendage, he promifed to give him and his feed the land of Canaan for his temporal fubfiftence. For earthly things are appendages to the covenant of grace, they are things added, as our Lord expreſſes it, to help a faint through this world.

2. We may view it farther, in its application, under the threefold notion of a token, a ſign, and a ſeal. As a token it is a ratification of God's grant in covenant, to be a God to Abraham and his ſeed. As a ſign, it denotes the grace of God on the heart, whereby it is enabled to love God, to worſhip him, and to have no confidence in the fleſh. Deut. xxx. 6. Rom. ii. 28, 29. Phil. iii. 3. And therefore called a ſign of circumciſion, *i. e.* of the circumciſion of the heart. As a ſeal it applies to the righteouſneſs of faith, *i. e.*

the righteouſneſs of Chriſt by which men are juſtified.

3. We may conſider it, in its connexion. And this is, with the Scriptures, Rom. iii. 2. "To them were committed the oracles of God." With the promiſes, [Rom. xv. 8.] "Now I ſay—that Jeſus Chriſt was a miniſter of the circumciſion for the truth of God, to confirm the promiſes made unto the fathers." With baptiſm, Col. ii. 11, 12. wherein theſe two are ſpoken of as ſtanding on a level with each other, as being each of them of the ſame religious kind.

If we view it in its obligation, we may obſerve, that as it was an entering into the viſible church of God, ſo it bound the perſon, who received it, to a conformity to all other inſtitutes, Gal. iii. 3. Without this conformity it profited nothing, for where this was wanting, it was deemed a nullity. That rite therefore which obliges to a conformity to religion muſt be a religious rite.

When, therefore, we conſider this inſtitute, in its uſe and application, under all theſe views, there can be no doubt of its being a religious inſtitute; becauſe its whole uſe and application are ſo. And as nothing more can be ſaid to prove the religious nature of baptiſm and the Lord's ſupper; a man might as well deny theſe to be religious ordinances, as the other. And hence it is, that Mr. B.'s conduct is the more to be admired, who, notwithſtanding he muſt have ſeen all this in ſcripture, does, of his own head (the word of God giving him no authority), transform it into a mere ſecular, political rite. And this is done to deſtroy all analogy between it and baptiſm, for fear

that analogy ſhould prove the deſtruction of his ſcheme.

Mr. B. in his preface ſays, *non tali auxilio, nec defenſoribus iſtis.* This is to intimate to the reader, that a good cauſe does not need a bad defence. Now, if we are to form a judgment of the cauſe he has undertaken to ſupport, from the means he makes uſe of, to ſupport it, we cannot ſuppoſe the cauſe he has taken in hand, is any other than a very bad one. I queſtion if the moſt carnal Jew, that ever ſat in the region of darkneſs, and ſhadow of death, could have given a more frigid, degrading account of an inſtitution of God than he has done. According to him, it was only a ſign of carnal deſcent—a mark of national diſtinction—a token of intereſt in temporal bleſſings—it had a political aſpect—it was performed with political views—and (not knowing very well what to do with it, he introduces a learned word, and ſays) it was adapted to an eccleſiaſtico-political conſtitution. Thus he. But one thing he forgot—he has not given all this the ſanction of the ſacred text. Indeed, if it agree to any thing in the Bible, it agrees beſt of all to the circumciſion of thoſe poor Shechemites, who were firſt deceived, and then deſtroyed by the ſons of Jacob. Gen. xxxiv.

Theſe two parts of the propoſition being evinced; namely, 1. The church membership of infants; and, 2. their admiſſion to it, by a religious rite; the whole propoſition which I undertake to maintain, and to lay as a ground-work, from which to conclude the baptiſm of infants, is this; God has conſtituted in his church the membership of infants, and has admitted them to it by a religious

rite. Before I pafs to the next argument, I will make a remark on each part.

I. From this fact, we learn fo much of the mind of God, as to be able to conclude, that there is nothing, in a ftate of Infancy, incompatible with church memberfhip. The reafon is evident; for had there been any thing unfuitable in fuch a practice, God, who is an infinitely wife judge of decency and fitnefs, would never have ordained it. This conduct of the infinitely wife God, and the practice of about two thoufand years, ftand in direct repugnancy to the weak prejudice of Baptifts; who from the fentiment they have adopted, are led to fuppofe that there is nothing in nature more ridiculous, than the idea of infants being church members. This is one inftance of human depravity; whereby the weaknefs of man fets itfelf up againft the wifdom of God: And as this is the more to be admired in thofe perfons, who in other refpects are defirous of fubmitting to the whole will of God; fo it ferves to fhow, what a very unhappy influence the admiffion of an erroneous fentiment may gain over the mind.

II. It appears from this part of the divine conduct, in plain oppofition to the views of Baptifts, that the ignorance, and want of faith, infeperable from a ftate of infancy, are no impediments to the adminiftration of a religious ordinance: And this truth fhould be the more regarded by us, as it ftands fupported by the high authority of God; and is as a thoufand arguments againft all thofe pleas which are drawn from the incapacity of infants. For while we fee thofe declared fit fubjects of a religious ordinance, who could know nothing

of its nature or uſe; with what prudence or piety can any man preſume to affirm, that infants are incapable of ſuch an ordinance? But if any one ſhould take ſo much authority on himſelf, as to arbitrate againſt the wiſdom of God, he would do well to conſider, that God is true, and every man a liar, *i. e.* that judges differently.

ARGUMENT II.

The church membership of infants was never ſet aſide by God or man; but continues in force, under the ſanction of God, to the preſent day.

The force of this and the preceding argument, taken together, may be comprehended by any man of common reaſoning powers. Every one knows, that what was once done, and never undone, muſt of courſe remain the ſame: And, that what was once granted, and never revoked, muſt needs continue as a grant. There can be no fallacy in all this.—Theſe arguments, therefore, being fairly maintained, will carry us forward to a dilemma; and that dilemma will bring us home to the concluſion.

In good theory, the proof of this argument ſhould not lie upon the Pædobaptiſt. For if I affirm, and prove, that God did ſettle a certain plan reſpecting church members, and another ſhould come and affirm that that plan was now altered; it ſhould lie on him to produce his proof that ſuch an alteration has taken place; and the reaſon is, that whatever God has eſtabliſhed ſhould be ſuppoſed to continue, though we could bring no

proof of its continuance, unleſs we are plainly told that he has ordered it otherwiſe. And then, ſince there is not a ſingle text in Scripture to prove that the church membership of infants is annulled, this argument ſhould remain in force without further proof.—However, I will wave this privilege, which I might juſtly claim, and proceed to evince the argument I have laid down.

There was only one point of time, in which it is even ſuppoſed the church membership of infants was ſet aſide; and that was, when the Gentiles were taken into a viſible church ſtate. In that period ſeveral inſtitutions did ceaſe, and ſome new ones were ordained. Our only queſtion is, whether the church membership of infants did ceaſe at the ſame time. It is evident that the mere change or ceſſation of inſtitutes could work no change upon membership, any more than a man's having his clothes changed can produce a change upon the man. All inſtitutes, whether typical or ratifying, that is, all inſtitutes of every kind, are to be conſidered, in reſpect to church members, as means of grace, and nouriſhments for faith, reſpecting Chriſt the mediator, and the unſearchable riches of Chriſt; and then a change taking place in theſe things, will, in itſelf, produce no more alteration, in the members of the church, than a change in a man's diet will deſtroy the identity of the man.

I am now to prove that the church membership of infants, which having been ordained of God, was never annulled, but carried forward into the Gentile church; and ſo conſequently is in force at the preſent time. And this I ſhall proceed to do,

From Scripture views of God's difpenfation towards the Gentiles.

Much light might be thrown upon this fubject, by confidering thofe prophecies of the Old Teftament which relate to the calling in of the Gentiles. This Dr. Williams has done to great advantage: But my defign being brevity, I fhall confine myfelf to paffages on that fubject in the New Teftament.

I. Matt. xxi. 43. "Therefore fay I unto you, the kingdom of God fhall be taken from you and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof."

The plain meaning of this paffage is, that as, in times paft, the Church of God, which is his kingdom, was limited to Judea; fo, in future, he would have a church in the Gentile world. The taking of the kingdom from the Jews, and giving it to the Gentiles, denotes,

1. The ceafing of a regular church ftate among the Jews. And this actually took place, by the deftruction of Rome, and the difperfion of others, who did not receive the Lord Jefus Chrift as fent of God; while thofe who did receive him, were at length removed from Judea, and by degrees loft the name of Jew, in that of Chriftian. Rom. xi. 12.

2. The fetting up a regular church ftate among the Gentiles. This, as the ceffation of the church among the Jews, was gradually brought about. For the Gentiles who came over to Chrift, joining themfelves to the Jewifh church, became in time the larger part. So that by the increafe of the Gentiles, and the breaking off of the worthlefs branches among the Jews, nothing remained but an entire Gentile church.

3. The fameneſs of the church ſtate among the Gentiles, with that among the Jews. For taking away and giving cannot import a change in the thing taken and given; but a tranſfer, the paſſing of a thing from one to the other. The kingdom given to the Gentiles was the ſame that was taken from the Jews: For all that was taken from the Jews was given to the Gentiles. Now, if we would know what was to be the church ſtate among the Gentiles, we have only to learn what it had been among the Jews: For in both caſes the church ſtate was the ſame. And then, as it has before been proved, and admitted by the Baptiſts, that the church ſtate among the Jews conſiſted in the membership of adults and infants, the church ſtate among the Gentiles muſt conſiſt of adults and infants too; Becauſe the ſame that was taken from the Jews was given to the Gentiles. And ſo it appears from God's diſpenſation to the Gentiles, that the church-membership of infants was not ſet aſide.—I will anticipate two objections in this place, which may be urged on each of the paſſages I ſhall alledge.

1. It may be ſaid, that in this way of viewing the ſubject, all the ordinances and rituals of the Jewiſh church muſt be adopted by the Gentile. To this I anſwer, that theſe things were not of the eſſence of a church ſtate; but only means of grace, and helps to faith for the time being. Neither were theſe taken and given, but annulled; they were not tranſferred, but aboliſhed. Rituals are to a church, as diet or ornaments are to a man; let the diet be changed, and the ornaments removed, the eſſence of the man will be ſtill the ſame. So the ſtate and eſſence of the church of

God, before theſe rituals were ordained, and while they were in force, and after their abolition, was, and is, and muſt be the ſame. This will be handled more fully in another place.

2. If any ſhould ſay, it does not appear that women in the Jewiſh church were admitted to an initiating rite; and if ſo, there is a difference between the preſent church and the Jewiſh; I obſerve in anſwer, that this difference does not imply a removing or changing of any thing; but merely that of adding. That whereas the church ſtate among the Jews included males both adult and infant; ſo to the Gentile church, together with theſe, there is, by the expreſs order of God, the ſuperadddition of females.

I would obſerve further, that the addition of females ſeems to me to be very favourable to the argument I am upon; becauſe it is a new proviſion annexed to an old law. Now an alteration made in a law, gives an additional *force* to all thoſe parts which are not altered. And the reaſon is, it ſuppoſes that all the unaltered parts are perfectly agreeable to the legiſlator's mind. And ſo, when the Lord expreſsly took away the partition between Jew and Gentile, and male and female; and paſſed over infants without making the leaſt alteration in their caſe; he thereby gave a ſuperadded confirmation, that the churchmembership of infants, which had been before eſtabliſhed, was in every reſpect agreeable to his will.

II. Rom. xi. 22, 23. "And they alſo, if they abide not ſtill in unbelief, ſhall be grafted in again: For God is able to graft them in again. For if thou wert cut out of the olive tree, which is wild by nature, and wert grafted contrary to nature

into a good olive-tree; how much more shall these which be the natural branches, be grafted into their own olive-tree?"

1. The olive-tree is to denote a visible church state. 2. The Jews are said to be natural branches, because they descended from Abraham, to whom the promise was made, "I will be a God unto thee and to thy seed." 3. The Gentiles were brought into the same church state, from which the Jews were broken off. 4. The Apostle suggesteth, that the Jews will again be grafted into their own olive-tree. From whence, with a view to my purpose, I would notice,

1. The future state of the Jews, who, he says, if they abide not in unbelief, shall be grafted in again. Grafting in again is the bringing of a person or thing into the same condition in which it was before. So the grafting in again of the Jews, is putting them into the same church state, in which they were before they were broken off. What was their church state before they were broken off? I answer, as before proved, that it consisted of the membership of adults and infants. Why then, if it before consisted of adults and infants, it will again consist of the same: because grafting in again is the placing of persons so grafted, in their former state. And that is in fact the same state, in which they would have continued, if they had never been broken off. That is, if it had not been for their unbelief (for which they were cut off), they would have continued, both they and their infants, as members of the church of God. So when it shall please God to give them faith, they will be reinstated, *i. e.* they and their infants will be members of the church of God again.

In compliance with this idea, I will just turn aside to obſerve, that, it is natural for one error to lead on to another; and that this is not more evident in any, than it is in the Baptiſts. They grant that infants were members of the Jewiſh church; and this from them is a very conſiderable conceſſion. But a conceſſion like this, leads to a conſequence horribly alarming to their ſyſtem. For if infants were once members of the church of God; then, it is evident, they were capable of ſuch membership; and then the queſtion will be, when did they ceaſe to be members? and why are they not ſo now?

To remove this difficulty, the Baptiſts have recourſe to this expedient. For as they cannot ſhow from any place of Scripture, that infants are expreſsly ſet aſide from church-membership; they fall to degrading the Jewiſh church, its membership and inſtitutions: And when they have done, there is hardly any church or inſtitution left. What was the Jewiſh church? Mr. Booth, vol. ii. 252. "It was an eccleſiaſtico-political conſtitution." What was the membership of it? Mr. B. page 251. "An obedient ſubject of their civil government, and a complete member of their church ſtate, were the ſame thing." What was the church inſtitute? Mr. B. page 250, &c. "It was a ſign of carnal deſcent, a mark of national diſtinction, it had a political aſpect, and was performed with political views." I wiſh I had a good caſuiſt at my elbow, to explain what kind of church this could be. For had I been Mr. B. I would, to ſave trouble, have fairly denied that it was any church at all. And to ſay the truth of him, he has fairly done all this.

Now, it is a deſperate cauſe, that leads a man to fall upon the very church of God. But this is done

to show that there is so great a difference between the church that now is, and that which once was (or rather never was), that though infants were members of the one, they have no right, no capacity, to be members of the other.

This is one shift to ward off the consequence I have mentioned. But now we want another shift, to escape the consequence that is yet to come. "And they, if they abide not still in unbelief, shall be grafted in again." Grafting in again is the bringing of persons or things into their former condition. Now, if the former Jewish church state was all political, as Mr. B. will have it; then the consequent will be, that when the Jews shall confess the Lord Jesus Christ, and believe with their heart, that God raised him from the dead, &c. and shall in consequence be reingrafted into their own olive-tree; they will be all political again! A mere ecclesiastico-political constitution! wherein an obedient subject of civil government, and a complete member of a church, will be the same thing!—Well, when this shall take place, infant church membership may come about again.

But I return from this digression to notice,

2. The present state of the Gentiles. It appears from the text that the church state is the same to the Gentiles, as it had been to the Jews, and as it will be to the Jews, in some future period, when it shall please God to graft them in again. And the reason of this is, because each in their turn belong to the same olive-tree, *i. e.* the visible church state. And therefore, as infants made a part of the church before the Jews were cut off, and will again make a part, when they shall be reingrafted; they must likewise make

a part among the Gentiles: Becaufe the fame olive-tree, *i. e.* church-ftate, muft confer the fame privilege on all who fhall be in it.

This truth will receive additional confirmation, and the contrary error will be more evident, if we conſider, that ſince infants were once members among the Jews; and when their reingrafting ſhall take place, will be ſo again; ſo, if among the Gentiles they are deemed improper ſubjects of membership, and, in conſequence of that, are univerſally rejected, two things will follow; 1. There will be, in the mean time, a very unhandſome ſchiſm in the eccleſiaſtical chain. For though infants were found members in the firſt ages of the church, and will be ſo in the laſt, there will be none to fill up the middle. And, 2. there will alſo be, in future time, a very unpleaſant diſcordancy. For when the Jews ſhall be grafted in again, they will adopt their old practice of receiving infants to membership; while the Gentiles denying they have any ſuch right, will perſiſt in ſhutting them out; and all this, as ſome ſuppoſe, in the ſpiritual reign of Chriſt.

III. Rom. xi. 17. "And if ſome of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive-tree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakeſt of the root and fatneſs of the olive-tree; boaſt not thyſelf againſt the branches."

1. The olive-tree, as before noted, is the viſible church ſtate. 2. The branches are members of the viſible church. 3. Some of theſe were broken off, and ſome remained. 4. The Gentiles who were called of God, were united to this remnant, for they were grafted in among them. From this view of the paſſage, I draw theſe three concluſions:

1. That there was no difcontinuance of the ancient church ftate; in its eflence, it remained the fame as it had always been. That this is a true conclufion appears from hence; the text informs us that fome of the branches were broken off; and if only fome, then not all; and that remnant, continuing in their former ftate, conftituted the ftill exifting church of God. And then it follows, that as the church ftate continued as before, the memberfhip of infants muft likewife continue: Becaufe the memberfhip of infants was a part of that church ftate. And this is the reafon, that no new regulation, refpecting infants, was made, or was neceffary to be made; for all, who knew what God had ordained refpecting memberfhip, knew very well what to do with their infants, without any further information on that fubject. This is the firft conclufion, viz. that the ancient church ftate was not diffolved when the Gentiles were called in.—And hence it follows,

2. That the bringing in of the Gentiles did not conftitute a new church. This paffage informs us, that when the Gentiles were called in, they became members of the church already conftituted; "They were grafted in among them," and fo became one body, one fold; that "with them they might partake of the root and fatnefs of the olive-tree." The firft Gentiles of whofe calling we read, are faid to have been added to the church; but there was no church exifting to which they could be added, but the ancient Jewifh church, of which all the apoftles and difciples of our Lord were members. If the Gentiles, therefore, were added to the old church, or, as the text has it, were grafted in among them, and with them did partake

of the root and fatneſs of the olive-tree; then it is evident, that the ancient church continued to exiſt, and no new one was formed at the calling in of the Gentiles. And then I conclude,

3. That infants were in a ſtate of membership, in that very church to which the Gentiles were joined. And this muſt certainly be true; becauſe they were grafted into that church, of which infants are, by the Baptiſts themſelves, granted to have been members. And then, it is plain that infants made a part of that church, called by ſome the Goſpel church, the pure church of primitive apoſtolic times. This concluſion muſt needs be admitted, unleſs any one will affirm, that the ancient church ſtate was entirely diſſolved; or elſe, that the Gentiles were not united to this ancient church. And to affirm either of theſe, will be to affirm againſt the word of God in general, and this text in particular. And herein the cauſe of the Baptiſts is ruined both ways; for if they maintain, that the old church was diſſolved, and the Gentiles formed into a new one, their cauſe is ruined, by maintaining againſt the word of God. But if they grant that the Jewiſh church continued, and that the Gentiles were grafted in among them, which is the real truth; then their cauſe is ruined that way. For then, as infants were in church fellowſhip, in what is called the primitive apoſtolic church, it follows, that thoſe ſocieties, who admit infants to fellowſhip, act agreeable to the apoſtolic pattern; and conſequently all thoſe ſocieties, who refuſe to admit them, are in an error.

IV. Eph. ii. 14. "For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us."

1. The terms [both and us] in this place, mean Jews and Gentiles. 2. A partition is that which separates one society or family from another. 3. It is said to have been broken down, by Jesus Christ, who is called our peace, because he made peace, by the blood of his cross. 4. The breaking down of a partition-wall, brings the two societies, or families, into one.—From this passage, the very same conclusions must be drawn, as from the preceding:

1. That the Jewish church continued as before, and was not dissolved at the calling in of the Gentiles; and the reason is, the taking down of a partition implies no dissolution of any society.

2. That the Gentiles were not formed into a new church: Because the breaking down of a partition united them to the Jewish church, and "made both one."

3. The infants were in actual membership, in that church to which the Gentiles were united: Because adults and infants being in fellowship among the Jews, the removal of the partition brought adults and infants into union with the Gentiles.—And then, the point is clearly gained, namely, that infants hold the same place among the Gentiles as they held before among the Jews.

I again affirm, that the point is evidently carried, unless one of these three things can be maintained: 1. That God excluded infants before the partition was taken down; or, 2. at the time it was taken down; or, 3. at some time after. For if one or other of these cannot be supported, then infants retain their right to church membership to this day.—Can any one maintain the first; that God excluded infants before the partition-wall was

broken down?—Upon what period will he fix?—And by what ſcripture will he ſupport it?—Will any one affirm the third; that God excluded them after the partition was taken down?—I ſuppoſe not. For that would be granting that the Gentiles continued ſome time, *i. e.* till the excluſion took place in fellowſhip, in that church in which infants were members. And then, I might aſk again, in what time did the expulſion take place? And where is it recorded in the word of God?—But I ſuppoſe, that he who contends for ſuch an excluſion, will affirm the ſecond; that infants were excluded at the time the partition-wall was broken down. If ſo, I aſk, who did exclude them? And how was it done? It could not be done by the mere taking down of the partition-wall; for the taking down the partition unites thoſe who before were ſeparate, but does not exclude any.

But if they were excluded, it muſt be done either expreſsly or implicitly. The firſt is not true; for there is no expreſs excluſion of infants in all the Scriptures. And the ſecond will not do for a Baptiſt; for, as he will not admit implicit proof on the ſide of infants, ſo neither can he urge implicit proof againſt them.—But let him take the advantage of implication; and ſay, that infants are excluded from church membership, by all thoſe places which require faith and repentance, &c. in order to baptiſm. To this I reply, that theſe places of Scripture can no more exclude infants from membership, than they exclude them from glory. And the fallacy of all this has been already fully evinced, when the ſecond argument againſt infant baptiſm was conſidered: And to that part, for his ſatisfaction, I refer the reader.—If then

they were not excluded before the partition was taken down, nor at the time, nor at any time since, they were not excluded at all. And then the consequence will be, that infants, according to the will of God, are possessed of a right to church-fellowship under the present dispensation, and to the present day.

By these four passages, all relating to God's dispensation towards the Gentiles, it appears, that the church-membership of infants was left undisturbed, and was carried forward into the Gentile church; where it continues still the same as when first instituted. And the importance of this fact, in the present inquiry, is so very considerable, that whoever admits it, must be compelled to admit the right of infants to baptism, as a necessary consequence. Now, that God did ordain their church-membership has already been evinced, and granted by Baptists; and that to the present day, it has never been annulled, is what I am engaged to prove. I will, therefore, in addition to these four Scriptures, which of themselves clearly prove the fact, bring forward a variety of evidence, which serve to corroborate this important truth.

1. There is in the New Testament no law whatever to set aside the primitive right of infants to church-membership.

If a law could be found, in the New Testament, to repeal that which had been established in the Old, I grant freely, that all that has been said on the four places of Scripture, would signify nothing. But if no such law exist, the reasoning on the preceding passages will not only remain untouched, but will acquire a livelier force from that very

fact.—I need not prove to a Baptiſt, that the New Teſtament contains no law by which infant membership is prohibited; he readily grants it; but adds in reply, that there was no neceſſity that ſuch a law ſhould be framed. Let us examine the thought.

If indeed nothing had been done reſpecting infants, this anſwer would have been a good one; but when the church-membership of infants is conſidered as an ancient eſtabliſhment, the anſwer is nothing to the purpoſe. For as the caſe in reality ſtood, the want of a law to ſet aſide infant membership, left it in its original ſtate, to continue down to the end of time. And how could it be otherwiſe? For who in this world was to alter it? It came down to Gentile times, in all the force an eſtabliſhment can be ſuppoſed to have, or need to have, in order to its continuance. It had the precept of God—It had the partiality of parents—It had the practice of near two thouſand years. If ſuch an inſtitution as this needed no law to ſet it aſide, which is what the Baptiſts affirm; the true reaſon muſt be, becauſe it was not the deſign of God it ſhould be ſet aſide. And what could have been a greater proof of the deſign of God to perpetuate it, than taking no meaſures to ſtop its progreſs? So that he, who grants that no ſuch law was made, does in effect admit, that it is now a ſtanding ordinance in the church of God to receive infants to membership. And then he muſt grant too, that they ſhould be baptized; becauſe there is no other way of receiving them.

But though a Baptiſt admits there is no expreſs law againſt their membership and baptiſm; yet he affirms that the requirement of faith and repentance

does of itself exclude infants. This is the purport of the Baptists' second argument against infants, which I have proved to be a mere sophism. For when faith and repentance are required, in order either to baptism or salvation; a very easy distinction will make it plain, that infants are not excluded in either case. And this distinction is easy and obvious to every person.

1. It was a very easy one to a Jew. For while he knew that infants were received into the church by circumcision, he likewise knew that every adult who was circumcised, put himself under immediate obligation to confess his sins, to bring his sacrifice, and to conform to all the laws of that church. He was very sensible an infant could not do this; and yet he saw it right to circumcise the infant. So when he heard of faith, and repentance, and confession of sin, respecting baptism, as a medium of entering into the church; he had nothing to do, but to use the same distinction, and all would be plain and easy as before.

2. The distinction is easy to a Pædobaptist. For he knows, that if the person be an adult, he must discover a disposition suited to the nature and design of the ordinance; but he knows, at the same time, that this was never designed to affect an infant, and that it can be no bar to his baptism, or blessedness.

3. This distinction is easy to a Baptist. For notwithstanding he is well persuaded, that he who believeth not shall not be saved; yet he knows an infant may be saved, though an infant do not believe. All this to him is easy and natural, and nothing in the world more plain. If this be so easy a distinction, it may be asked, why cannot a

Baptiſt carry it to baptiſm as well as to any thing elſe? I anſwer, he can if he pleaſe; for it ariſes from no defect of underſtanding that he does not do it;—but it is an unpleaſant thing to employ a diſtinction, ſo as to deſtroy one's own ſentiments.

In ſhort, it is only conſidering, that an infant is not an adult, and that an adult is not an infant, than which nothing can be more eaſy; and then the requirement of faith and repentance is no more a law againſt the memberſhip and baptiſm of infants, than it is againſt their ſalvation.—All I meant here was to affirm that there is no law, in the New Teſtament, to over-rule the church-memberſhip of infants; and this is a corroborating evidence, that their memberſhip, which had been divinely inſtituted, continues the ſame down to the preſent time.

2. The Jews, at large, had no apprehenſion of the excluſion of infants; they neither oppoſe nor approve, which they doubtleſs would have done, if ſuch an excluſion had taken place.

This is a circumſtance which merits particular attention, and has no ſmall influence upon the preſent queſtion. For as every material alteration in old cuſtoms is apt to ſtir up ſome oppoſition; ſo, had ſuch a change as this been introduced, by which the infant offspring would have been put back from their former place in the church of God, it muſt have furniſhed occaſion to a variety of animadverſions: Some, perhaps, might have been for it, while many would have oppoſed the new plan. That this would have happened had ſuch a revolution taken place, will appear ſtill more certain, if we conſider the nature of ſuch a change,

and the perfons who would have felt themfelves hurt by its introduction.

1. As to the change itfelf, it had a tendency to affect in a very fenfible part. And this is a clear cafe, whether we conſider—the tender age of the fubjects—or their number—or the privilege to which they were admitted—or the length of time through which the practice had been carried—or laſtly, the divine authority which gave rife to that practice. Here is a practice of two thoufand years ſtanding.—The privilege was that of admitting infants to membership in the church of God—theſe infants formed a number in Iſrael exceedingly great.—And this practice did not take its rife from ſome dark verbal or written tradition; but ſtood ſupported by the lively oracles of God. Such was the cuſtom which the Baptiſts ſuppoſe was annulled about this time.

2. On the other hand, if we take into conſideration the character of thoſe perſons among whom this cuſtom had prevailed, and among whom it is ſuppoſed to have ceaſed, we ſhall have ſufficient reaſon to think it impoſſible that a cuſtom of this nature ſhould be abrogated, and they not oppoſe a ſingle word. As to their character, it is certain, that, a few only excepted, they were upon the whole the deadly enemies of Chriſt and his doctrine. They were ſtrongly attached to the forms and ceremonies of religion. They would wrangle for a rite, quarrel for a faſt, and almoſt fight for a new moon. Every one knows what diſturbance they made in the church of God, about ſuch things as theſe.

Now is it poſſible, that ſuch a change could be brought about, and among ſuch a people, in a

manner so still and silent, that in all the New Testament we do not read, that they ever said a word about it, for or against? No priest nor publican; no pharisee, lawyer, or libertine; neither pious nor profane; neither zealous, moderate, or lukewarm, in all the land of Israel, oppose a single sentence, or ask a reason why. But since this must have been a change so remarkable; and they, among whom it is supposed to have happened, not the most modest; how came they to be so silent, so shy? What made them so passive, so peaceable, so complying? Nothing.—They were neither complying, passive, nor peaceable, nor slow to speak, nor slow to wrath, when any old forms were invaded; but they were very much so about the change in question: And the true reason of it is, it never took place.—There is another evidence, that the church-membership of infants was never annulled by God or man; and that is this:

3. Our Lord and his Apostles take special notice of infants, and, instead of excluding them, they speak of them as still possessing a right to membership in the church of God.

The notice taken of infants, by our Lord and his apostles, I call special; because it is not such as God takes of his creatures in a way of common providence; as the giving of food to a stranger, the satisfying the desire of every living thing, or hearing the cry of a young raven when he calls upon him. Such notice as this God takes of all his creatures. But that which I now mean relates to matters of another nature, religious matters, the things of the kingdom of God, and our Lord Jesus Christ. The passages I shall bring are not intended to prove any new institution respect-

ing infants, for nothing of this kind took place; but as their church-membership had been long settled, I only mean to show that our Lord speaks of them, under that idea, as the acknowledged members of the church of God. And hereby I mean to evince, that their membership, which had been long established, was never annulled to the present day. To this end I allege,

I. Luke, ix. 47, 48. "And Jesus took a child, and set him by him, and ["when he had taken him in his arms," Mark, ix. 36.] he said unto them, Whosoever shall receive this child, in my name, receiveth me: And whosoever shall receive me, receiveth him that sent me: For he that is least among you all, the same shall be great." In this passage we have three things very observable:

1. The subject spoken of, a little child. There can be no doubt, but this was a child in regard of his age; as the circumstance of our Lord's taking him in his arms, makes this certain beyond dispute. And it is also evident, that what our Lord said did not apply to this child alone, as though something peculiar to himself led our Lord so to speak; since he makes it a thing general and common to other children. The words of Mark are, "Whosoever shall receive one of such children in my name." He meant, therefore, that child in his arms, and other little children like him.

2. The action respecting this child. "Whosoever shall receive this child in my name." To receive a person is to treat him suitably to his character, place, and station. John i. 11. "He came unto his own, and his own received him not." Rom. xiv. 1. "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye." To receive a person in the

name of Chriſt, is to treat him as one belonging to Chriſt, as one in viſible union with him, as a member of that church, of which he is the head. Matt. x. 40. "He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that ſent me." This is ſpoken of the apoſtles of Chriſt, and intends a treatment ſuitable to their character, and the relation they ſtood in to him. So John, xiii. 20. Then the meaning is, whoſoever ſhall receive this child, or one of ſuch children, in my name, *i. e.* as perſons belonging to me, and in viſible union with myſelf, receiveth me, *i. e.* treateth me as the viſible head of the church of Chriſt.

Whoſoever ſhall receive this child or one of ſuch children, in my name! Remarkable phraſe! I have pondered it in my own mind, and wiſh to ſubmit it to any caſuiſt, with this queſtion: Is it poſſible to receive a perſon in the name of Chriſt, without conſidering that perſon as viſibly belonging to Chriſt? I own, that to me it appears impoſſible. But as Chriſt knows beſt what his own words imply, he ſhall determine the queſtion. Mark, ix. 41. "Whoſoever ſhall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, becauſe ye belong to Chriſt." So to give to any in his name, is to give to them, becauſe they belong to Chriſt. And then, when Chriſt ſpeaks of receiving little children in his name, we are to conſider little children as viſibly belonging to him. And if they viſibly belong to him, who is head of the church, it is becauſe they viſibly belong to that church, of which he is head.

3. The reaſon of this action. This reaſon is two-fold: 1. As it reſpected God and Chriſt; "Whoſoever ſhall receive this child in my name,

receiveth me; and whosoever receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me." The force of the reason lies in this; receiving little children in Christ's name, *i. e.* treating them as visibly belonging to him, is showing a proper regard to God and Christ. But why should this be considered as showing a proper regard to God? I answer, I know no reason in the world but one: and that is, because God had long before constituted infants visible members of his own church, and still continued to them the same place and privilege. 2. As it respected themselves. "He that is least among you all, the same shall be great." This reason suggesteth three things: 1. Our Lord speaks of his disciples, in a collective capacity, as forming a religious society or church; "He that is least among you all." And this, indeed, was truly the case; for these disciples, with others, were branches in the olive-tree; and such branches as were not broken off. 2. Our Lord speaks of them, as having little children in their society or church; "He that is least among you all, the same shall be great." Now, though it is true, that adults on some accounts may be called little children, yet the term [least] cannot mean adults in this place; because this is given as a reason why they should receive this little child. For what God will do for an adult can be no motive to the receiving an infant. If we say, God can make that adult, which you deem very little, to become great; therefore receive this little child: This would be no reason at all. But if it be taken thus; God can make the least child in your community to become great, therefore receive this little child; the reasoning will be good, and becoming the

wifdom of Chrift. And this is no more than a plain fact; children were at this time the acknowledged members of the church of God. 3. Our Lord fpeaks thus, to induce them to pay a proper regard to children. "The leaft among you fhall become great, therefore receive this child in my name." Receiving may refpect the firft act of recognizing a perfon a member of a church; or all fubfequent acts, by which we treat them as fuch. Our Lord's expreffion is applicable to both, and enjoins both on his difciples.—This is one inftance of fpecial notice taken of infants, in which they are confidered as holding a place in the church of God.

Mark, x. 14. "But when Jefus faw it, he was much difpleafed, and faid unto them, Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: For of fuch is the kingdom of God."

The perfons who were brought, are faid by Mark to have been young children; our Lord calls them little children, and Luke calls them infants. There can be no doubt but they were fuch as were in an infantile ftate. The defign, for which they were brought, is faid to be, that he fhould put his hands on them, and pray. Some of the Baptifts *fuppofe* they were difeafed children, and were brought to our Lord to be healed; but of this there is nothing faid. It is moft likely they were brought to receive the benediction of Chrift. Mark, x. 16.

That this paffage regards infants, as continuing in a ftate of church-membership, which is all I produce it for, will appear by confidering of whom our Lord fpake, and what he fpake of them.

1. Of whom he fpake. There can be very little difficulty on this part of the fubject, as we are plainly

told, what the perſons were who were brought to him, and of whom it is evident he ſpake. Some of the Baptiſts remarking upon the phraſe *tōn toioutōn* of ſuch, or of ſuch like, affirm that our Lord meant adults of a child-like diſpoſition, and that of theſe, and not of the infants, he ſaid, Of ſuch is the kingdom of God. This conſtruction, which indeed has nothing to ſupport it, will appear very uncouth, when we conſider theſe words of our Lord, as a reaſon for bringing and permitting the little children to come to him: Suffer them to come unto me, for of ſuch is the kingdom of God. But this expoſition, beſides that it makes our Lord ſpeak obſcurely, repreſents him as giving a reaſon quite diſtant from the ſubject he was upon. For whereas a reaſon for coming ſhould be taken from thoſe who are to come, and not from others; this expoſition makes our Lord ſay, Suffer *theſe* to come, becauſe *thoſe* belong to the kingdom. To ſay, adults belong to the kingdom of God, is no good reaſon for bringing infants to Chriſt. It is a much better one to ſay, ſuffer theſe little children to come, becauſe theſe little children, and others like them, belong to the kingom of God. But if it be ſaid, others belong to the kingdom of God, becauſe they are like infants, then infants muſt belong to the kingdom of God becauſe they are like them. The truth is, our Lord evidently ſpeaks of infants as he had done before, in the preceding paſſage.

2. What he ſpake of them: Of ſuch is the kingdom of God; that is, ſuch belong to the kingdom. Our inquiry is, what kingdom did our Lord mean? was it the church, or a ſtate of glory? If the Lord meant the church, then he has aſſerted

what I contend for, that infants were ſpoken of by him, as members of the church; and, therefore, the fact is eſtabliſhed. But the Baptiſts in general underſtand this of a ſtate of glory, and allow infants to belong to that, but deny that they belong to the church. This, indeed, is granting the greater, and denying the leſs; and therefore an argument may be taken, from what they grant, to deſtroy what they deny; that is, an argument *á majore ad minus*. If infants belong to a ſtate of glory, which is the greater; then much more do they belong to a church-ſtate, which is the leſs. Beſides, as the inſtitution of a church is a diſpenſation of God, which leads to glory; it is abſurd to grant perſons a place in glory, and at the ſame time deny them a place in that diſpenſation which leads to it.

Though to affirm, that our Lord, by the kingdom of God, intended a ſtate of glory, does not militate againſt, but rather concludes for the church-memberſhip of infants; there are ſome conſiderations which ſerve to evince, that our Lord intended the church on earth chiefly, if not only; for I have ſome doubt whether he did not intend both, though the church more particularly. It is to be obſerved, in the firſt place, that theſe words, "of ſuch is the kingdom of God," were ſpoken to the apoſtles, as a reaſon for their ſuffering, and a rebuke for their hindering, little children to come unto him. Now it is always more natural, when we intend to reaſon with, or rebuke any perſon, to fix upon that as a reaſon, which is moſt familiar to him. The apoſtles were well acquainted with the memberſhip of infants in the church, as a practice which had prevailed in their nation for

many centuries; whereas they could know but little of the ſtate of infants with reſpect to glory. Now as the reaſon, why theſe little children ſhould be ſuffered to come, was, that they belonged to the kingdom of God; and as this was deſigned, at the ſame time, as a rebuke; it muſt be evident, that our Lord intended that idea of the kingdom with which they were moſt familiar. For had it been meant of a ſtate of glory, the apoſtles might very well have pleaded ignorance; but they could not be ignorant that infants belonged to the church, and therefore the reproof could not come home to them, but under that idea. For in that, they acted contrary to a principle they knew in keeping thoſe, who belonged to the church, from the church's Head.

It may further be remarked, that it is highly reaſonable to conclude, that our Lord intended the ſame reaſon, for infants coming to him, as he had urged to others, for their receiving them. Others were to receive infants in his name; and with this to enforce it, that whoſoever received them in his name, received him, &c. This expreſſion denotes a relation to himſelf, as if he had ſaid, Receive them, becauſe they belong to me, receive them as you would a diſciple. This is a reaſon that has reſpect to preſent relation; and if it be natural to ſuppoſe, that our Lord gives a ſimilar reaſon for their coming to him, the kingdom of God will not mean a future ſtate of bleſſedneſs, but a preſent church ſtate, to which they belong. Moreover, it may be ſaid with much more truth of infants in general; and it is of ſuch our Lord ſpeaks, that they belong to a church on earth, than to a ſtate of glory: Becauſe many may belong to the

former who do not belong to the latter. And whereas it cannot be ſaid of infants, as ſuch, that they belong to a ſtate of glory, for then all would be ſaved, becauſe all have been infants: but it could be ſaid of infants, as infants, where our Lord was, that they belonged to the church on earth.

I only introduce this to ſhow, that our Lord, in ſaying, Of ſuch is the kingdom of God, did recognize infants as church-members. And againſt this ſenſe of the kingdom, as meaning the church, the Baptiſts bring only one objection, *viz.* the incapacity of infants. But this is removed by the practice of many centuries; which ſhows that God does not judge of incapacity, after the manner of men. What our Lord ſaid, as it proves the memberſhip of infants, which is all I brought it for, ſo it is no more than what was familiar to the whole nation.

Acts, ii. 38, 39. "Then Peter ſaid unto them, Repent and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jeſus Chriſt, for the remiſſion of ſins, and ye ſhall receive the gift of the Holy Ghoſt. For the promiſe is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God ſhall call."

As this paſſage is only brought forward to ſhow, that infants are ſpoken of in the New Teſtament, as church-members, agreeable to the ancient diſpenſation of God; I ſhall confine myſelf to theſe three concluſions.

I. That the phraſe, "to you, and to your children," intends adults and infants.

II. That this promiſe muſt comprehend adults and infants, wherever it comes, even as long as God ſhall continue his word to us.

III. That infants are placed in the ſame rela-

tion to baptiſm, as they were of old to circumciſion.

Theſe I ſhall now proceed to evince; and in the firſt place I affirm,

I. That the phraſe, To you and to your children, intends adults and infants. This may be proved by conſidering,

1. The reſemblance between this promiſe, and that in Gen. xvii. 7. "To be a God unto thee, and unto thy ſeed after thee." The reſemblance between theſe two lies in two things; 1. Each ſtands connected with an ordinance, by which perſons were to be admitted into church-fellowſhip; the one by circumciſion, the other by baptiſm.

Both agree in phraſeology; the one is, "to thee, and to thy ſeed;" the other is, "to you, and to your children." Now every one knows that the word ſeed means children; and that children means ſeed; and that they are preciſely the ſame. From theſe two ſtrongly reſembling features, *viz.* their connexion with a ſimilar ordinance, and the ſameneſs of the phraſeology, I infer, that the ſubjects expreſſed in each, are the very ſame. And as it is certain that parents and infants were intended by the one; it muſt be equally certain that both are intended by the other.

2. The ſenſe, in which the ſpeaker muſt have underſtood the ſentence in queſtion. The promiſe is, to you and to your children.

In order to know this, we muſt conſider who the ſpeaker was, and from what ſource he received his religious knowledge. The Apoſtle, it is evident, was a Jew, and brought up in the Jewiſh church. He knew the practice of that church, with reſpect

to thoſe who were admitted to be its members. He knew, that he himſelf had been admitted in infancy, and that it was the ordinary practice of the church to admit infants to membership. And he likewiſe knew, that in this they acted on the authority of that place, where God promiſes to Abraham, "to be a God unto him, and to his ſeed." Now if the Apoſtle knew all this; in what ſenſe could he underſtand the term children, as diſtinguiſhed from their parents? I have ſaid, that *tekna* children, and *ſperma* ſeed, mean the ſame thing. And as the Apoſtle well knew, that the term ſeed intended infants, though not mere infants only; and that infants were circumciſed, and received into the church, as being the ſeed; what elſe could he underſtand, by the term children, when mentioned with their parents? Thoſe who will have the Apoſtle to mean, by the term children, adult poſterity only, have this infelicity attending them, that they underſtand the term differently from all other men; and this abſurdity, that they attribute to the Apoſtle a ſenſe of the word, which to him muſt have been the moſt unfamiliar and forced. And, therefore, that ſenſe of the word for which they contend, is the moſt unlikely of all to be the true one, becauſe it is utterly improbable that a perſon ſhould uſe a word in that ſenſe which to him, and to all the world beſide, was altogether unfamiliar.

3. In what ſenſe his hearers muſt have underſtood him, when he ſaid, "The promiſe is to you, and to your children."

The context informs us, that many of St. Peter's hearers, as he himſelf was, were Jews. They had been accuſtomed for many hundred years to receive infants, by circumciſion, into the church; and this

they did, as before obſerved, becauſe God had promiſed to be a God to Abraham, and to his ſeed. They had underſtood this promiſe, to mean parents and their infant offspring; and this idea was become familiar by the practice of many centuries. What then muſt have been their views, when one of their own community ſays to them, "The promiſe is to you, and to your children?" If their practice of receiving infants was founded on a promiſe exactly ſimilar, as it certainly was; how could they poſſibly underſtand him, but as meaning the ſame thing, ſince he himſelf uſed the ſame mode of ſpeech? This muſt have been the caſe, unleſs we admit this abſurdity, that they underſtood him in a ſenſe to which they had never been accuſtomed.

How idle a thing it is, in a Baptiſt, to come with a lexicon in his hand, and a criticiſm in his head, to inform us that *tekna*, children, means poſterity! Certainly it does, and ſo means the youngeſt infants. The verb *tikto*, from which it comes, ſignifies, to bring forth, *i.e.* the offspring. And are not infants of that number? But the Baptiſts will have it that *tekna*, children, in this place, means only adult poſterity. And, if ſo, the Jews to whom he ſpoke, unleſs they underſtood him in a way in which it was morally impoſſible they ſhould, would infallibly have underſtood him wrong. Certainly all men, when acting freely, will underſtand words in that way which is moſt familiar to them; and nothing could be more familiar to the Jews, than to underſtand ſuch a ſpeech, as Peter's, to mean adults and infants. So that if the Jews, the awakened Jews, had apprehended the Apoſtle to mean only adults, when he ſaid, "To you and your children;" they muſt have had an un-

derſtanding of ſuch a peculiar conſtruction, as to make that ſenſe of a word, which to them was totally unnatural and forced, to become familiar and eaſy.

We ſhould more certainly come at the truth, if, inſtead of idly criticiſing, we could fancy ourſelves Jews, and in the habit of circumciſing infants, and receiving them into the church. And then, could we imagine one of our own nation and religion, to addreſs us in the very language of Peter in this text, "The promiſe is to you and your children;" let us aſk ourſelves, as in the ſight of God, whether we could ever ſuppoſe him to mean adult poſterity only? Or if, inſtead of putting ourſelves in the ſituation of Jews, we ſhould ſuppoſe the Apoſtle to addreſs the members of the eſtabliſhment, in the ſame phraſeology, as he did the Jews, can any perſon doubt, whether they would underſtand him to mean adults and infants? It is certainly impoſſible. And why? Becauſe they have been for ages in the habit of receiving infants into the church. Juſt ſo it was with the Jews when the Apoſtle addreſſed them; and, therefore, they could no more have underſtood him, as meaning to exclude infants, than the members of the eſtabliſhment would by the uſe of the ſame phraſe.

I have been endeavouring to prove that both Peter, who ſpoke, and the Jews, who were his hearers, muſt have underſtood the promiſe in the text to mean adults and infants; becauſe ſuch a meaning would be to them the moſt natural and obvious, both from their own habit and practice, and from its exact reſemblance to that promiſe on which their practice was founded, and by which

their habit was formed. But ſince Mr. Booth and all the Baptiſts will have it to mean no ſuch thing, I ſhall only ſay, as Mr. B. does in his anſwer to Dr. Williams, page 274, "Then Dr. Samuel Johnſon might well ſay, though a man accuſtomed to ſatisfy himſelf with the obvious and natural meaning of a ſentence, does not eaſily ſhake off his habit, yet a true-bred lawyer never contents himſelf with this ſenſe when there is another to be found. My opponent, ſays Mr. B. to Dr. W. ſeems to have imbibed the ſpirit of Dr. Johnſon's true-bred lawyer; for he cannot be at all content with the obvious and natural meaning, &c." *Mutato nomine, &c.* This is true of Mr. Booth.——I am to prove in the next place,

II. That this promiſe muſt comprehend adults and infants wherever it comes, let it come wherever it may.

The Apoſtle, in applying this promiſe, diſtinguiſhes thoſe to whom it is to apply into preſent and abſent. The firſt claſs were his hearers; the ſecond he deſcribes two ways—all that are afar off, —as many as the Lord our God ſhall call. To each of theſe claſſes, *viz.* thoſe who were preſent, and thoſe who were abſent, he applies the promiſe in the text. To thoſe who were preſent, the promiſe is, to you and to your children;—to thoſe afar off, and the promiſe is to you and to your children;—to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call, the promiſe is to you and to your children. Let the promiſe come to what perſons ſoever it may, it muſt come to them and to their children; becauſe the promiſe muſt be the ſame wherever God ſhall ſend it. I have already proved that the words [you and children] mean

adults and infants; and both being in the promiſe, it muſt therefore belong to each: To you adults and to your infants, who are preſent; to you adults, who are afar off, and to your infants; to as many adults as the Lord our God ſhall call, and their infants. That this is true may be proved by conſidering the eſſence or nature of the promiſe.

There are two things which enter into the eſſence of a promiſe: it muſt contain ſome good—it muſt be made to ſome perſon or perſons. That theſe two belong to the eſſence of a promiſe appears by this, that if either be taken away, there can be no promiſe—*e. g.* I will be a God to thee and to thy ſeed; the good in this promiſe is God himſelf—the perſons were Abraham and his ſeed. If the good be taken away, it will then be no promiſe; I will—to thee and to thy ſeed. The caſe will be the ſame if the perſons are taken away; I will be a God—in either caſe it is no promiſe. So when a promiſe is made to different perſons, one perſon is as eſſential to the promiſe as the other—*e. g.* I will be a God unto thee and to thy ſeed; the promiſe is as much to the ſeed as to Abraham, and as much to Abraham as to the ſeed; becauſe both are eſſential to the promiſe.

Now the Apoſtle, expreſſing the eſſence or nature of the promiſe in the text, as it reſpects the objects, ſays, "The promiſe is to you and to your children." Both parts, therefore, belong to the promiſe; it is eſſential to the promiſe that it be—to you;—it is likewiſe eſſential to it that it be to your children. And the caſe being ſo, we cannot take away either part without violating the eſſence of the promiſe. We have no more

right to say, The promise is to you, but not to your children, than the promise is to your children, but not to you; for as it was the design of God that the promise should be to both, it was his design that it should be to their children as truly as to themselves. And so the promise must be to Peter's hearers and their children—to all that are afar off, and to their children—to as many as the Lord our God shall call, and to their children; and the reason is, both enter into the essence of the promise. So when God said, "I will be a God unto thee and to thy seed," it would apply, in the same form, "to thee and to thy seed," to every man and every generation of men of the offspring of Abraham, as long as the promise was in force.

Mr. Booth objects to this, in vol. ii. p. 255, and says, "These words [as many as the Lord our God shall call] are, as plainly as possible, a limiting clause, and extend a restrictive force to the term, children, as much as to the pronoun, you, or to that descriptive language, all that are afar off." To this I reply, that the Apostle himself did not make use of that limit which Mr. B. says is so plain; for the Apostle actually spoke to those who, in Mr. B.'s sense, were already awakened and called; and then, as plainly as possible, distinguishes between them and their children. Now if the Apostle addressed those who were already called, and extended the promise beyond them, even to their children, then the promise was not limited to the called. But this the Apostle actually did as plainly as words could express it; for he spoke to those who were pricked in their heart, and said, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?"

To theſe he ſaid, "The promiſe is unto you"—and, inſtead of confining it to them only, he extends it to their children alſo; and ſo paſſes over that limit which Mr. B. is pleaſed to lay down. And as the Apoſtle extends the promiſe beyond the called in the firſt clauſe, we muſt follow his example, and extend it beyond the called in the laſt clauſe—thus the promiſe is to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call, and to their children: And then Mr. B.'s limiting clauſe will be nothing more than a very lame evaſion.

Notwithſtanding this, there is ſome truth in Mr. B.'s idea reſpecting the limiting clauſe, though he himſelf, by miſapplication, has done violence to that truth. That clauſe, "to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call," is really a limiting clauſe, but not in that way Mr. B. ſuppoſes. This, like every other promiſe, has two limits, and theſe two are fixed by two limiting clauſes: One limit determines how wide the promiſe ſhall extend; the other how far it is to run—the one is a limit of latitude, the other of longitude. The limit of latitude extends to parents and children—that of longitude reaches down "to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call." And as there is a perfect harmony between theſe two, there is no need to deſtroy the one in order to preſerve the other; for both limits being ſettled and fixed, that of latitude, which extends to parents and children, muſt continue firm, till, through ſucceſſive ages, it comes down to that of longitude, which reaches to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call; that is, as long as God ſhall continue to call, the promiſe ſhall pertain to parents and children.

Mr. B. therefore, was very right in making

this a limiting clauſe, for ſo it really is; but he was very wrong when, inſtead of preſerving both, he ſet one limit to deſtroy the other. And as it often falls out that thoſe, who do violence to the ſpirit of a text, are led to utter ſome rath expreſſion againſt the letter of it, juſt ſo it has fallen out in Mr. B.'s caſe. He has violated one limit in the text, and has ſo expreſſed himſelf as to exceed all limits of truth. In vol. ii. p. 354, he has ſaid, "There is nothing ſaid about the promiſe reſpecting any beſides thoſe who were then awakened." Thoſe, who were awakened, are diſtinguiſhed by the pronoun "you;" and it is certain ſomething is ſaid about the promiſe reſpecting them. But, ſays Mr. B. "There is nothing ſaid about the promiſe reſpecting any beſides." Mr. B. ſhould not have ſaid this with the text before his eyes. He ſhould firſt have erated that clauſe of it, "and to your children," and not have let it ſtand to ſtare him in the face, and convict him of falſehood. As ſomething was ſaid about the promiſe reſpecting thoſe who were awakened, and their children both, he might as well have denied it reſpecting the awakened, as to deny it reſpecting their children: But it is often the fate of thoſe who oppoſe truth to loſe truth and modeſty together.

When any diſpute happens on a place of Scripture, and it cannot be ſettled from the context, the beſt way is to paſs to a ſimilar place, and obſerve (if there be any plain indications) in what manner that was underſtood, and what practice took place upon it. That paſſage, to which the text bears the ſtrongeſt reſemblance, is Geneſis, xvii. 7. "I will eſtabliſh my covenant—to be a

God unto thee and to thy ſeed." There is no place in Scripture ſo like the text as this; they are both worded in the ſame way—"to thee and to thy ſeed"—to you and to your children: They are both connected with a religious ordinance. By ſeed, which is the ſame as children, was meant an infant of eight days old and upwards; and becauſe a promiſe is made to the ſeed, an infant becomes the ſubject of a religious ordinance. Now, if the language of the text be ſimilar, and if it be connected with a religious ordinance as that was, what better comment can be made upon it than what that paſſage ſuggeſts? Why ſhould not the ideas be alike, if the language and circumſtances be ſo? The reaſon why a comparing of Scripture with Scripture aſſiſts the underſtanding, is this: When God uſes the ſame kind of language in two places of Scripture, and the circumſtances are alike, it is plain he means to be underſtood as intending ſimilar things. This is ſo ſure a rule of interpretation, that we are not afraid of venturing our everlaſting intereſts upon it. And, by adopting it in this inſtance, the reſult will be clearly this: That the Holy Ghoſt, by the phraſe, "you and your children," meant adults and infants; that theſe are placed together in the ſame promiſe; and that the promiſe, thus made to adults and infants, is connected with baptiſm.—And from hence it may be proved,

III. That infants are placed in the ſame relation to baptiſm, as they were of old to circumciſion.

Let any one compare the two places together, *viz.* Gen. xvii. 7, 9, 10. and this now before us, and he will ſee that parents and children are united, in each promiſe, in the ſame way—there

the promiſe is, "to thee and to thy ſeed"—here it is, "to you and to your children;"—that the promiſe, in each place, is connected with a religious ordinance: In Geneſis it is connected with circumciſion—in this text with baptiſm;—that, in both places, the ordinance is made to reſult from the promiſe—the one is ſet down as a reaſon for the other; Gen. xvii. 9. "Thou ſhalt keep my covenant therefore;" that is, becauſe God had given a promiſe. So here, "Repent, and let every one of you, of your's, be baptized, for (*gar*, becauſe) the promiſe is to you and to your children:" Infants, therefore, in this paſſage, are placed in the ſame relation to baptiſm as they were anciently to circumciſion. This being ſo, I reaſon thus:

When a poſitive inſtitute is connected with a promiſe, all, who are contained in the promiſe, have a right to the inſtitute. I think any one may be compelled to grant this, as it is certainly an undeniable truth; for if parents muſt, therefore, be circumciſed becauſe they are included in the promiſe, then, as infants are alſo included in the promiſe, they too muſt be circumciſed. All this is evinced by the hiſtory of circumciſion, and is indeed a ſelf-evident caſe; becauſe if a promiſe give a right to an inſtitute, the inſtitute muſt belong to all who are intereſted in the promiſe. And, therefore, we may reaſon thus: If parents muſt be baptized becauſe the promiſe belongs to them, then muſt their infants be baptized, becauſe the promiſe is to them alſo. This mode of reaſoning is the more certain, as it is confirmed, beyond all doubt, by the divine procedure; for if you aſk, Who were to be circumciſed? the reply

is, Thoſe to whom the promiſe was made. If you inquire again, To whom was the promiſe made? we anſwer, to adults and infants. Again, if you aſk, Who are to be baptized? the anſwer is, Thoſe to whom the promiſe is made. But to whom is it made? The Apoſtle ſays, "To you and to your children." Now what proof more direct can be made or deſired for infant baptiſm?

From theſe premiſes the reſult is plainly this: That as infants ſtand, in this text, in the ſame relation to baptiſm as they did to circumciſion, their right to the one muſt be the ſame as it was to the other. The caſe, in both inſtances, ſtands fairly thus: The promiſe connects itſelf with the ordinance; that with circumciſion—this with baptiſm. It alſo connects two parties together, infants and parents, and unites them both to that ordinance with which itſelf is connected. It is by virtue of the union of the promiſe with the ordinance that thoſe who have an intereſt in the one have a right to the other; and when two parties, parents and children, are intereſted in the ſame promiſe, and that promiſe gives a right to the ordinance, it gives the ſame right to both the parties who are intereſted in it. And hence, as parents and children are intereſted in the promiſe, the right of the children to the ordinance is the ſame as that of parents.

I produce theſe three paſſages only to ſhow that ſpecial notice is taken of infants, and that they are ſpoken of agreeable to the idea of their church-membership. In Luke, ix. 47, 48, our Lord propoſes them for reception in his name, and thereby owns them as viſibly related to himſelf. He indicates that the reception was to be

of the ſame kind as that which might be claimed by his own diſciples; and that receiving them, as viſibly related to himſelf, *i. e.* in his name, was ſhowing a proper reſpect to him, and to his Father who ſent him: "Whoſoever ſhall receive this child in my name, receiveth me; and whoſoever ſhall receive me, receiveth him that ſent me," &c. In Mark, x. 14, our Lord explicitly declares what was the ground of that reception, by expreſſing their viſible relation to the church, and to to himſelf;—"Of ſuch is the kingdom of God;" as ſuch they were to be brought to him, and no one was to forbid them to come. In Acts, ii. 38, 39, infants are placed in the ſame relation to baptiſm as they were before to circumciſion. The Apoſtle unites them with their parents in the promiſe, and connects that promiſe with baptiſm, thereby copying the divine pattern in Geneſis, xvii. and allotting them the ſame ſtation, with reſpect to baptiſm, as they had before with regard to circumciſion.

In each of theſe caſes infants are ſpoken of agreeable to that conſtitution of God, by which they were admitted to church-membership, and to a religious ordinance. And this being all that my argument requires, I ſhall proceed to notice one thing more, *viz.*

IV. The hiſtorical account of the baptiſm of houſeholds, as recorded in the Scripture.

The inſtances of this kind are three: The family of Lydia, Acts, xvi. 15; the family of the jailer, Acts, xvi. 33; and that of Stephanus, 1 Cor. i. 16. The caſe of the jailer and his family is thus deſcribed: "And he took them the ſame hour of the night, and waſhed their ſtripes, and

was baptized, he and all his, ſtraightway. And when he had brought them into his houſe, he ſet meat before them, and rejoiced, believing in God, with all his houſe, *eegalliaſato panoiki pepiſteukōs to Theeō*. He rejoiced domeſtically, believing in God; *i.e. he*, believing in God, rejoiced over his family. Now as the houſehold of the jailer is expreſſed by the phraſe, "all his, or all of his," it explains the term *Oikos*, houſehold, or family, which is uſed in the two other inſtances: So then, to baptize a man's houſehold is to baptize all his. This may ſerve as a pattern of primitive practice—he and all his were baptized. But whether all believed, or were capable of believing, is not ſaid, no mention being made of any one's faith but his own. And though I do not conſider this hiſtoric account as having force enough of itſelf to evince the baptiſm of infants, yet there are two conſiderations which give it weight on that ſide.

(1.) Its agreement with that practice, in which we are ſure infants were included; I mean the practice of Abraham, and the Jews, with reſpect to circumciſion. This agreement may be conſidered, 1. In the principle which led to the practice. Circumciſion was founded on this promiſe of God, "I will—be a God unto thee, and to thy ſeed." Baptiſm proceeds on this, that the promiſe is to you and to your children: And in this they are both alike. 2. In the practice itſelf. When Abraham received circumciſion, his houſehold were circumciſed with him: So the jailer, when he was baptized, all his were baptized likewiſe. Now, when we diſcern two caſes alike in principle and practice: and are ſure, that infants were included in the one; we then very naturally

are led to conclude, that infants muſt be intended in the other.

(2.) Its concordance with the hypotheſis of infant baptiſm. Such accounts as theſe, have a favourable aſpect on the ſentiments of Pædobaptiſts; becauſe on their plan, provided they were placed in the ſame circumſtances as the Apoſtles were, whoſe lot it was to preach the Goſpel where Chriſt had not been named; caſes of a like nature would very frequently occur. Whereas, on the plan of the Baptiſts, if placed in ſimilar circumſtances, though we might hear of various perſons baptized on a profeſſion of faith; we ſhould not expect to hear of the baptizing of houſeholds; or, that any man, and all his, were baptized ſtraightway. And indeed, the very idea of baptizing houſeholds, and of a man, and all his, being baptized at the ſame time, does ſo naturally fall in with the views of Pædobaptiſts, that I am inclined to think it paſſes with the common people, inſtead of a hundred arguments. For though they do not reaſon by mood and figure, neither do they confine themſelves to logical accuracy, in any form; yet they have logic enough to ſee, that the baptizing of a man, and all his, and likewiſe of this and the other houſehold, is by no means agreeable to the plan, and that it has no reſemblance to the practice of the Baptiſts.

It is in this way, I conſider theſe accounts of baptizing as having weight in the preſent inquiry. Here are facts recorded, relative to baptizing; I take theſe facts, and compare them with the proceedings of different baptizers; and I find they will not agree to one claſs, but very well with the other: I, therefore, am led to conclude that that claſs of baptizers agree beſt to the primitive prac-

tice, to whom these facts will best agree. For, as the practice of the Apostles has no affinity with that of the Baptists, it is very reasonable to infer that their views of the subject could not be the same.

This being the last corroborating argument I mean to bring, I will collect the force of the whole into one view. The whole defence of infants rests on two arguments;—1. That God did constitute in his church the membership of infants, and admitted them to it by a religious ordinance.—2. That the right of infants to church-membership was never taken away: The consequence of which is, that their right to membership continues to the present moment. The first of these arguments is granted by the Baptists themselves. The other I have evinced from five topics: 1. From God's dispensation towards the Gentiles, in forming them into a church-state. 2. That God never did, by any law, take away that right which had been before granted to infants. 3. That none of the Jews had any apprehension of the rejection of infants, which they must have had, if infants had been rejected. 4. That Jesus Christ spake of them as visibly belonging to the church, and to himself, as the head of the church: And that the apostle Peter placed them in the same relation to baptism, as they had been before to circumcision. 5. That the apostle Paul, in baptizing whole families, acted agreeable to, and so evinced the validity of all the preceding arguments.

The evident result of the whole is, that infants, according to divine appointment, have a right to church-membership, to the present hour. Then, the only question that remains, and by answering of which, I shall be brought to the close of the in-

quiry, is this; Have infants (any infants, for I take them indefinitely) any right to chriſtian baptiſm? To this I reply, 1. That thoſe perſons who have a right to be members, ſhould certainly be admitted to memberſhip; *i. e.* ſolemnly recogniſed. And the reaſon is, becauſe every one ſhould have his right. 2. If perſons, who have a right to be members, ſhould be received to memberſhip; then, they are to be received, either without baptiſm, or with it. I ſuppoſe none will ſay they are to be received without baptiſm; for then, if one may be ſo received, ſo may all, and thus baptiſm will be excluded. I expect no oppoſition from a Baptiſt in this place. For if the right of infants to memberſhip be once evinced, the oppoſition of a Baptiſt is over. And therefore, if he be able to do any thing in this controverſy, it muſt be done before it comes to this. On the other hand, if no perſon is to be received to memberſhip without baptiſm; then every one, who ſhould be received, muſt of neceſſity be baptized. And ſo the concluſion of the whole will be this; Since infants, therefore, have a right to memberſhip, and all who have ſuch right muſt be received as members, and none ſhould be received without being baptized; then it follows, that as infants have a right to be received, they muſt alſo have a right to be baptized; becauſe they cannot be received without baptiſm.

CHAPTER III.

HAVING advanced what I judged eſſential on both ſides, I will now, agreeable to my deſign, give the reader a ſcheme of the whole. By this ſcheme the reader will be able to diſcover what is common to both ſides, and what is the neat force of each. It was in this way, the ſubject preſented itſelf to my mind, when I was led a ſecond time to take it under conſideration. And I perſuade myſelf, that, by adopting this method, the reader will be more capable of judging, in this controverted queſtion, which ſide of the two is the ſtronger, and conſequently which is the true one. I will place the whole on one page, that the reader may have it at once under his eye. I ſhall place thoſe Scriptures, that weigh equal on both ſides, at the top of the page; and the argument againſt infant baptiſm in one column, and thoſe for their baptiſm in the other. I do this, becauſe I know of no method more fair, or more calculated to lead to the truth, as it is in Jeſus.

A Scheme of the Controverſy on Baptiſm.

I. Thoſe places of Scripture which are common to both ſides, *viz.* Baptiſts and Pædobaptiſts. Matt. iii. 6. "And were baptized of him in Jordan, confeſſing their ſins." Mark, xvi. 16. "He that believeth and is baptized ſhall be ſaved." Acts, ii. 41. "Then they that gladly received his word, were baptized." Acts, viii. 27. "And Philip ſaid, if thou believeſt with all thine heart, thou mayeſt," &c.

N.B. The places, and others of the ſame kind, as they prove the baptiſm of an adult to be right, are expreſſive of the ſentiment of Baptiſts and Pædobaptiſts with reſpect to an adult ſubject: For both think it right to baptize an adult. And as they prove equally on both ſides, they cannot be urged by either party againſt the other.

II. Thoſe arguments, which are peculiar to each, compared.

N.B. The queſtion is not of adults, in this both are agreed: But, "Are infants to be baptized?"

Arguments againſt Infant Baptiſm.

1. Whoever has a right to a poſitive ordinance muſt be expreſsly mentioned; as having that right; but infants are not ſo mentioned, with reſpect to baptiſm: Therefore infants are not to be baptized.

2. The Scriptures require faith and repentance, in order to baptiſm; but infants have not faith or repentance: Therefore infants are not proper ſubjects of baptiſm.

Arguments for Infant Baptiſm.

1. God has conſtituted in his church the membership of infants, and admitted them to it by a religious rite.

2. The church-membership of infants was never ſet aſide, by God or man; and conſequently continues in force to the preſent day.

N.B. The Baptiſts admit the firſt. The other is, by a variety of evidence, clearly evinced.

Coroll.---*As God has conſtituted infants church members, they ſhould be received to membership, becauſe God has conſtituted it.*

Dilemma.---*Since infants muſt be received to membership; they muſt be received without baptiſm, or with it: But none muſt be received without baptiſm; and, therefore, as infants muſt be received, they muſt of neceſſity be baptized.*

I shall now only make a few remarks, on this scheme of the controversy, and so conclude this part of the subject.

1. At the top of the page, I have cited some passages of Scripture, which support the sentiment of both parties, that is, the propriety of baptizing an adult professing faith, &c. These, and such like scriptures, which for want of room I have not set down, prove as much on one side as on the other: And, therefore, I have said they are common to both parties. My design in placing them at the head of the Scheme, is to detect an error incident to Baptists in general; namely, a supposition that such texts prove only on their side, and against the sentiments of Pædobaptists. I have observed this error, in every Baptist with whom I have conversed, both before and since my present sentiments have been known. I once asked a worthy Baptist minister, what he thought were the strongest arguments against Pædobaptists? He immediately had recourse to such passages as are set down in the Scheme. I told him, that these were so far from being the strongest, that they were no arguments at all against Pædobaptists; but rather proved on their side, in common with Baptists. My friend wondering at this, I observed, that Pædobaptists as well as Baptists held adult baptism; and as these passages only prove adult baptism, they prove nothing more than what is held by both. When I had made the matter sufficiently plain, our conversation on this subject ended. He, however, called on me the next day, and said, I am really surprised at what you said yesterday, and could hardly sleep for thinking of it.

The error I am guarding against, is that of

claiming an exclusive right to those Scriptures, which do not exclusively belong to them. It is by means of this common error, that the Baptist cause is maintained; for it gives it the appearance of strength, when in reality it has none. Mr. Booth shall come forward as an example, since he is as deeply tinctured with this error as any of his brethren. In vol. ii. p. 415, he says, "The Baptists have no need of subterfuge to evade the force of any argument formed upon it [1 Cor. vii. 14.] is plain, I humbly conceive, from the preceding reflections. No, while they have both precept and example on their side, &c."—Both precept and example on their side! This looks very formidable indeed; But let us examine the phrase. Pray, Mr. Booth, what do you mean by the Baptists' side? Do you mean adult baptism? if you mean this, it is only passing a deception upon the reader; for you must know that Pædobaptists have no dispute with you upon that subject. You certainly know that they both hold and practise adult baptism as well as you, and that what you call your side is no more your's than it is their's. But do you mean the denial of infant baptism? This you should mean when you distinguish your side from their's; for herein it is that you and Pædobaptists take different sides, seeing they affirm, and you deny, that infants are fit subjects of baptism. If so, then you affirm that Baptists have both precept and example for the denial of infant baptism, which is indeed properly your side. No, Sir, very far from it; you have neither precept nor example, on your side, in all the word of God. You have nothing in the world on your side, as you are pleased to call it,

but two poor ſophiſms. *i. e.* a pair of bad, very bad arguments, which I have placed together in one column.

But the truth is, when you ſpeak in ſo lofty a tone of the Baptiſts' ſide, as having both precept and example, you only mean that adult baptiſm has theſe. Pray, Sir, do you and Pædobaptiſts take oppoſite ſides on the article of adult baptiſm? If not, why is it your ſide ſo peculiarly? You have ſaid in this quotation that the Baptiſts have no need of ſubterfuge: Good Sir, what is a ſubterfuge? Is it an evaſion—a deception? Why do you call that your ſide excluſively, which is no more your ſide than it is the ſide of the Pædobaptiſts? Was it becauſe your own real ſide [the denial of infant baptiſm] was weak? And did you wiſh, by a dextrous ſhift, to make it paſs for ſtrong? Pray, Mr. B., is not this a ſubterfuge? It is very extraordinary that you ſhould fly to a ſubterfuge, and in that very place too where you ſay the Baptiſts do not need any. And whereas moſt diſputants make uſe of ſubterfuges only when they actually need them, you muſt be a genius of a very peculiar caſt indeed, to make uſe of a ſubterfuge, when, as you yourſelf ſay, there is in reality no need of any ſuch thing.

By this the reader may perceive how neceſſary it is to keep theſe things clear in his own mind, if he wiſhes to form a judgment on this ſubject according to truth; for though the Baptiſt ſide has in reality no ſtrength at all, yet it acquires the appearance of it from the miſrepreſentation which I have endeavoured to expoſe. I have, therefore, been the more deſirous of placing this matter in a fair light; becauſe, though frequently called to

ſpeak on the ſubject, I was not for ſome years aware of the deception. Let the reader keep in view thoſe Scriptures at the top of the Scheme, which weigh equally on both ſides, while I paſs to the two columns, where the arguments of both are placed in oppoſition to each other; and by comparing theſe, we ſhall ſee which is the ſtronger, and, therefore, which is the true ſide of the queſtion.

2. If the reader will turn to the Scheme, he will ſee, on the left column, what is the neat ſtrength of the Baptiſt ſide, and what arguments they produce againſt the baptiſm of infants. I have there ſet down two arguments which are urged by Baptiſts: The one taken from a want of expreſs precept or example to baptize infants; the other from their want of capacity to believe and repent, &c. Theſe two are the only arguments they can produce; and if they are not good they have nothing good to urge. With reſpect to the firſt, that there is no expreſs command or example for baptizing infants, the ſame is true reſpecting female communion; and ſo this argument, if it were good, would have a double effect: It would exclude infants from baptiſm, and females from the Lord's ſupper. And then the Baptiſts would be right in refuſing to baptize infants, but, at the ſame time, they would be wrong in admitting females to the Lord's ſupper; but on the contrary, if woman have a right to the Lord's table, though there be no expreſs law or example for their admiſſion, then the argument is good for nothing. I ſhall ſay more upon this when I come to examine Mr B.'s defence of female communion.

As to the other argument, I mean that taken from the incapacity of infants to believe and repent, it is nothing more than a ſophiſm. I have diſcovered its fallacy by applying it to different caſes; and in the ſame way that it proved againſt infant baptiſm, it would have proved againſt infant circumciſion—againſt the baptiſm of Chriſt—againſt the temporal ſubſiſtence of infants—and, laſtly, againſt their eternal ſalvation. I have likewiſe ſhown wherein its fallacy conſiſted, *viz.* in bringing more into the concluſion than was in the premiſes; All this the reader may obſerve by recurring to the place where it is examined. The conſequence is that the Baptiſts have nothing to place againſt infant baptiſm but two unſound, ſophiſtical, deceitful arguments. This is the ſum total of the Baptiſt ſide; but if any Baptiſt think he is able either to maintain theſe two arguments, or to produce any thing better, I ſeriouſly invite him to the taſk.

3. On the oppoſite column I have placed the arguments for infant baptiſm. Their order is the moſt ſimple, and the whole conſiſts of three parts: 1. That God formed a church on earth, and conſtituted infants members of that church:—2. That the memberſhip of infants, from that time to this, has never been ſet aſide by any order of God; conſequently it ſtill remains:—3. That as infants have a divine right to memberſhip, they muſt be received as members; and as they muſt not be received without being baptized, they muſt be baptized in order to be received.

Theſe are the arguments in one column, which are to be compared with thoſe two on the Baptiſt ſide in the other; and by comparing them

together, the reader may see on which side the evidence preponderates, and consequently on which side the truth actually lies. There are three parts on the right column, which link into each other, and form a strong chain of evidence, to be placed in opposition to two false sophistical arguments, which constitute the whole force on the Baptist side; that is, there is something to be placed against nothing—substantial evidence against a pair of sophisms: And this is to be done, that the reader may see which has the stronger side, and which the true. As far as concerns myself, I only say I have, after many supplications for the best teaching, examined, compared, and decided, and am well satisfied with the decision; The reader, if he be a man fearing God, will go and do likewise.—So much for the comparison; a few words on the evidence, by itself, will finish this part of the business.

The nature of this proof, on the side of infants, is such, that Baptists can only attack it in one part: *e. g.* If I affirm, as in the first part, that God did constitute infants members of his church, the Baptists grant they were once church-members. If I affirm, as in the third, that every one who has a right to be a church-member, has a right to be baptized, they are compelled to grant that too. So there remains but one point on which a Baptist can form an attack, and that is the second part, wherein I say, that the church-membership of infants having been once an institution of God, it was never set aside either by God immediately, or by any man acting under the authority of God. This is the point then that decides the question.—I will spend a few words in vindicating this turn-

ing point againſt the *argumentum ad hominem* made uſe of by Mr. Booth.

In ſupport of this I have argued from five topics: God's method of acting in bringing the Gentiles into a church ſtate;—there never was a law of God to ſet their memberſhip aſide;—the Jews, in Chriſt's time, had no apprehenſion of any ſuch thing;—Chriſt ſpoke of infants as actually belonging to the church, and his Apoſtle placed them in the ſame relation to baptiſm as they had been in to circumciſion;—and St. Paul, in conformity to this ſcheme, baptized families, particularly the jailer and all his ſtraightway. Each of theſe is already ſet forth, and evinced in its proper place.

But what do the Baptiſts place againſt this evidence? Mr. Booth, in anſwering Dr. Williams on this ſubject, does neither produce one Scripture to prove that the church-memberſhip of infants, which he grants to have exiſted once, was ever ſet aſide, nor does he anſwer thoſe Scriptures which the Doctor had alledged to evince the continuance of their memberſhip. What then does Mr. B. do? Whoever will be at the pains to read his books, will find his mode of reaſoning to be of this kind. He inſtances a variety of things belonging to the Jewiſh church, ſuch as its being national—its prieſthood—its tithes—its various purifications—its holy places, holy garments, &c; and then argues moſt erroneouſly, that as theſe things are done away, the memberſhip of infants muſt be done away too. This, I ſay, is the mode of his arguing, and indeed the only argument he brings, as may be ſeen by any one who reads his works with care. Now this

reasoning of his is guilty of a very egregious absurdity, and a very material error in point of chronology.

I. A very egregious absurdity. Mr. B. seems to consider the various rites, &c. of the Jewish church as being so incorporated and interwoven with the members of that church, that the rites and they become essentially the same; and then, if the rites be taken away, he fancies that the very essence of the church is so destroyed or altered, that infant membership is gone of course. Let any one weigh Mr. B.'s reasoning in vol. ii. p. 37, and understand him on any other than this absurd principle if he can. "An Apostle," says he, "has taught us, that the ancient priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also in the law. That is, as Dr. Owen explains it, the whole law of commandments contained in ordinances, or the whole law of Moses, so far as it was a rule of worship and obedience unto the church; for that law it is that followeth the states of the priesthood." Very well. That law was changed, which was a rule of worship and obedience to the church; but what has this to do with changing the church? Is a church changed because the rule, which directed its worship, is changed? I wonder much why Dr. Owen is here introduced, unless it be to pass off an absurdity under the sanction of a great name; as nothing can be more contrary to what Mr. B. is going to say than this quotation from the Doctor.

Now see Mr. B.'s curious reasoning. "We may therefore adopt (he should have said, corrupt) the sacred writer's principle of reasoning, and say, the constitution of the visible church

being manifeſtly and eſſentially altered, the law, relating to qualifications for communion in it, muſt of neceſſity be changed. Conſequently no valid inference can be drawn from the membership of infants, under the former diſpenſation, to a ſimilarity of external privilege under the new covenant." Now in what way could the conſtitution of the church be eſſentially altered by a change in the law of ordinances, unleſs upon that abſurd idea that the ordinances and members were ſo compounded and incorporated with each other, as to form, in this incorporated ſtate, the very eſſence of the church?

One thing we may remark in this quotation, which is that Mr. B. grants infants to have been church-members under the former diſpenſation. This is granting my firſt argument for infant baptiſm; there is only one more to be maintained, *viz.* That the membership of infants has never been annulled; and this being evinced, the oppoſition of a Baptiſt is at an end, ſince he cannot by any means deny the concluſion. And now the whole debate is brought into this narrow limit—has the church-membership of infants at any time been ſet aſide, or has it not? I have advanced five arguments to prove it never has been ſet aſide. Mr. B. ſays it has. If you aſk him to prove it, he tells you "the conſtitution of the viſible church is manifeſtly and eſſentially altered." If you aſk him how he proves this eſſential alteration? he tells you that tithes, and purifications, and prieſthood, and other things of this kind belonging to the Moſaic code, are changed or taken away; and then moſt abſurdly infers, that infant membership is taken away too: As if

a member of a church and a Mosaic rite had been the same; as if infant membership, which was long before Moses, had been nothing more than a Mosaic rite. But let us observe how grandly he reasons down infant membership.—

"We may, therefore," says he, "adopt the sacred writer's principle of reasoning, and say."—I have been at some pains to inform myself respecting this sentence—whether Mr. B. meant to imitate the Apostle's phraseology, or to reason after the same method, or to reason from the Apostle's datum or principle, *viz.* "the priesthood being changed." I was at length inclined to view the latter as his meaning; because it seemed too trivial to tell the reader in that pompous way, "We may adopt the sacred writer's principle of reasoning," when nothing more was meant but imitation of phraseology. For the same reason I thought he could not mean an imitation of the Apostle's method, for that would be only saying, he should lay down a datum as the Apostle had done, and then draw an inference as the Apostle did. All this is very well, and *secundum artem;* but then he might as well have told the reader that he would adopt Aristotle's principle of reasoning as the sacred writer's. For if Mr. B. only meant that he would lay down a datum or principle to begin with, and then proceed to infer, it can signify nothing to any man living unless his datum be a true one. And if this be all, he need not have introduced it with such pomp as the "sacred writer's principle of reasoning;" for what other would any person adopt unless he were an idiot? This as well as the other, being too trifling to be Mr. B.'s meaning,

I therefore concluded he meant to adopt the Apoſtle's datum, *viz.* "The prieſthood being changed," and from thence to draw an inference againſt infants. I was the more inclined to think he intended this, ſince he had juſt cited the Apoſtle's words and Dr. Owen's explanation of them; and this being done, he immediately proceeds to adopt.

The Apoſtle does indeed ſay, "The prieſthood being changed, there is made of neceſſity a change alſo of the law." The prieſthood implied ſervants of the church to miniſter in holy things; the law was a commandment contained in ordinances, and was, as Dr. Owen ſaid, a rule of worſhip and obedience to the church. The prieſts who were to miniſter, and the law, which was to regulate, were both changed: The law was changed in conſequence of a change in the prieſthood. Well, and what then? Why, according to Mr. B., the argument will run thus: The prieſts were changed, and the rule of worſhip was changed, therefore the church was eſſentially altered, therefore infants were excluded.—Is not this a good inference, The prieſts were changed, therefore infants were excommunicated? It might have been ſo if the prieſts had all been infants; but even then it would only have concluded againſt infant prieſts. Every argument Mr. B. has brought againſt the continuance of infant church-membership is of the ſame kind—tithes, purifications, holy places, &c. and of theſe the reader may take which he pleaſes, and infer accordingly. Tithes are abrogated, therefore infants are excluded. Purifications are ſet aſide, therefore infants are ſhut out. Holy places,

&c. are no more, therefore—not ſo faſt—if Mr. B. is to make good his concluſion againſt the perpetuity of infant memberſhip from that datum of the Apoſtle, The prieſthood being changed," let him have the liberty of wording his own argument—I have no objection to this—let him proceed.

"The conſtitution of the viſible church being eſſentially altered"—Stop—Pray, Sir, is this the Apoſtle's principle of reaſoning? Do you, by that ſentence, mean the ſame as is expreſſed by the Apoſtle, "The prieſthood being changed?" If you do, I will not contend for a word.—Proceed—"The conſtitution of the viſible church [that is the prieſthood] being eſſentially altered or changed, the law, relating to qualifications for communion in it [that is, in the prieſthood], muſt of neceſſity be changed: Conſequently [becauſe the prieſthood is changed] no valid inference can be drawn from the memberſhip of infants [that is, in the prieſthood] under the former diſpenſation, to a ſimilarity of external privilege under the new covenant." *Bene concluſum eſt a dato ſcriptoris ſacri!* And an excellent argument it is againſt all thoſe who mean to bring up their infants to be Jewiſh prieſts.

Ah, aliquis error latet! Mr. B. did not mean to conclude ſo: He is diſputing againſt infant baptiſm, and not againſt infant prieſthood. Very well; but then he muſt have a very different datum. He is certainly at liberty to diſpute and conclude as he pleaſes, only let him do it fairly. I certainly ſuppoſed he was reaſoning from the ſacred writer's principle—"The prieſthood being changed;" he had juſt quoted it, and ſet Dr.

Owen to explain it, and said, "We may adopt it;" But that principle, as to infants, only concludes against an infant priesthood, which was not the thing he intended.

Priests, we said, were servants to minister to the church in holy things; and if so, there is a wide difference between the priesthood being changed, and the constitution of the visible church (namely the members that constitute it) being essentially altered. The same may be said of all the instances mentioned by Mr. B.; these might all be changed or abrogated, and yet no essential alteration take place in the church, that is, in the members of it. I am very suspicious that Mr. B. to make out a better conclusion, meant to pass it upon the reader, that the Apostle's expression, "*the priesthood being changed*," and *that* of his, "*the constitution of the visible church being essentially altered*," were of the same import, and conveyed precisely the same idea. If this was really his design, it is not much to his honor; it must proceed from a greater love to hypothesis than to truth, or, as I rather think, it arose from that absurd idea which he seems to entertain—that the priesthood, rites, and ordinances, which were given to the church, were essentially the same with that church to which they were given. And it is on this absurd principle that his opposition to the continuance of infant membership is carried on; he turns the priesthood into a church, and every institute into an infant, and then contemplates the change of the one, and the removal of the other. In the change of priesthood he sees nothing but an essential change in the church, and fancies the removal of institutes to be the removal

of infants. And now he will adopt the principle of the facred writer :—The prieſthood is changed, therefore the church is eſſentially altered; this inſtitute is taken away, there goes an infant; that inſtitute is abrogated, there goes another infant; and now all the inſtitutes are gone, and now all the infants are gone; and then, ſays he, "no valid inference can be drawn from the membership of infants under the former diſpenſation, to a ſimilarity of external privilege under the new covenant."—We will now leave Mr. B. in poſſeſſion of his abſurdity, and take notice of,

II. A very material error in point of chronology. With reſpect to chronology, moſt perſons know that from the time of Abraham to that of inſtituting the prieſthood, Moſaic rites, &c. we may reckon about four hundred years. During this ſpace of time, the church, in which infants were members, was not national; it had no levitical prieſthood, there was no inſtitution of tithes, nor was the Moſaic code of rites yet formed. All we know of the church is, that its members conſiſted of adults and infants, who were initiated by the ſame rite; that ſacrifices were offered; and, it is probable, that the father of the family, or ſome reſpectable perſon, did officiate in their aſſemblies as a prieſt. Here is a congregational church, a ſimple worſhip, and ſome creditable officiating prieſt.

If we carry our views forward, we ſhall ſee that church, which at firſt was congregational, become a national church; the worſhip that was once ſimple, under the direction of the Moſaic code; and inſtead of a prieſt choſen by the people, a regular prieſthood is ordained of God. Now

whether we view the congregational or national form, the ſimple or complex worſhip, the irregular or regular prieſthood, we ſee no alteration in the conſtitution of the church, much leſs an eſſential one, as it reſpected the members of which it was compoſed. If, therefore, the paſſing from congregational to national, from a ſimple to a complex worſhip, from an irregular to a regular prieſthood, produced no eſſential alteration in the church members, then ſhould all this be reverſed, ſhould there be a change from national to congregational, from a complex to a ſimple worſhip, from a regular to an irregular prieſthood? Every man in his ſenſes muſt ſee that this can no more alter the eſſence of the church than the other did.

All this is plain enough to any man except Mr. B.; for, according to his mode of reaſoning, there muſt have been, from the beginning, I know not how many eſſential alterations in the conſtitution of the viſible church: For if, as he will have it, a change of prieſthood made one eſſential change, then the inſtitution of the ſame prieſthood muſt have made another—ſo there were two changes. And, not to ſay any thing of the changes from Adam to Abraham, what became of the eſſence of the church when the functions of this prieſthood, during the captivity, were ſuſpended? For if the changing of prieſthood did eſſentially alter the church, the inſtitution of prieſthood muſt have done the ſame; and then its ſuſpenſion during the captivity, and its reſtoration at the cloſe of it, muſt have made two more; becauſe, according to Mr. B.'s view of things, a change of prieſthood eſſentially alters the church. Such

is the abfurd idea he entertains concerning the church of the living God!

I obferve that Mr. B., in oppofing the continuance of infant membership, takes care not to go too far back; the period of Mofaic rites fuits him beft, and there he fixes: For this æra, as he vainly fuppofes, furnifhes him with weapons which he does not fparingly ufe, efpecially againft a diffenting minifter. Here he finds not only infant membership, but a national church, a prieftlhood, tithes, and inftitutes of various kinds. Now, fays Mr. B., when reafoning with a diffenting minifter, (for we muft know that thefe weapons of his would be efteemed by a clergyman as rotten wood), now, fays he, "If you will plead for the continuance of infant membership, which I grant to have exifted, you muft alfo admit a national church; you muft call yourfelf a prieft, and wear holy garments, and turn your communion-table into an altar, and demand tithes, and call your meeting a holy place." But why all this? Becaufe, fays he, all thefe things belonged to the fame difpenfation as infant membership did; and fo if you take one, you muft even take all, and then you will have a tolerable body of Judaifm.

Now before we rob Mr. B. of this miferable weapon, I would juft obferve that this argument of his, which is the only one he has got, is what is called *argumentum ad hominem*; and, though often ufed, it is one of the weakeft that can be adopted. It is calculated to make an impreffion on fome men, whofe fentiments may be of a peculiar caft; but if the fame be turned againft others who are of a different fentiment, it is of no force at all:—*e. g.* Mr. B.'s argument, has the appearance of ftrength,

if uſed againſt a diſſenting miniſter; becauſe he may reject the idea of a national church, prieſthood, the right of tithes, &c.; but if the ſame be urged againſt a clergyman who admits theſe, all its force is gone—it is even good for nothing. This argument derives all its force from the ſentiments of the perſon againſt whom it is uſed; it may be very ſtrong againſt one man, and very weak againſt another; it will ſerve to ſupport error as well as truth, and, therefore, when it is a ſolitary argument, no dependance whatever can be placed upon it. I do not mean to diſcard the uſe of it in all caſes—I grant it may anſwer a good purpoſe if prudently managed; but this I ſay, it ſhould never be a man's only argument; for that man's cauſe muſt be miſerably poor indeed which depends on one ſolitary argument that will either protect truth or falſehood. Juſt ſuch is the caſe of Mr. B. in oppoſing the continuance of infant membership; and I wiſh him to conſider ſeriouſly whether ſuch kind of reaſoning is fit to ſtand againſt a plan of God.

Now, weak as this argument is in itſelf, there is one thing in Mr. B.'s caſe which makes it ſtill worſe; he is indebted for the uſe of it to a very capital abſurdity. As he is not able to prove an eſſential alteration in the conſtitution of the church, he moſt abſurdly ſuppoſes, or ſeems to ſuppoſe, that members and religious inſtitutes do belong to, and equally conſtitute the eſſence of the church of God; for what elſe but ſuch an abſurd idea could induce him to affirm that the church was eſſentially altered, and ſo infants cut off, merely becauſe the inſtitutes of the church were abrogated? Now, though this argument of

his is so exceedingly weak, and the principle on which it is built so very absurd, that no one need be under any apprehension, should it remain quietly in his possession, I mean, notwithstanding, to take the liberty of changing his place, and fixing him in that station, where he shall feel himself totally deprived of its assistance.

Mr. B. must certainly know that the national form of the church, the institution of priesthood, tithes, and other Mosaic ordinances, were of a much later date than infant church-membership. I take the liberty, therefore, of changing Mr. B.'s standing, and putting him as far back as the patriarchal age, the times of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And now having placed Mr. B. among the patriarchs, I wish him to take a view of their ecclesiastical affairs, and to indulge me at the same time with a little free conversation on that subject.

Now, Sir, what do you perceive in this age of the church? Here you see the venerable patriachs, obedient to the divine order, admitting infants to church-membership. But on the other hand, you see here no national church, no instituted priesthood, no law of tithes, nor indeed any Mosaic rites. Your favourite argument against the continuance of infant membership, derived from a national church, the levitical priesthood, tithes, &c. is, by falling back about the space of three hundred years, fairly and irrecoverably lost. You had formed so close a connexion between infant membership, a national church, a priesthood, tithes, and Mosaic rites; as if they all rose into existence at the same time, and were all to expire together. But here they stand entirely apart; infant membership is in no alliance with a national church, is

totally unconnected with levitical prieſthood, and has nothing at all to do with Moſaic inſtitutes. The cloſe union you fancied exiſted between theſe does here vaniſh away. And now, Sir, what will you do with a diſſenting miniſter in this caſe? Your *argumentum ad hominem*, the only argument you had, is loſt.

Loſt, did I ſay?—Nay now I think of it, it is not loſt neither. Oh no! ſo far from it, that I believe I can put you in a way whereby you may manage your matters to far greater advantage. For though, by putting you back to the patriarchal age, I deprive you of thoſe topics with which you have been able to combat a diſſenting miniſter, *viz.* a national church, an inſtituted prieſthood, Moſaic rites, &c.; yet all is not loſt, you will here find topics, which, if managed with dexterity, will make no inconſiderable impreſſion on a clergyman. You obſerve, Sir, that infant memberſhip has nothing to do with a national church, prieſthood, tithes, &c.; and then, ſhould any clergyman riſe to defend the continuance of infant memberſhip, you may ſay to him; My good Sir, if you inſiſt upon infant church-memberſhip now, which I myſelf grant to have exiſted in the times of Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob; pray obſerve the conſequence; you muſt relinquiſh the idea of a national church, you muſt ceaſe to call yourſelf a prieſt, you muſt lay aſide your holy garments, and finally, you muſt give up all your tithes. For, if you will be a patriarchal profeſſor in infant memberſhip, you muſt be ſo in every thing elſe. If you will conform to the patriarchs in one particular; in the name of conſiſtency and com-

mon honeſty, I aſk, why are you not a conformiſt in every particular?

You ſee, Mr. B. that this is *argumentum ad hominem* againſt a clergyman with a witneſs, and will make him feel according to its importance; for certainly it will bring him into as great a difficulty as your other argument of the ſame kind brought Dr. Williams.—Well, what a happy invention! Here is an expedient, by which you will be able to annoy either a clerical, or a *non-con* opponent. Before, when you fixed your ſtation among the Moſaic rites, you could only act with advantage againſt a *non-con*; but now, if you only ſtep back three hundred years, you may employ your artillery as ſucceſsfully againſt a clerical antagoniſt. And thus by ſtepping backward or forward, according to the caſt of your adverſary, which is a thing eaſily done, you will have it in your power to urge ſomething againſt all comers. This is one of the beſt inventions in the world for your cauſe; for as you ſtand forth as a great diſputant againſt infant membership, it is probable you will meet with antagoniſts of all kinds. This expedient—like the two edges of a ſword, or the two horns of a dilemma—will enable you to meet an adverſary at all points. Should you attack a diſſenting miniſter, be ſure you fix upon Moſaic rites; but if a clergyman ſhould prove an antagoniſt, you know your cue, quit that ſtation, and fall back to the patriarchal age; and ſo by humouring the buſineſs, you will be a match for both. Excuſe my officiouſneſs in ſuggeſting any thing, eſpecially to you, who are ſo well verſed in all the turns of diſputation; I only do it becauſe this thought ſeemed to eſcape you.

Candid Reader, I have now done with this part of the ſubject, and have only to ſay, that of all the miſerable oppoſitions that were ever ſet up againſt an ordinance of God, I mean infant memberſhip in its perpetuity, I think there never was a more miſerable oppoſition than this. The Baptiſts grant infant church-memberſhip to have exiſted once. I have affirmed that it ſtill exiſts; and this being proved, the oppoſition of a Baptiſt is at an end. I have argued from five different topics in proof of the perpetuity of infant memberſhip. Mr. B. who denies this, urges againſt it one ſolitary argument; and that even the weakeſt of all arguments, the *argumentum ad hominem;* and this ſame ſolitary weak argument is founded on a groſs abſurdity; and finally, by removing Mr. B. from the Moſaic rites to the patriarchal age, this ſolitary, abſurd argument vaniſhes like a ghoſt, and utterly forſakes him.

APPENDIX.

A SHORT METHOD WITH THE BAPTISTS.

IT is a certain fact, that when any ſentiment is falſe, it will appear the more glaringly ſo the more it is examined, and the farther it is drawn out. I have been very attentive to the tendency of Mr. Booth's reaſoning, and have pledged myſelf more than once to take ſome notice of it. When a writer does not with to be prolix in anſwering a large work, it is beſt, if he think the work erroneous, to pitch upon ſome prominent parts, in which the fallacy of the author is ſufficiently palpable to run down and ruin his whole ſyſtem. I will adopt this method with Mr. B.'s performance, wherein he expreſſes the ſentiments, and purſues the reaſoning of the Baptiſts in general. It is his ſecond edition of Pædobaptiſm examined, to which my attention will be chiefly directed, as that ſubject, on which I ſhall more directly animadvert, is not handled in the anſwer to Dr. Williams, the Doctor, in his piece, having urged nothing upon it: And indeed it does not ſignify which of Mr. B.'s books is quoted, ſo far as I ſhall notice him.

The ſentiment of the Baptiſts, reſpecting a fit ſubject of the baptiſmal ordinance, divides itſelf into two parts: They affirm that believing adults are fit ſubjects of baptiſm;—they deny that baptiſm ſhould be adminiſtered to infants. When ſupporting what they affirm, the ſubject runs very ſmoothly; and no man that I know, except perhaps a Quaker, will deny the concluſion. For my own part, I am as well perſuaded that a believing adult is a fit ſubject for baptiſm as ever I was in my life; and I neither have, nor mean to ſay, one word againſt it. This is the common ſentiment of Baptiſts and Pædobaptiſts, and is not, as Mr. B. falſely and boaſtingly calls it, the Baptiſts' ſide. As far, therefore, as the proof of adult baptiſm goes, it is all very well, and exceedingly plain from Scripture, and is admitted, without diſpute, by both parties.

But when the Baptiſts are brought to anſwer for their negative part, *viz.* infants are not to be baptized, their difficulties inſtantly commence, and the mode they adopt of conducting the debate, drives them into ſuch extremities, as ruin the cauſe they mean to carry. *e. g.* Is an infant to be baptized? No, ſays a Baptiſt. Why? Becauſe baptiſm, ſays he, being a poſitive ordinance, no one can be deemed a proper ſubject of it but by virtue of ſome plain, expreſs command of God. This idea of expreſs command they raiſe ſo exceſſively high, that ſure enough they have done the buſineſs of infants in cutting them off from baptiſm; but, at the ſame time, and by the ſame proceſs, a breach is made in female communion, and women are cut off from the Lord's table.—This is the firſt thing that riſes out of their ſyſtem, and

which will co-operate with others to ruin it. I undertake to prove that, according to the principles and reasonings of the Baptists, a woman, however qualified, can have no right at all to the Lord's supper.

Again, the Baptists, in order to patch their system, and give it the appearance of consistency, are under the necessity of maintaining the right of females to the Lord's table, upon the same principle on which they oppose infant baptism; but when they set about this, they make a shift to lose their principle, are transformed into Pædobaptists, reason by analogy and inference, and fall into prevarication and self-contradiction, the most miserable.—This is the second thing. I, therefore, undertake to show, that the Baptists, in proving against infants, and in defending female communion, do shift their ground, contradict themselves, and prevaricate most pitifully.

Further, when an argument is urged against the Baptists from the membership of infants in the ancient church, and their being, all infants as they were, the subjects of a religious rite, the Baptists do not deny the fact of their membership; but, in order to evade the consequence, they lay violent hands on the church, the membership, and the instituted religious rite, and in this way they endeavour to effect their escape.—This is the third thing. I, therefore, undertake to prove that, according to their principles and reasonings, the ever blessed God had no church in this world for at least fifteen hundred years.

There is another thing I thought of introducing against the Baptists in this way; but as I know not how they will answer it (since Mr. B. has

ſaid nothing about it, though it was in a work which he himſelf has noticed), I intend now to put it in another part in the form of a quere, which I ſhall ſubmit to any Baptiſt who may think proper to write on the ſubject.

Here are, therefore, three things that ariſe out of the baptiſt ſyſtem, and which, if fairly evinced, are ſufficient to ruin that ſyſtem out of which they ariſe :

1. That, according to the principles and reaſoning of the Baptiſts, a woman however qualified, can have no right at all to the Lord's table.

2. That the Baptiſts, in oppoſing infant baptiſm, and defending female communion, do ſhift their ground, contradict themſelves, and prevaricate moſt pitifully.

3. That, according to their principles and mode of reaſoning, God had no church in this world for at leaſt fifteen hundred years.

Theſe things I undertake to make out from the works of that venerable champion on the Baptiſt ſide, the Rev. Mr. Abraham Booth.

I will begin with the firſt of theſe, *viz.* That, according to the principles, &c. of the Baptiſts, no woman, however qualified, can have any right to the Lord's table. But before I proceed to the proof, it will be neceſſary to obſerve to the reader, that baptiſm and the Lord's ſupper are both conſidered by Mr. B. as poſitive ordinances, which I will not diſpute with him, but do grant them to be ſuch. The reader, therefore, will remark, that as Mr. B.'s reaſoning, by which he oppoſes infant baptiſm, is founded upon this, that baptiſm is a poſitive inſtitute : the ſame reaſoning is alſo applicable to the Lord's ſupper, be-

cauſe that is likewiſe a poſitive rite. This Mr. B. will not deny, nor can he deny it, without overturning his own ſyſtem. Then, as the inſtitutes are both poſitive, and the ſame reaſoning will apply to both, I undertake to prove,

1. That, according to the principles and reaſonings of the Baptiſts, a woman, however qualified, can have no right at all to the Lord's ſupper.

That I may make this matter as plain a poſſible to the reader, it will be needful to ſet down various topics from which female right to the Lord's ſupper may be, or is at any time evinced. I ſay then if women have a right to the Lord's table, that right muſt be proved from ſome or all of the following conſiderations: *viz.* From their being in the favour of God—from their fitneſs for ſuch an ordinance as godly perſons—from the benefit it may be to them—from their church-membership—from their baptiſm—or, laſtly, from ſome expreſs precept or example in the word of God. Let us form each of theſe into a queſtion.

Queſtion 1. Can the right of a woman to the Lord's table be proved from their intereſt in God's favour?

Anſwer. Mr. Booth ſays, No. Vol. ii. p. 227. "But ſuppoſing it were clearly evinced that all the children of believers are intereſted in the covenant of grace, it would not certainly follow that they are entitled to baptiſm. For baptiſm, being a branch of poſitive worſhip [and ſo the Lord's ſupper], depends *entirely* on the ſovereign will of its author; which will, revealed in poſitive precepts, or by apoſtolic examples, is the *only rule* of its adminiſtration."——"So far is it from being a fact, that an intereſt in the new covenant, and

a title to positive institutes [baptism and the Lord's supper], may be inferred the one from the other." Page 228. "All reasoning from data of a moral kind is wide of the mark."

Note. No interest in the covenant of grace, or the new covenant, however clearly evinced, can give any right to a positive institute, *i. e.* either to baptism or the Lord's supper. Then a woman, being in the covenant of grace, or in God's favour, has no right on that account to the Lord's supper; for all this depends only on positive precept or example.

Question 2. Can the right of females be proved from their suitableness to that ordinance as godly persons?

Answer. Mr. Booth affirms it cannot. Vol. i. p. 227. "But when our divine Lord, addressing his disciples in a positive command, says, 'It shall be so;' or, when speaking by an apostolic example, he declares, 'It is thus,' all our own reasonings about *fitness*, expediency, or utility, must hide their impertinent heads." Vol. ii. p. 228. "This being the case, we may safely conclude that all reasoning from data of a moral kind, and the supposed fitness of things, is wide of the mark." Vol. ii. p. 389. "But were we to admit the great Vitringa's presumtions as facts, *viz.* That the infants of believing parents are sanctified by the Holy Spirit, p. 377, yet while positive appointments are under the direction of positive laws, it would not follow that such children should be baptized.

Note. Our being sanctified, and thereby possessing a fitness for a positive institute, gives us no right at all to that institute, be it what it may.

No right to any inſtitute, according to Mr. B., can be inferred from ſanctification of the Spirit; and all our reaſoning from fitneſs, or ſuppoſed fitneſs, is altogether impertinent, and muſt hide its impertinent head. So no woman, Mr. B. being judge, has a right to the Lord's table on account of her being a ſanctified or godly perſon.

Queſtion 3. Can the right of females to the Lord's table be proved from the benefit or uſefulneſs of that ordinance to them?

Anſwer. Mr. Booth denies that it can. Vol. i. p. 23. "Seeing baptiſm [and the Lord's ſupper too] is as really and entirely a poſitive inſtitution as any that were given to the choſen tribes, we cannot with ſafety infer either the mode, or the ſubject of it, from any thing ſhort of a precept, or a precedent, recorded in ſcripture, and relating to that very ordinance." Vol. i. p. 227. "When our divine Lord, addreſſing his diſciples in a poſitive command, ſays, 'It ſhall be ſo,' or, when ſpeaking by an apoſtolic example, he declares, 'It is thus,' all our own reaſonings about fitneſs, expediency, or *utility*, muſt hide their impertinent heads."

Note. To reaſon from the utility or benefit of an inſtitute is quite an impertinent thing; ſo that we cannot ſay, the Lord's ſupper may be uſeful to females, therefore females ſhould be admitted to the Lord's ſupper: For, as Mr. B. affirms, we cannot with ſafety infer either mode or ſubject from any thing ſhort of precept, or precedent, recorded in Scripture, and relating to the very ordinance.

Queſtion 4. Can this right of females be proved from their church-membership?

Answer. Mr. B. says it cannot. Vol. i. p. 22. "Nor does it appear from the records of the Old Testament, that when Jehovah appointed any branch of ritual worship, he left either the subjects of it, or the mode of administration, to be inferred by the people, from the relation in which they stood to himself, or from general moral precepts, or from any branch of moral worship." In the answer to Dr. Williams, p. 421, Mr. B. says, "But had our author proved that infants are born members of the visible church, it would not thence have been inferible, independent of a divine precept, or an apostolic example, that it is our duty to baptize them. For as baptism is a positive institute, &c.

Note. Mr. Booth says we cannot infer the right of a subject to a positive ordinance from the relation he stands in to God, not even from church-membership; consequently the membership of a female gives her no right to the Lord's table.

Question 5. Can the right of females to the supper be proved from their baptism?

Answer. No, says Mr. Booth. Vol. i. p. 22. "Nor does it appear from the records of the Old Testament, that when Jehovah appointed any branch of ritual worship, he left either the subjects of it, or the mode of administration, to be inferred by the people, from the relation in which they stood to himself, or from general moral precepts, nor yet from any *other well-known positive rite.*" Page 23. "We cannot with safety infer either the mode, or the subject of it [a positive ordinance] from any thing short of a precept or a precedent

recorded in Scripture, and relating to that very ordinance." This is the burden of Mr. B.'s song.

Note. Baptism is a well-known positive rite; and Mr. B. denies that the mode or subject of one rite could be inferred from another, consequently baptism can infer no right to the Lord's supper: For, upon Mr. B.'s word, we cannot infer either mode or subject from any thing short of precept or example relating to that very ordinance. Now as the right of females to the Lord's table cannot, upon the principles of the Baptists, be proved from any of the preceding topics, there remains nothing to screen them from that consequence which I am now fastening upon them, but some express command or explicit example. I come in the last place, to inquire,

Question 6. Can the right of women to the Lord's table be proved from any express law or example in holy Scripture?

Answer. Here Mr. B. affirms;—and I deny.

It will be necessary here to give the reader a complete view of Mr. B.'s defence of female communion. This defence is very short, but, on his principles, it is the most curious, most diverting, most mean, that (I think) was ever offered to the Public. It is in vol. ii. p. 73, 74. and is as follows:

"In regard to the supposed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply by demanding: Does not Paul, when he says, Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat, enjoin a reception of the sacred supper?—1. Does not the term *anthrōpos*, there used, often

ſtand as a name of our ſpecies, without regard to ſex?—2. Have we not the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of common ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in this paſſage?—3. When the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *anthrōpos*, but *aneer*. This diſtinction is very ſtrongly marked in that celebrated ſaying of Thales; the Grecian ſage was thankful to fortune that he was *anthrōpos*, one of the human ſpecies, and not a beaſt—that he was *aneer*, a man, and not a woman.—4. Beſides, when the Apoſtle delivered to the church at Corinth what he had received of the Lord, did he not deliver a command—a command to the whole church, conſiſting of women as well as men? When he further ſays, We, being many, are one bread and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread; does he not ſpeak of women as well as of men?—5. Again, are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?—6. And are not male and female one in Chriſt?"—This is the whole of the defence, and I confeſs I have been often diverted in reading it; I thought it a curioſity as it came from the pen of Mr. B., who is ſo great an enemy to all inference and analogy reſpecting poſitive inſtitutes!

The whole of this defence I have divided into ſix parts, and theſe, for the ſake of greater plainneſs, are diſtinguiſhed by ſtrokes and figures. Mr. B., in theſe ſix parts, aims at three diſtinct arguments: The firſt is taken from the word *anthrōpos*, man, which includes the three firſt parts; the ſecond is taken from Paul's addreſs to the church as a body, and takes in the forth part;

the third is from the condition and qualification of females, and comprehends the two laſt parts.

Since Mr. B. offers this defence to the public as proving an explicit warrant for female communion; we muſt, therefore, firſt of all lay down the preciſe idea of the term explicit. Explicit denotes that which is direct, open, and plain; and which immediately ſtrikes the mind without reaſoning upon it; *e. g.* Acts, viii. 12. "They were baptized, both men and women." Here the reader inſtantly diſcerns both ſexes, without inferring from any other place. And hence the term explicit is oppoſed to implication, *i. e.* any thing included under a general word. And it is likewiſe oppoſed to inference, *i. e.* proof drawn from ſome other place. An explicit warrant, therefore, is ſuch as ſtrikes at once; and precludes the neceſſity of implication, reaſoning, or inferring from ſome other topic. Such a warrant Mr. B. inſiſts upon for infant baptiſm; and this brings him under the neceſſity of producing the ſame for female communion. Which if he be unable to do, all he has ſaid againſt infants will literally ſtand for nothing, and his books on that ſubject will be even worſe than waſte paper.—Now for the explicit warrant for female communion.

1. We begin with the argument from the word *anthrōpos*, man, concerning which Mr. B. ſays three things to evince an explicit warrant. And firſt, Does not the term *anthrōpos*, man, often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies without regard to ſex? What a lame ſet-out towards an explicit warrant! Often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies! That's admirable on our ſide! This is what the learned call preſumptive evidence, and this is what Mr. B. produces towards an explicit warrant. Does he

think presumptive and explicit are the same? Whatever advantage Mr. B. may wish to take, yet I would not grant this were I in his place, lest some Pædobatist should take an advantage of it too. This presumptive mode of arguing on a positive institute will not do Mr. B. much credit; he must certainly put on a better appearance than this.

Well then, in the second place; "Have we not," says Mr. B. "the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the sanction of common sense, for understanding it thus in that passage?" 1 Cor. xi. 28. The authority of lexicographers! and common sense! Here is help for the learned, and the unlearned, that both may be able, after consultation had, to pick out an explicit warrant! For my own part, I do not much like the labour of turning over lexicographers at the best of times, and especially for an explicit warrant; *i. e.* a warrant that strikes the mind at once. I rather think Mr. B., if he wished people to labour for that which should be had without any labour at all, should have sent his inquirers to commentators as well as to lexicographers, to know how the Apostle used the word in question. But suppose we depend on the authority of these lexicographers, it may still be proper to ask, how it is they know in what manner the Apostle used this word! Do they know by analogy, or by inferring from other premises? Ah! Mr. B.! I fear these gentry would betray you. And to give you your due, you do not seem to place much confidence in them; for you say, that the authority of common sense is incomparably more.

Common ſenſe! Hardly one in five hundred is able to conſult a lexicographer, and therefore Mr. B. in order to make his explicit warrant explicit, furniſhes help to the unlearned. Well, common ſenſe, ſince it pleaſes Mr. B. though you do not underſtand Greek, to ſubmit to your determination, whether *anthrōpos* be an explicit word for a woman; and ſo, whether there be any explicit warrant for female communion: I will take the liberty of aſking a few queſtions. Do you know what Mr. B. means to prove from 1 Cor. xi. 28. Let a man, *anthrōpos*, examine himſelf, &c? Yes, he means to prove an explicit warrant for female communion. Very well. What is an explicit warrant? It is that, the ſenſe of which you inſtantly perceive, without the neceſſity of reaſoning upon it, or inferring it from ſome other part. Can a warrant be deemed explicit, if it be not founded on explicit words? Certainly not, for the words conſtitute the warrant. If the word *anthrōpos*, man, be uſed ſometimes for a male infant of eight days old, John, vii. 22, 23; and perhaps a hundred times in the New Teſtament for a male adult only; and ninteen times in the Septuagint and New Teſtament, to diſtinguiſh the male from the female when both are named; would you, after all this, conſider it as an explicit word for a woman? No, it is impoſſible. Mr. B. ſays, he has your authority for underſtanding it, as a name of our ſpecies, *i. e.* comprehending male and female, in this place; but if this word be not an explicit word for a woman, how do you know that women as well as men are included in it? I conclude it from this, that women as well as men were baptized, that they were received into the church; and therefore

muſt be implied in this word.—So, ſo! You conclude it by analogy, implication, and inference! Theſe are fine materials for an explicit warrant. *Cito in cellam abi*, and take your authority with you leſt Mr. B. ſhould flog you in his next publication for talking ſo much like a Pædobaptiſt.

But if the authority of lexicographers and common ſenſe will not bring the buſineſs home, Mr. B. is determined to make uſe of his own authority. He has no other way of preſerving the credit of his book; and, therefore, he will even riſk his own reputation rather than loſe his explicit warrant. He ventures in the third part to ſay, that "when the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *anthrōpos* but *aner*." This is Mr. B.'s own, and he himſelf is accountable for it. The aſſertion is made uſe of to give a colour to his explicit warrant; and it was, no doubt, the neceſſity of his caſe that drove him to this. He had preſſed the Pædobaptiſts, through a great part of his 875 pages, to produce an explicit warrant for infant baptiſm; and having thereby forged a chain for himſelf, he is now entangled in his turn. It is ſufficient for me, in this place, to ſay, that this aſſertion of Mr. B. is utterly falſe. I have already preſented the reader with nineteen inſtances out of the Septuagint and New Teſtament, which lie directly againſt him. Mr. B. in order to paſs off this aſſertion of his with a better grace, has given us a quotation, though not at all to the point, from Diogenes, out of his Life of Thales. What I have to ſay reſpecting the quotation is this, that had Diogenes, or any one elſe, affirmed the ſame as Mr. B. (which he has not, nor Thales neither), I would have linked them together as two falſe witneſſes.

And I say farther, it seems a marvellous thing, that Mr. B. should be so well acquainted with Thales, and his biographer Diogenes; and at the same time so excessively ignorant of his own Bible.

This is Mr B.'s first argument to prove an explicit warrant; and the parts of which it is composed are three. It is said, indeed, "a three-fold cord is not easily broken." But Solomon did not mean such a cord as Mr. B.'s; his is what people commonly call a rope of sand, which will by no means indure stretching. Here we have, in this part, a presumption to begin with; and next, implication and inference; and lastly, a broad falsehood to close the whole. This is Mr. B.'s method of making up an explicit warrant! And every one knows, that when presumption takes the lead, it is no wonder if falsehood should bring up the rear.

2. I come now to take notice of his second argument, taken from Paul's address to the church as a body; and which takes in the fourth part of his defence of female communion. His words are these: "Besides, when the Apostle delivered to the church at Corinth what he had received of the Lord; did he not deliver a command—a command to the whole church, consisting of women as well as men?" When he further says, "We being many, are one bread and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread; does he not speak of women as well as men?" This is Mr. B.'s way of producing an explicit warrant; did he not deliver a command to the whole church, consisting of women as well as men? and did he not speak of women as well as men? It was Mr. B.'s place to

ſhow by explicit words, that he did ſpeak of women as well as men; but ſince he has only propoſed his queſtions, and has not himſelf affirmed any thing, he ſeems willing to throw the work of inferring off from himſelf upon the reader. Mr. B. is an artful diſputant, he knew that reaſoning by inference, which he had ſo often exploded, would be highly unbecoming in him; and therefore, to avoid that, he puts it into the form of a queſtion, as if he would ſay, I leave you, my reader, to draw the inference.

If by the command in this argument Mr. B. means theſe words, "Let a man examin himſelf, &c." he had ſpoken upon it in his way before; and if it had contained any explicit warrant for female communion, it was certainly in his power to ſhow it: There could, therefore, be no neceſſity to produce it again, and eſpecially in the obſcure manner he has done. But if that be the command he intends, I defy him to ſhow one explicit word for female communion in any part of it. He has, indeed, in what he thought fit to advance upon it, ventured a preſumption, an inference, and a falſehood; of all which I have ſpoken ſufficiently already.

But I rather think he means ſome other command, becauſe he introduces it with the word, "beſides," as if intending ſome freſh matter. And if ſo, I know no more than the pen in my hand, what command it is he drives at. But be it what it may, he aſks, whether it was not to women as well as men? And I, on the other hand, declare I neither know what it was, nor to whom it was directed. It certainly was his duty to have ſpecified what the command was; and if it was a

command to receive the Lord's ſupper, he ſhould then have proved that females were as explicitly named therein as males. Does Mr. B. think, that, after all he has ſaid about expreſs commands, he himſelf is to take any thing for granted: or to form a concluſion by a gueſs? It muſt be abſurd in a man like him, who, when he pretends to produce an explicit warrant, talks to his reader about ſome unknown command; and then, inſtead of ſpecifying what this command was, and ſhowing that women were expreſsly named therein; leaves him, in the beſt way he can, to conjecture the whole.

Mr. B. having expreſſed himſelf plainly on the firſt argument, did thereby lay himſelf open to detection, and it became an eaſy buſineſs to expoſe him for his preſumptive argument, his inference, and his falſehood; but he has ſaved himſelf from that in his ſecond argument merely by the obſcurity of his language. Saved himſelf, did I ſay, by the obſcurity of his language? No, far from it. A man renders himſelf ſufficiently ridiculous, who comes full of his explicit warrant for female communion, and then ſays to his reader, Did not the Apoſtle deliver a command to women as well as to men? and did he not ſpeak to women as well as to men? When it was his buſineſs to ſhow that he did, and to bring explicit words to prove it.

3. I advert laſtly to Mr. B.'s third argument, which is taken from the condition and qualification of females; and comprehends the two laſt parts. Thus he expreſſes himſelf: "Again, are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper of which women are not equally capable as men?" And are not male and female one in Chriſt?—I have no

reaſon to complain of the ambiguity of this argument any more than that of the firſt; it is ſufficiently plain, that even he that runs may read it. I ſhall, therefore, only briefly obſerve upon it, that

The mode of reaſoning, which Mr. B. has openly adopted in this place, is that of analogy. The analogy lies between the male and the female, thus: That the one has the ſame pre-requiſites for the Lord's table as the other, and both the one and the other are in Jeſus Chriſt. From hence ariſes an inference: If both have the ſame relation to Chriſt, and the ſame pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, then the female muſt, by juſt conſequence, have the ſame right to the holy ſupper as the male.

Well ſaid, Mr. B.! This is ſo neat, that I could almoſt find in my heart to forget that explicit warrant which you had ſpoken of ſome time ago. Now you talk like a logical man—and a generous man too; for your laſt is better by far than your firſt. It muſt be much better to be thus open, than to hazard your reputation by any thing forced, or any thing falſe. You ſee what a good thing it is to have analogy and inference ready at hand, and how admirably adapted they are to help at a dead lift. We ſhould not deſpiſe any help, as we know not how ſoon we may need it; and, to give you your due, you have been neither too proud nor too ſtubborn to make uſe of this. You may be the more eaſily excuſed for what you have ſaid againſt analogy and inference, for as you are a Baptiſt, what you have ſaid was a matter of conſiſtency; but now you are become a patron of female communion, the caſe is altered, and

you are altered with it. But, at the same time, this is no more than what all the Baptists, with whom I have ever conversed on the subject, have done; and if it will be any comfort to you in this case, I can tell you, with great certainty, that I have met with many of your fraternity who have been as great changelings in this business as yourself. At present I only blame you for this, that under the colour of explicit proof, you should introduce, and endeavour to pass off, nothing better, but something far worse, than inferential reasoning.

I would just remark on what Mr. B. has advanced in support of his explicit warrant, that the defence he has set up carries in it its own conviction. I mean with respect to the number of particulars—the manner in which they are proposed, and the matter of which they consist.

Now it is the nature of an explicit warrant to show itself instantly to the mind of the reader; and its own evidence is the strongest it can have: The consequence is, that he who really produces one, neither can, nor does he need, to strengthen it by any reasons he can advance. *e. g.* Were I called upon to produce an explicit warrant for female baptism, I would only alledge those words in Acts, viii. 12. "They were baptized both men and women." These words strike the mind at once, and no reasoning whatever can add any thing to their strength or evidence; but Mr. B., by introducing six particulars, shows plainly that neither of them is explicit, and that it is not in his power to produce any explicit warrant at all: For had any one of these been explicit for female communion, he might very well have thrown away all the rest.

In this view there is another thing remarkable in his defence, and that is, that every ſentence but one runs in the form of a queſtion to the reader. Inſtead of advancing his explicit proof, Mr. B. comes to the reader *in forma pauperis*, with his petition in his mouth, as if he would ſay, O generous reader, grant me what I aſk, or—my cauſe is ruined! I have been driving againſt infant baptiſm with all my might, crying out, No explicit warrant, no explicit warrant for infant baptiſm in all the word of God! And now, as I am called upon myſelf to give an explicit warrant for female communion, I beſeech thee, indulgent reader, to admit my preſumption, falſehood, implication, inference, and analogy, for explicit proof, and thus in pity ſave my ſinking reputation: And your petitioner, as in duty bound, will ever ——. I ſaid that every ſentence in this defence but one was put in the form of a queſtion. Now what is ſtill more remarkable is this, that that one ſentence, which is the only affirmative in the whole defence, ſhould be the very falſehood againſt which I have already produced nineteen inſtances.

If we paſs from the number of parts which are contained in this defence, and the manner in which they are preſented to the reader, and come to the matter of it, we may ſay of that, that there is not a ſingle article in it but what is either falſe, or preſumptive, or inference, or analogy, or implication. Every part is reducible to one or other of theſe; and there is not one explicit word for female communion throughout the whole. Such a defence as this would not have done very well in the hands of a Pædobaptiſt; but when

adopted by a Baptiſt, it is ridiculous in himſelf, and an inſufferable abuſe of, and a burleſque upon, his reader. In ſhort, there is no explicit warrant to be had.

Now to the point. I was to prove that, according to the principles and reaſonings of the Baptiſts, a woman, however qualified, can have no right at all to the Lord's ſupper. We have ſeen, on the one hand, that it is not poſſible to produce an explicit warrant for female communion, and, on the other, Mr. B. affirms that they ſhould not be admitted without one; the reſult, therefore, is, that, according to Mr. B.'s mode of reaſoning, no woman has any right at all to communicate at the Lord's table: And as Mr. B. agrees with Baptiſts in general in this point, the ſame is true of the principles and reaſonings of them all.—This is the firſt conſequence which I undertook to make good againſt the Baptiſts, and from which they have only two ways of clearing themſelves. They muſt either give up their mode of reaſoning againſt infants, or, if they do not chooſe this, they muſt produce the ſame expreſs proof for female communion as they require for infant baptiſm.

As Mr. B. has plainly aſſerted that there can be no argument for female communion but ſuch as is founded on poſitive precept or example, recorded in Scripture, and relating to that very ordinance, it lies upon him to come forward and produce his warrant, or give up female communion. If I were to anſwer his book, I would turn the inquiry from infant baptiſm to female communion, and then put it upon him to make good his concluſion for the right of females upon the very ſame

principles which he employs againſt infants. And I do now in good earneſt put this upon him, and heartily invite him to the taſk, being verily perſuaded that if this ſubject were thoroughly ſifted, it would be the ſpeedieſt method of adjuſting the debate.

When I had compared what Mr. B. has ſaid againſt infants with what he has ſaid in defence of women, I have been ready to ſuſpect that he deſigned his book ſhould operate on the Pædobaptiſt ſide; for, when ſpeaking againſt infant baptiſm, he carries his demand of expreſs, unequivocal, and explicit proof ſo high, and enlarges upon it ſo much, as if, by making it exceedingly remarkable, he wiſhed ſome one to compare the whole with his defence of female communion, and perceived that the moment this was done, the cauſe of the Baptiſts would fall. And had Mr. B. been a perſon whoſe character for integrity was not known, it would have been a matter of ſome difficulty with me to determine whether he did not deſign, in a covert way, to run down the Baptiſts' ſide? But knowing him to be a man of good reputation, I readily acquit him of this; yet I think, at the ſame time, that his book, though written on the Baptiſt ſide, will do more towards overturning the Baptiſt ſentiment than any one that has been written for many centuries.

Thus much for the firſt conſequence, viz. that, according to the reaſonings of the Baptiſts, no woman has any more right to the Lord's ſupper than an infant has to baptiſm. But they, not liking this conſequence, are induced to ſet up a defence of female communion on the ground of expreſs warrant; and in doing this, they prevaricate, diſcard

their own principle, reaſon by analogy and inference, and fall into ſelf-contradiction: This is the ſecond conſequence I have before mentioned, and which I will now plainly evince.

Mr. Booth, in vol. ii. p. 509, expreſſes his ſurpriſe at the inconſiſtency of Pædobaptiſts with each other. "But is it not," ſays he, "I appeal to the reader, is it not a very ſingular phænomenon in the religious world, that ſo many denominations of proteſtants ſhould all agree in one general concluſion, and yet differ to ſuch an extreme about the premiſes whence it ſhould be inferred?" To this I only ſay, if it be a very ſingular phænomenon for a number of perſons to be inconſiſtent with each other, it muſt be a more ſingular one ſtill for one man to differ from himſelf. We will take a view of Mr. B. in a double capacity—as a patron of female communion, and as an oppoſer of infant baptiſm.

Mr. B.'s defence of female communion does not take up one clear page; the falſehood, and the quotation made uſe of to ſet it off, make up more than one third of the defence; ſo there are only nineteen lines remaining: I will, therefore, ſelect ſome paſſages from his oppoſition to infant baptiſm, and place them againſt what he has advanced, in theſe nineteen lines, in defence of female communion. I do this to ſhow that a Baptiſt cannot maintain that ground on which he oppoſes infant baptiſm—that he is compelled to deſert his own principle, and does actually prevaricate, and contradict himſelf; from which, as well as from other topics, it will appear, that the cauſe of the Baptiſts is a loſt cauſe. I ſhall now introduce Mr. B. in his double capacity.—

I. When M. B. is an oppoſer of infant baptiſm, he ſpeaketh on this wiſe: Vol. ii. p. 228. "This being the caſe, we may ſafely conclude that all reaſoning from data of a moral kind, and the ſuppoſed fitneſs of things, is wide of the mark." Vol. i. p. 227. "But when our divine Lord, addreſſing his diſciples in a poſitive command, ſays, 'It ſhall be ſo,' or when, ſpeaking by an apoſtolic example, he declares, 'It is thus,' all our own reaſonings about *fitneſs*, expediency, or utility, muſt hide their impertinent heads."

But when Mr. B. becomes a defender of female communion, he expreſſeth himſelf thus: Vol. ii. p. 73, 74. "In regard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply by demanding—Are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?" Thus Mr. B. He only aſks the queſtion, and leaves the inference to the reader. This is artfully done, for fear he ſhould ſeem to prove a right to a poſitive inſtitute by inference.

The reader is deſired to obſerve that Mr. B., in oppoſing infant baptiſm, will admit of no reaſoning from moral data, or the ſuppoſed fitneſs of things, and ſays that all ſuch reaſoning is wide of the mark. And he likewiſe ſays, "that all our reaſonings about fitneſs—muſt hide their impertinent heads." But, in defending female communion, he aſks, "Are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?" Here Mr. B., the patron of female communion, adopts the ſame reaſoning which Mr. B., the oppoſer of infant baptiſm, had declared to be wide of the mark. As the patron

of females he will reafon from the fitnefs of things —" are there any pre-requifites for the holy fupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?" As the oppofer of infants, he infifted that all fuch reafonings fhould hide their impertinent heads. If the patron of females and the oppofer of infants be the fame perfon, he muft be guilty of a miferable prevarication; for he attempts to pafs off that reafoning upon others, which he himfelf declares to be wide of the mark; and will needs bring thofe heads of reafoning to light, which he brands with the name of impertinent, and fays that their impertinent heads muft be hid. This in and out proceeding of the patron of females and oppofer of infants I fubmit to the judgment of the reader, and leave the patron and oppofer to fettle the matter the beft way he can.

II. Again, Mr. B., when oppofing infant baptifm, fays, vol. i. p. 23. "Seeing baptifm is really and entirely a pofitive inftitution, we cannot with fafety infer either the mode or the fubject of it from any thing fhort of a precept, or a precedent, recorded in Scripture, and relating to that very ordinance." Vol. ii. p. 227. "Baptifm, being a branch of pofitive worfhip, depends entirely on the fovereign will of its Author; which will, revealed in pofitive precepts, or by apoftolic examples, is the only rule of its adminiftration." And in vol. ii. p. 44, he fays, "The inquirer has nothing to do but open the New Teftament, and confult a few expreſs commands and plain examples, and conſider the natural and proper ſenſe of the words, and then, without the aid of commentators, or the help of critical acumen, he may decide on the queſtion before him." A little after

he ſpeaks of expreſs commands and expreſs examples, which is his uniform mode of expreſſion when oppoſing infants.

But when Mr. B. comes to defend female communion, he expreſſes himſelf thus: Vol. ii. p. 73. "In regard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply by demanding—Does not the term *anthrōpos*, there uſed, *often* ſtand as a name of our ſpecies without regard to ſex? Have we not the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of common ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in that paſſage? When the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *anthrōpos* but *aneer*."

The reader is requeſted to notice, that Mr. B., as an oppoſer of infant baptiſm, contends for precept, poſitive precept, expreſs commands, or expreſs examples, and ſays, in his index, that the law of inſtitutes muſt be expreſs, &c; but, as a defender of female communion, he takes up with an ambiguous word, a mere preſumptive proof—"Does not," ſays he, "the term *anthrōpos often ſtand* as a name of our ſpecies?" and this preſumption he attempts to ſtrengthen by a falſehood, of which I have already ſpoken. As an oppoſer of infants he ſays the inquirer may decide the queſtion without the aid of commentators, or the help of critical acumen; but, as a patron of females, he firſt furniſhes his reader with an ambiguous word, and then ſends him to lexicographers to have it manufactured into a poſitive one. Since it was not in Mr. B.'s power to form a poſitive precept out of an ambiguous word, without the aid of a little inference, he very artfully

throws it into the hands of lexicographers and common ſenſe to effect this buſineſs for him. And one cannot ſufficiently admire how tenacious he is of expreſs precept when an oppoſer of infants, while at the ſame time, as the patron of females, he is ſo very complying, that he can even admit preſumptive evidence to paſs for an explicit warrant.

III. Further, Mr. B., in oppoſing infant baptiſm, expreſſes himſelf thus: Vol. i. p. 22. "Nor does it appear from the records of the Old Teſtament, that when Jehovah appointed any branch of ritual worſhip, he left either the ſubjects of it, or the mode of adminiſtration, to be inferred by the people from the relation in which they ſtood to himſelf, or from general moral precepts, or from any branch of his moral worſhip, nor yet from any other well-known poſitive rite; but he gave them ſpecial directions relating to the very caſe." In vol. ii. p. 227, he ſays, "But ſuppoſing it were clearly evinced that all the children of believers are intereſted in the covenant of grace, it would not certainly follow that they are entitled to baptiſm; for baptiſm, being a branch of poſitive worſhip, depends entirely on the ſovereign will of its Author, which will, revealed in poſitive precepts, or by apoſtolic examples, is the only rule of its adminiſtration." And in the ſame page he ſays, "So far is it from being a fact, that an intereſt in the new covenant, and a title to poſitive inſtitutes may be inferred the one from the other."

But in proving the right of women to the Lord's table, he ſays, vol. ii. p. 73, 74. "In regard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting

women to the holy table, we reply by demaning —Are not male and female one in Chriſt?" As if he ſhould ſay, if a female be in Chriſt, which is the ſame as being in the covenant of grace, ſhe muſt have a right to a poſitive inſtitute. Here is art and inference together! The art appears in this, that Mr. B. would not be ſeen to draw the inference himſelf, but leaves that to a Pædobaptiſt, who is more accuſtomed to that kind of work.

But leaving Mr. B.'s piece of art in ſhunning to draw the inference, I would deſire the reader to attend him once more in his double capacity. In that of an oppoſer of infants he affirms, that a right to a poſitive ordinance is not to be inferred from the relation we ſtand in to God; when a patron of females, he will infer their right to the Lord's ſupper from their being one in Chriſt with males. As an oppoſer of infants, he inſiſts that an intereſt in the covenant of grace, though clearly evinced, gives no claim to an inſtituted rite; as a patron of females, he contends that if a woman be intereſted in Chriſt, ſhe has therefore a right to ſuch an inſtitute. As an oppoſer, he declares it is far from being a fact, that an intereſt in the new covnant, and a title to poſitive inſtitutes, may be inferred the one from the other; as a patron, he will do that which is ſo far from being a fact: He infers the one from the other, the right from the intereſt—are not male and female one in Chriſt? He is very inflexible as an oppoſer, and very pliant as a patron. "*Subjecta mutata ſunt, et ille cum illis.* So that, however the oppoſer of infants may differ in his mode of reaſoning from Pædobaptiſts, the patron of females finds it neceſſary to reaſon in the

ſame way. It is pity the patron and oppoſer do not agree, as it would certainly be for the credit of both to ſettle on ſome uniform mode of logic.

Before I turn from this phænomenon in the religious world, I would juſt glance at Mr. B.'s defence of female communion by itſelf. Mr. B. ſhould have made this a diſtinct chapter, and ſhould have placed a title at the head of it; but as he has not done this, I will take the liberty of doing it for him: and the reader may obſerve, in the mean time, how the chapter and title will agree. Mr. B. begins his defence in theſe words: "In regard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply," &c. This will furniſh with a title, which will run thus:

The Right of Women to the Lord's Table, founded on explicit Warrant.

N B. An explicit warrant for females is one wherein their ſex is ſpecified, and is oppoſed to all implication, analogy, and inference.—Now for the Chapter.

"Does not Paul, when he ſays, 'Let a man examine himſelf, and ſo let him eat,' enjoin a reception of the ſacred ſupper? Does not the term *anthrōpos*, there uſed, *often* ſtand as a name of our ſpecies without regard to ſex?" [This is preſumptive proof.] "Have we not the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of common ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in that paſſage?" [This is inference.] "When the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *anthrōpos* but *aneer*."

[This is falſe.] "When the Apoſtle delivered to the church at Corinth what he had received of the Lord, did he not deliver a command—a command to the whole church, conſiſting of women as well as men?" [This at beſt is implication or preſumption.] "When he further ſays, We, being many, are one bread and one body, for we all are partakers of that one bread, does he not ſpeak of women as well as of men?" [This is the ſame as before; and Mr. Peirce would have ſaid, "Infants," as well as men and women.] "Again, are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?" [This is analogy and inference together.] "And are not male and female one in Chriſt?" [This is analogy and inference again.]

The reader will obſerve that the Title promiſes an explicit warrant, that is, a warrant in which the ſex is ſpecified, and which ſtands oppoſed to implication, analogy, and inference; but the Chapter produces nothing explicit, the whole being nothing more than a compound of preſumption, falſehood, implication, analogy, and inference. Thus it appears how the Title and Chapter agree, or rather, diſagree; and that Mr. B. himſelf is one of the moſt wonderful phænomena which the religious world has afforded.

The whole of Mr. B.'s conduct in this affair brings to mind a paſſage of Mr. Alſop, which Mr. B. has quoted in vol. ii. p. 507. "The reader will learn at leaſt how impoſſible it is for error to be conſonant to itſelf. As the two mill-ſtones grind one another as well as the grain, and as the extreme vices oppoſe each other as well as the intermediate virtue that lies between them, ſo

have all errors this fate (and it is the beſt quality they are guilty of), that they duel one another with the ſame heat that they oppoſe the truth." Mr. B.'s two mill-ſtones are his oppoſition to infant baptiſm, and his defence of female communion. Theſe two militant parts, like the two mill-ſtones, do operate in hoſtile mode, and rub, and chafe, and grind each other, as well as infant baptiſm, which lies between. And it is certainly the beſt property Mr. B.'s book is poſſeſſed of, that it exhibits the author in his double capacity, not only as militating againſt the baptiſm of infants, but as duelling and battering himſelf with the ſame heat with which he oppoſes that. Three ſhort reflections on this conduct of Mr. B. and one apology, will finiſh this part of the ſubject.

I. There is ſomething in this conduct very unfair. No man ſhould bind a burden on others, which he himſelf would not touch with one of his fingers. Can it be deemed an upright proceeding in Mr. B. to cry down all reaſoning by analogy and inference on a poſitive inſtitute, and after that uſe the ſame reaſoning, and even worſe, himſelf? Can it be conſidered fair to demand, repeatedly and loudly to demand, ſpecial, expreſs, and explicit proof, and then put off the reader with preſumption, inference, and analogy? Certainly he ſhould do as he would be done by; but if this conduct of his be fair, I know not what is otherwiſe.

II. There is ſomething in this conduct very impolitic. After Mr. B. had demanded poſitive, expreſs, and explicit proof, and had run down all proof by analogy and inference, he ſhould, if he had had but a little policy, have kept that de-

fence of female communion entirely out of sight. It was not crafty in him, though there is a spice of it in the defence itself, to suffer that to go abroad, which, when set against what he had said in opposition to infant baptism, would run down and ruin the whole. Had I been he, and wished my other arguments to stand, I would have taken that defence, and thrown it into the fire.

III. There is something in this conduct very unfortunate. It is a sad case that a book should be so written, that one part shall rise up against and ruin the other. Mr. B., Sampson-like, when opposing infant baptism, thinks he can carry gates and bars and every thing else away; but when he defends female communion, Sampson-like again, he becomes like another man, that is a Pædobaptist: For he reasons, infers, and proves (set aside his falsehood and presumption), in the very same way. In one thing, however, he differs, and herein he is unfortunate, that instead of killing the Philistines, to wit, the arguments of Pædobaptists, he falls to combating himself, and destroys his own.

What shall we say to these things? I reply, that with respect to myself I say thus much: that as he is unfair, I would dislike him; as he is impolitic, I would excuse him; as he is unfortunate, I would pity him; and, under all these views, I would make the best apology for him which the nature of the case will admit.

Since it is evident that Mr. B. demands express, positive, and explicit proof with respect to the mode and subject of an instituted rite, and as it is equally evident that he himself reasons on such a rite by implication, analogy, and inference,

the apology I make for him, and it is the beſt I can make, is this: That he underſtood explicit proof, which he had ſo much inſiſted on, and proof by inference, which he himſelf adopted, to mean preciſely the ſame thing, ſo that when any thing was proved by inference, &c. that proof was conſidered by him as expreſs and explicit. This, I ſay, is the beſt apology I can make for thoſe repugnancies, or (if this apology be admitted) ſeeming repugnancies, I find in his book. But, methinks, I hear ſome Pædobaptiſt ſay, If this apology be good, it will indeed reconcile ſome of his inconſiſtencies, but then he will, at the ſame time, ſtand in need of another; for if expreſs proof and proof by inference be the ſame thing, I ſhould be glad to know why he wrote his book at all. To this I can only ſay, that I have no other apology to make; *ætatem habet*, let him apologize for himſelf. Leaving Mr. B., or any one elſe, to manage theſe prevarications, &c. the beſt way he can, I paſs to the third conſequence, namely,

That, according to the principles and reaſonings of the Baptiſts, God had no church in this world at leaſt for fifteen hundred years.

The way in which the Baptiſts are driven into this conſequence is this; When it is urged againſt them that infants were conſtituted church-members, and were, by the Lord himſelf, deemed fit ſubjects of a religious rite, they, in order to avoid a conſequence which would bear hard on their arguments, endeavour to reduce this church into a mere civil ſociety; and as they cannot deny the membership of infants, they try to eſcape by deſtroying the church. Now as this is a neceſſary

conſequent of their principle, it will ſerve to diſcover the error of that principle of which it is a conſequent.

Mr. B., in trying to effect his eſcape in this way, has uſed a language, which, if true, will prove that God for many centuries had no church at all in this world. This is Mr. B.'s expedient, but it is a deſperate one. In vol. ii. p. 252, he calls the then exiſting church, an "eccleſiaſtico-political conſtitution." By this compound word he ſeems to conſider the church under the notion of an amphibious ſociety; partly civil, and partly religious. And he might have likewiſe conſidered, that, as nothing in nature differs more than policy among men, and piety towards God, they muſt be viewed in all bodies of men, whether large or ſmall, as things totally and at all times diſtinct. But this Mr. B.'s ſyſtem would not admit. Now in a large body, as the Jews for inſtance, all laws pertaining to human ſociety, as ſuch, were civil laws; and all laws, though in the ſame code with the others, relating to the worſhip of God, were, properly ſpeaking, eccleſiaſtical laws. So with reſpect to men, when they are united in promoting order and mutual ſecurity, they are to be conſidered as a political ſtate; but if ſome, or all of theſe profeſs piety towards God, and unite in his worſhip, they are to be viewed as a viſible church. And though all the inhabitants of Judea belonged to the ſtate, it will not follow that all belonged to the viſible church. There were without doubt ſome excommunicated perſons, ſome who voluntarily withdrew, and there might be many, who came into the land of Iſrael, that did not join themſelves to the Lord. There was, therefore, no juſt reaſon

why Mr. B. ſhould confound things, which in their own nature are and ever muſt be, ſeparate. Neither is it probable he would have done it, if he had not been compelled by his oppoſition to the continuance of infant membership.

Though Mr. B., by the phraſe eccleſiaſtico-political conſtitution, has confounded the church and ſtate, the one being a kingdom of this world, the other the kingdom of Chriſt; yet as ſomething of church ſtill makes its appearance, the conſequence charged on Baptiſt principles may not ſeem to be clearly evinced. 'Tis true he ſeems to grant two parts, the political and eccleſiaſtical; but if we look more narrowly into his book, the eccleſiaſtical part diſappears, and nothing will remain but the political only.

In vol. ii. p. 251, Mr. B. has theſe emphatic words, "To be an obedient ſubject of their [the Jews] civil government, and a complete member in their church-ſtate, were the ſame thing." Every one knows, that a civil government, be it where it may, is converſant about preſent things, it is a government among [*cives*] citizens as ſuch, and is deſigned to regulate their worldly concerns. An obedient ſubject of ſuch a government, is one who quietly and cheerfully ſubmits to its regulations, and ſeeks the peace and ſecurity of that community to which he belongs. Now Mr. B. aſſures us that ſuch was the nature of things among the Jews, that "an obedient ſubject of the civil government, and a complete member of the church-ſtate, were the ſame." If this were ſo, it muſt be becauſe the civil government was nothing leſs than the church; and the church was nothing more than the civil government; that is, they

were both the same thing. It signifies nothing by what name we call this community, whether a national church, or an ecclesiastico-political constitution; it means no more at last than a civil government: For, as Mr. B. informs us, there was nothing more required in a complete member of what he calls the church, than his being an obedient subject of the civil government. Now as this, whatever it was, could be no church of God, and as it is not supposed there was a church of a higher nature in any other part; it will follow, that, according to Mr. B.'s principles, God had for many centuries no such thing as a church, properly so called, in this world.

What a dreadful ecclesiæcide in this same Mr. B.! And when we consider that all this results from principle, and is carried on by regular logical process; what a horrid principle must that be which leads a man to destroy the very church of God! Though I have been a Baptist myself for several years, I never till lately discerned this shocking consequence of the Baptist sentiment. And I am much indebted to Mr. B. for an insight into this, as well as other consequences which necessarily result from the Baptist scheme. And I have no doubt but his book, when nicely examined, will do more good this way than any thing which has hitherto been written on the subject.

As Mr. B., to preserve his system, has laid violent hands on the ancient church of God; we cannot suppose that that which was connected with it could possibly escape. He that could reduce the church into a civil government, will not think it much to manufacture a religious institute into a political rite. What was circumcision? According to Mr.

B.'s Talmud, "it was a ſign of carnal deſcent, a mark of national diſtinction, and a token of intereſt in temporal bleſſings." Here indeed is a good match; a civil inſtitute, and a civil government! Now, though there is not a word of truth in all this; yet this honor Mr. B. ſhall have, and it is an honor I cannot always give him, that in this he is actually conſiſtent with himſelf: He has ſecularized the church and the inſtitute together.

I will not now contend with Mr. B. whether he has given a true account of the ancient church, and its members; it is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe to take notice of what he has affirmed. Yet I could wiſh, ſhould he write again upon the ſubject (as I hope he will), to ſee a fuller account of that church, the complete members of which were only obedient ſubjects of the civil government. I have never, in my ſmall reading, met with a definition of a church like this; it is enough for me now that Mr. B. has. My buſineſs is not to diſpute, but to take it upon his word. I only ſay, that if ſuch a church did ever exiſt, whatever it was, it could be no church of God. And as there was no better church, *i. e.* a civil government, in any other part; there was not, on Mr. B.'s principles, for many centuries, a church of God, properly ſo called, in all the world.

"An obedient ſubject of their civil government, and a complete member of their church ſtate, were the ſame thing." The ſame thing! If, then, the complete member was no more than an obedient ſubject; the church ſtate could be no more than a civil government: For, according to Mr. B., they were preciſely the ſame thing. What might be the reaſon of all this? Mr. B. ſhall in-

form us himself; it was, "Because by treating Jehovah as their political sovereign, they avowed him as the true God." As it is not my business in this place to oppose any thing Mr. B. says, I shall only take the liberty to explain. What is a political sovereign? He is one who reigns over others in civil things; that is, he governs and regulates the affairs of this present world. This is the reason then, that an obedient subject of civil government, and a complete church-member, were the same thing; because all that God had to do with them was, as a political sovereign, to regulate the affairs of the present world.

But where would have been the harm of supposing the ever-blessed Jehovah to have been more, infinitely more, than a political sovereign? And that he gave his word and ordinances to lead to the faith of Christ? That he sent his prophets to bear witness, that through his name whosoever believed in him should receive remission of sins? That he formed a people for himself, to shew forth his praise? Where, I say, would have been the harm of supposing this? None at all in reality; the harm would only have been to Mr. B.'s system. For had Jehovah been a religious sovereign, he would have had a religious community, and that community would have been a religious church, *i. e.* a church professing godliness; and then, an obedient subject of civil government would not have been a complete member; and then, their institute would have been a religious institute; and then—what then? And then Mr. B.'s system would have gone to ruin. But he, wisely foreseeing this, takes measures to secularize the whole. He begins at the head, and goes down to the institute. Jehovah

muſt be a political ſovereign, that the church may be political; the church muſt be political, that the membership may be ſo too; the membership muſt be political, that the inſtitute may be political alſo. So all was political; a political ſovereign, a political church, a political member, and a political inſtitute. And now Mr. B. has gained his point; for ſure enough there can be no analogy between a church and no church; and conſequently no argument can be drawn in favour of infant membership from a church which never was, to a church that now exiſts. Yes, he has gained his point, he has run down infant baptiſm; but, at the ſame time, he has eradicated the church of God. Nay, he was under a neceſſity of eradicating the church of God, that infant baptiſm might be run down. This has given me a notion of infant baptiſm far different from what I ever had. And, if I could ſay, that any one thing has ſatisfied my mind reſpecting it more than another, it has been this: I ſaw that infant baptiſm could by no means be overthrown, without overthrowing the church of God. And for this conviction I am indebted to that very book, on which I have taken the liberty to animadvert. Nothing, therefore, in nature can be plainer than this conſequence, that the ſyſtem of Mr. B. has ſubverted the church of God.

Theſe are the three conſequences which riſe out of the Baptiſt ſyſtem, and which, I have ſaid, will operate to ruin that ſyſtem out of which they ariſe: Namely,

1. That, according to the principles and reaſonings of the Baptiſts, a woman, however qualified, can have no right to the Lord's table.

2. That the Baptists, in opposing infant baptism, and defending female communion, do vary their mode of reasoning, contradict themselves, and prevaricate most wretchedly.

3. That, according to their principles and reasoning, God had no church in this world for many centuries.

I shall now close the Appendix by an appeal to the reader; and this I mean to do in three questions.

1. Are these consequences real? To answer this question I need only appeal to the Appendix itself. There the reader may satisfy himself respecting their reality. As to the first, it is there evident, that there is no explicit command for female communion; and, according to the Baptist system, they are not to communicate without: The consequence is, that they have no right to communicate at all. With regard to the second, I have placed Mr. B.'s defence of female communion against his opposition to infant baptism; and what repugnancy, prevarication, and self-contradiction, are discoverble in these two, I have presented to the reader. The third speaks openly for itself, that the best church in the world for many centuries was nothing else but a civil government.

2. Do these consequences rise out of the Baptists' system? For an answer to this I might refer the reader to the former part of the Appendix; where he may see in what way they actually do arise out of their system. Their system destroys the right of females to the Lord's supper, by demanding explicit proof for infant baptism; because there is no such proof for female communion.

Their attempt to prove the right of females to commune, involves them in the most mean prevarication and self-contradiction. And in overthrowing the argument for infant baptism taken from the membership of infants in God's ancient church, they overthrow the very church itself. In this way, these horrid consequences owe their birth to that bad system.

3. Are such consequences as these which rise out of the Baptist system, sufficient to ruin that system out of which they rise? To this I answer, that if any consequences are sufficient to ruin a system, these are they. It is a rule in reasoning, that that argument which proves too much destroys itself. The same is also true of a system; the system that proves too much must follow the fate of its kindred argument, and prove its own destruction. This system, it is true, proves against infant baptism; but there it does not stop, it carries its force still farther, it proves against female communion, and against the existence of God's church; and to complete the whole, it proves against the author who patronizes it. So that if infant baptism fall, they all fall together; female communion falls, the church of God falls, the author himself, Mr. B., falls, and all by the same fatal system. For if this system make infant baptism a nullity, it makes female communion a nullity too; and turns the church itself into a civil government, and turns the patron of it into a self-contradictor. This, if any thing can be, is proving too much; and, therefore, that system which is productive of such consequences, must itself be destroyed by the consequences it produces. And I appeal to the

conſcience of any reader whether theſe conſequences have not been proved, and whether they are not ſufficient to deſtroy any ſyſtem.

I call this a ſhort method with the Baptiſts, becauſe, whatever courſe they may take, it will ſerve to ruin their ſcheme. If, on the one hand, theſe conſequences are ſuffered to remain as they do now in Mr. B.'s book, their ſcheme will be ruined this way. For that ſyſtem can have no pretenſion at all to truth, which in its conſequences militates againſt female communion, and the very exiſtence of the church of God; and moreover exhibits the patron of it under the ſhape of a ſhifter, prevaricator, and ſelf-contradictor. But if, on the other hand, they alter their mode of defence ſo as to avoid theſe conſequences, their ſcheme will be ruined that way: For then, they will loſe thoſe very arguments by which they endeavour to ſupport it. So that let a Baptiſt, Mr. B. for inſtance, take which way he will, his ſcheme will either be overwhelmed with its own conſequences, or it will fall for want of arguments.

Thus much I ſay at preſent concerning the Appendix: And ſhall now commit it into the hands of God, the eternal patron of truth, and to every reader's judgment and conſcience in his ſight.

A CASE

SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF BAPTISTS.

BEFORE I enter on the Mode of Baptiſm, I would take the liberty of propoſing to my Baptiſt friends a plain caſe; not ſo much a caſe of conſcience as a caſe of criticiſm. That on which this caſe is founded is as follows: It is well known that under the preſent diſpenſation there are two inſtituted ordinances; the one in Scripture is expreſſed by the term *deipnon*, a ſupper, the other by *baptiſma*, baptiſm. The proper and obvious meaning of *deipnon* is a feaſt or a common meal, Mark, vi. 21; John, xxi. 22; the proper meaning of *baptiſma* is ſaid to be the immerſion of the whole body. The caſe then is this:

If, becauſe the proper meaning of the term *baptiſma*, baptiſm, is the immerſion of the whole body, a perſon, who is not immerſed, cannot be ſaid to have been baptized, ſince nothing ſhort of immerſion amounts to the full import of the word baptiſm. If this be true, I ſhould be glad to know that as *deipnon*, a ſupper, properly means a feaſt or a common meal, whether a perſon who, in the uſe of that ordinance, takes only a piece of bread of half an inch ſquare, and drinks a table-ſpoon full of wine, which is neither a feaſt nor a common meal, and ſo does not come up to the proper meaning of the word, can be ſaid to have received the Lord's ſupper?

Mr. Booth, I preſume, ſaw this in Mr. Piries' book, but has not taken any notice of it; I therefore requeſt ſome Baptiſt friend to turn his attention to it.

OF THE MODE OF BAPTISM.

IT appears to me, from the following circumſtance, that the Baptiſts are not ſo tenacious of the mode as of the ſubject of baptiſm. I had been convinced more than four years ago, in reading Dr. Williams's book, that immerſion was not eſſential to baptiſm; and though I preached ſince that period ſeveral baptizing ſermons without ſaying a word about the mode, I never heard of any of our Baptiſt friends that ever obſerved that omiſſion; whereas, on the contrary, had I inſiſted on the mode, and omitted the ſubject, I have not a doubt but they would have noticed it in the firſt ſermon: And I remember ſome years back to have heard a Baptiſt miniſter ſay, that the mode of baptiſm, by immerſion only, did not appear equally plain as the ſubject. Indeed I am perſuaded that if it can be made plain to the Baptiſts that it is wrong to reject an infant, they will ſoon give up the idea of immerſion only; and it is for this reaſon that I have been the more diffuſe on the ſubject, and ſhall now be ſhort on the mode.

All our knowledge of the manner of baptizing muſt, at this diſtance of time from the firſt inſtitution, be collected from the word "baptize," the circumſtances of baptiſm, and the alluſions of Scripture to that ordinance: Theſe three I will endeavour to examine impartially, confining myſelf to Scripture, and the word made uſe of in the inſtitute. The queſtion, on which this examination is to proceed, is this; Is immerſion eſſential to bap-

tism? or, in other words, Is there no baptism but what is by immersion? I shall begin the inquiry with that precise term which the Scriptures always use when this ordinance is spoken of, namely *baptize*, and examine those places in which it occurs either as a noun or a verb, where the ordinance is not intended.

There is a word commonly introduced into this debate, viz. *bapto*, though it is never used in Scripture, respecting this ordinance; and this being the fact, I see no great propriety in bringing it into the debate at all; for let it mean what it may, it can signify nothing to the question in hand unless it had been used by the inspired writers to express this ordinance. I do not, however, shun this term because it would be unfavourable to my sentiment, but because I judge it best to examine that word, and that only, which the Holy Ghost, when speaking of this ordinance, has thought proper to adopt.

Nevertheless, that I may not omit it altogether, I would say thus much of the term *bapto*, that it is a term of such latitude, that he who shall attempt to prove, from its use in various authors, an absolute and total immersion, will find he has undertaken that which he can never fairly perform. Of the truth of this assertion I would give the plain reader a taste in the following instances. The term *bapto* then is used to express,

1. The throwing of a person into the mire. Job, ix. 31. *en rōpō me ebapsas*, Thou shalt plunge, baptize, or make me foul in the mire.

2. A partial dipping. Matt. xxvi. 23. *O embapsas met emou en tō trublio touton cheira.* He that dippeth, baptizeth, his hand with me in the dish.

3. A ſtained garment. Rev. xix. 13. *imation Bebammenon aimati.* A veſture dipped, baptized, ſtained with blood.

4. A human body wet with the dew. Dan. iv. 33. *apo tou droſou tou ouranou to ſoma autou ebaphē.* His body was wet, baptized by or from the dew of heaven.

5. The colouring a lake with the blood of a frog. Homer, *ebapteto de aimati limne.* The lake was baptized, coloured, or ſtained with blood.

6. The ſmearing of the face with colours or waſhes. Ariſtophanes, *baptomenos batracheiois.* He baptized, ſmeared [his face] with tawny waſhes; ſpeaking of Magnes, the comedian, who uſed to colour his face inſtead of uſing a maſk.

7. The ſtaining of the hand by preſſing a ſubſtance. Ariſtotle, *Thlibomenos de baptei teen cheira.* Being preſſed, it baptizes, ſtains the hand.

So various is the uſe of the term *bapto*, that we can only view it as meaning to wet or ſtain, and that by whatever mode the nature of the thing to be wetted or ſtained may require. And I can truly ſay I have often been heartily ſick and ſorry when I have obſerved perſons of eminence for learning, eſpecially Dr. Gale, labouring, in oppoſition to the very inſtances which they themſelves had produced, to prove that this term intended immerſion, total immerſion, and nothing elſe. But as this word is never uſed with reſpect to the ordinance in queſtion, and can therefore give us no information concerning the mode of it, I ſhall immediately diſmiſs it without further notice.

I come now to conſider the term *baptizo*, which is the only term made uſe of to expreſs this ordinance, and this I ſhall do by ſetting down thoſe

places where it is used as a verb or a noun when the ordinance is not intended. These places are as follow: Heb. ix. 10. "Which stood in meats and drinks and divers washing—*diaphorois baptismois*, divers baptisms." Mark, 7. 4. "And when they came from the market, except they wash, *nce baptisōntai*, except they baptize, they eat not. And many other things there be which they have received to hold, as the washing, *baptimous*, baptisms of cups and pots, brazen vessels and of tables." Luke, xi. 38. "And when the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he had not first washed, *ebaptisthee*, baptized, before dinner." The word, in these instances, is used,

1. For those various ablutions among the Jews, by sprinkling, pouring, &c.

2. For a custom among the Pharisees of washing before meals.

3. For a superstitious washing of household furniture, cups, pots, &c.

With these instances in view I would propose to the reader two questions:

I. Is the word baptize used in these instances to express immersion only? The reader may observe that the very first instance proves it is not. The Apostle plainly expresses the Jewish ablutions by the term "baptisms;" and any man, by looking into his Bible, and reading the account of the Jewish service, may see what kind of baptisms these were. Mr. Booth himself, in his answer to Dr. Williams, p. 347, will grant for the sake of argument, that the Apostle uses the term baptisms in this place to denote pouring and sprinkling as well as immersion; nor does he, in what he has advanced on the subject, deny this to have

been the fact; and indeed a man must be very defective in point of modesty who will even attempt to deny this. Well then, if the word baptism is not used in these instances, as it is certain it is not, to express immersion only, I ask, in the next place—Is it used to express any immersion at all? I will apply this question to each of the instances:

1. The Apostle speaks of the Jewish service, and says it stood in "divers baptisms." I ask whether immersion of the whole body was any part of that service? It is clear that the Apostle, by the word "baptisms," intended sprinkling and pouring; but I believe it is not clear from any part of the Jewish service, that any one was ordered to immerse himself, or to be immersed by another. If this, however, can be proved, it must then be granted that the Apostle uses the word "baptisms" to denote immersion as well as pouring and sprinkling; but if this cannot be proved, it will then be evident that no immersion at all is intended by the word baptisms.

2. I will apply the question to the second case—the baptizing before meals. It is said, "that when they come from market, except they baptize they eat not;" and "the Pharisee marvelled that our Lord did not baptize (that is, himself) before dinner." I ask, Is there any immersion at all here? The Pharisee marvelled that our Lord did not baptize himself before dinner—did he marvel that he did not immerse himself? The Pharisees, when they come from market, except they baptize [themselves], they eat not—did they too immerse themselves every time they came from a market? I know it is not an impossible case; but I am asking whether it is at all a probable thing? And if it be not, then it is improbable

that the word baptize in these places should intend any immersion at all. Perhaps some one will say that nothing more is intended than the washing of hands, as this is agreeable to the tradition of the elders mentioned in Matt. xv. 2; and it is well known that we dip our hands in order to wash them. Supposing this to be the fact, I reply, that if we dip our hands in order to baptize [wash] them, then it is certain, that dipping and baptizing [washing] are different things;—that baptizing [washing] is the end, and dipping a mean to that end;—that we only dip so much of our hands as may be necessary to baptize [wash] them;—and that our dipping the hands in order to baptize them depends entirely on circumstances: *e. g.* If I baptize [wash] my hands in a bason, I dip so much of them as may be necessary to baptize them; but if I baptize [wash] them at a cock, I do not dip them at all—I only receive the water as it falls, and baptize [wash] them without dipping And it signifies nothing to us how they baptized [washed] their hands, whether in a bason or at a cock; for the word "baptize" does not express the manner of doing, whether by immersion or affusion, but only the thing done, namely "washing."

3. I now carry the question to the third case—the superstitious baptizing [washing] of household furniture, cups, pots, brazen vessels, and tables. Cups, *poteeria*—these, it appears from the name, were drinking-vessels; pots, *xestai*—those vessels out of which wine or water was poured, pitchers or flagons. Brazen vessels, *chalkia*—were, it is probable, for culinary uses, for boiling. Tables, *klinai*—some take this word as it is here rendered, others think it means those seats or

benches on which they fat at meals; and thefe are fometimes called "*beds*," beds, perhaps from the leaning poſture then in uſe. The Jews, our Lord obſerves, held and practiſed the baptizing of theſe; now we aſk, Does the word baptize in this place expreſs any immerſion?

Theſe things, it is plain, were baptized [waſhed]; but how they were baptized, no creature living can determine. One thing, however, may be remarked, which is, that all theſe articles might very conveniently be baptized [waſhed] by pouring, &c. while, on the contrary, it would have been very inconvenient, and even improper, to baptize [waſh] others, *viz.* the brazen veſſels and tables, by immerſion. It is, I believe a general opinion that ſome of theſe things were baptized by dipping—as the cups and pots, and that others were baptized [waſhed] by pouring, ſprinkling, &c: And hence many learned men have conſidered the word baptize as expreſſing all theſe modes. In this, however, they appear to me to have been miſtaken; for the word baptize [waſh], though it has been applied to all modes of waſhing, is not properly expreſſive of any mode, but intends only the waſhing itſelf, which may be done by either.

The concluſion, therefore, from theſe inſtances is this: It is evident that the word baptize does not intend immerſion only; the various ſprinklings, pourings, &c. among the Jews are plainly called "baptiſms." Nay, farther, it is not certain that there was any immerſion at all in either of the baptiſms [waſhings] before us; and it is very certain that whether theſe perſons and things were baptized by immerſion, aſperſion, or affuſion, the word baptize does not expreſs

either of the modes by which any perſon or thing was waſhed, but only the waſhing itſelf. And though there has been much diſpute about the word "baptize," ſome affirming it to mean immerſion only, others aſperſion and affuſion as well as immerſion, yet, properly ſpeaking, it means neither of them. It has indeed been uſed for all the modes of waſhing—ſprinkling, pouring, and immerſing; whereas it does not expreſs the one nor the other, but waſhing only; and this may be done in either of the modes: And, therefore, when we read of any perſon or thing being baptized, we cannot conclude from the word itſelf whether it was done by affuſion, aſperſion, or immerſion.

As the word "baptize," which means ſimply to waſh, does not determine the mode in which perſons ſhould receive baptiſm, I will attend, in the next place, to the circumſtances of that ordinance. Thoſe I mean to conſider are, firſt, The places where baptiſm was adminiſtered, and, ſecondly, The preparations for baptiſm.

1. The places choſen for this ordinance were, among others, the river Jordan, and Enon near Salim, where, it is ſaid, there were many waters. This is a circumſtance that appears to weigh on the ſide of immerſion; and if we give it that weight in the ſcale of reaſon, for which the Baptiſts contend, it will amount to this—it is a preſumptive, but not a certain, proof of immerſion. That it is a preſumptive proof appears by this—that here was, as far as we know, a fair opportunity for immerſion; that it is no more than a preſumptive proof is evident from hence—that all this might be, and yet no immerſion. If we ſay

they baptized in or at a river, therefore they baptized by immerſion, this would be a good conſequence if it were impoſſible to baptize at or in a river in any other way: But ſince a perſon can baptize in or at a river by affuſion as well as immerſion, we can only draw a concluſion in favour of immerſion by an act of the fancy. However, let it be a proof of the preſumptive kind, and it cannot poſſibly be any thing more.

Now, as it is the nature of preſumptive proof to admit of increaſe or diminution, this, like all proof of the ſame kind, may be increaſed or diminiſhed. That, on the one hand, which ſerves to increaſe the preſumption on the ſide of immerſion, is this: That of all who adminiſter baptiſm, there are none at this time (as far as I know) that baptize in or at a river, but ſuch as uſe immerſion. It may indeed be ſaid that all this may be accounted for: The caſe of John differed very much from our's; he had vaſt congregations and many to baptize, and no houſe fit to contain them: So that his chooſing a river, though he had baptized by affuſion, would, in his caſe, have been, on the whole, the wiſeſt plan. And although perſons who baptize by affuſion, do not now go to a river, yet were they circumſtanced, with reſpect to their congregations and accommodations, as John was, they would, in their choice of place, act in the ſame manner he did. Something like this, I ſuppoſe, might be ſaid; but I was willing to give the preſumption all its force.

On the other hand, the preſumption may be diminiſhed by obſerving, firſt, that there were many baptizings which do not appear to have taken place at or in any river—as that of Paul, of the

jailer, of Cornelius, of thoſe of Samaria, and of the three thouſand. And, ſecondly, there is another thing: It cannot be proved with certainty that even thoſe who were baptized in or at Jordan, Enon, &c. were—I will not ſay totally immerſed, but that they were ſo much as in the water at all. Whoever is acquainted with the indeterminate ſenſe of the prepoſitions *en*, *eis*,* *ek*, and *apo*, on which this proof muſt depend, will be very ſenſible of this. Theſe occur in the following Scriptures: Matt. iii. 6. "They were baptized of him, *en tō Iordanee*, in Jordan;"—*en* means not only "in," but "nigh, near, at, by, &c." Acts, viii. 38. "They went down both, *eis to udōr*, into the water;" but *eis*, beſides "into," often means "towards, near, &c." Matt. iii. 16. "And Jeſus when he was baptized, went up ſtraightway, *apo tou udatos*, out of the water." Acts, viii. 39. "And when they were come up, *ek tou udatos*, out of the water;"—*apo* and *ek* very often ſignify "from." So that whereas it is read in our tranſlation—in Jordan, into the water, out of the water, it will read as well in the Greek—at Jordan, to the water, from the water. This is a truth beyond all diſpute, and well known to every one who is at all converſant with the Greek. And whoever duly conſiders this will eaſily be perſuaded that it is utterly impoſſible to prove that any one, who is ſaid in Scripture to have been baptized, was ſo much as in the water at all, or that he even wet the ſole of his foot.

* John, xx. 4. 5. came firſt *to* [*eis*] the ſepulchre—Yet went he not in. From which it is evident that *eis* ſignifies *to* as well as into; and therefore to pretend to determine the mode of baptiſm from the ſignification of that word is trifling.

2. The other circumſtance relates to a preparation for the ordinance. Every one who has been accuſtomed to baptize by immerſion, muſt certainly know, that it is neceſſary, with reſpect to decency and ſafety, to change the dreſſes, and to have ſeparate apartments for men and women. This is evidently neceſſary, whether we baptize in a river, or in a baptiſtry. Now it is certain, that although we read of many baptizings, there is not the leaſt intimation given, either of changing the dreſs, or of any ſuitable accommodation for the different ſexes. This, though a circumſtance that weighs againſt immerſion, I conſider as being, like the other, only of the preſumptive kind. For, no doubt, it would be very illogical to ſay, we read of no change of dreſs, or ſeparate apartments for baptizing, therefore there was no immerſion.

This preſumption, like the other, may be made ſtronger or weaker. It may be made weaker in this way; that though we read of no changing of garments, or any ſeparate apartments, yet there might have been both; as many things might be done of which the Scriptures take no notice. On the other ſide, the preſumption may be made ſtronger, by obſerving that there are other caſes in which mention is made of garments, where there could be no more neceſſity of mentioning them, than in the caſe of baptiſm; ſuppoſing baptiſm to have been performed by immerſion. To inſtance only in two caſes; when our Lord waſhed his diſciples' feet, it is ſaid, he laid aſide his garments. And Luke, ſpeaking of thoſe who ſtoned Stephen, ſays, "they laid down their clothes at a young man's feet, whoſe name was Saul." Now if the Scriptures take notice of the putting off of garments for

the purpose of washing feet, and stoning a man to death; how comes it to pass, that as thousands, upon supposition they were baptized by immersion, must entirely have changed their garments, or have done worse, the Scriptures should not drop a single hint about it? Both these presumptions may be tossed and turned, and strengthened and weakened, just as fancy may dictate; whereas, when all is said and done, they are no more than presumptions still. And when we have only presumption in the premises, we can have nothing more than presumption in the conclusion.

To conclude this part respecting the circumstances of baptism: I will only say, we have here a goodly combat; presumption contending with presumption. One presumption says, that as they sometimes made use of a river for baptizing, it is likely they baptized by immersion. The other presumption answers, that since it does not appear, that the sexes were decently accommodated for immersion, or that there was any changing of garments, it is therefore likely they did not immerse. That presumption replies, that the sexes might be very decently accommodated with change of dress, and separate apartments, though the Scriptures should notice neither. This presumption affirms, that persons might be baptized in or at a river, and yet no immersion after all.

Now instead of determining which of these presumptions is the stronger; we may learn thus much from the circumstances of baptism, and indeed it is all we can learn; and that is, that it is utterly impossible to determine, from any information they give, whether baptized persons were immersed or not. Nay, so far are circumstances from

ſettling this point, that we cannot be certain there was a ſingle perſon of all the baptized, who went into the water even ankle deep. This is the true ſtate of facts as they ſtrike me, and all beyond this is the flight of fancy.

Since neither the term "baptize," nor yet the circumſtances of baptiſm, determine any thing concerning the mode, whether it is immerſion or affuſion; I ſhall in the next place conſider the alluſions to that ordinance. I know not whether I ſpeak accurately when I call them alluſions; but the conſequence either way is not material, as every one will eaſily underſtand what I intend. Now theſe alluſions being of two kinds, I will, for the ſake of diſtinction, and without any deſign of offence, call one the "Baptiſt alluſion," and the other, the "Pædobaptiſt alluſion."—I begin with,

I. The Baptiſt alluſion. The reader will find this in Rom. vi. 4. "Therefore we are buried with him by baptiſm into death," &c. A ſimilar phraſe occurs in Col. ii. 12. The Baptiſts think there is an alluſion in theſe words to the manner of baptizing; and as the Apoſtle ſpeaks of being buried with him, they conclude the mode to have been immerſion. On this concluſion of theirs,

1. I obſerve that theſe words are an inference from the third verſe, in which the Apoſtle ſays, "Know ye not that ſo many of us as were baptized into Jeſus Chriſt were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptiſm." We have here three things; 1. a baptizing into Jeſus Chriſt; 2. into his death; 3. into his burial: And the laſt is made the conſequence of the firſt. Therefore we are buried with him, becauſe we were baptized into him. To form the antitheſis,

we muſt diſtinguiſh between the life and death of Chriſt; and then it will be, We are baptized firſt into the life of Chriſt, then into the death of Chriſt, and laſt of all into his burial. We are brought by baptiſm into his life, into his death, and into his burial. Now, if baptiſm bring us into each of theſe, and one of them, as the Baptiſts ſay, is an alluſion to the mode of baptizing, then, for the ſame reaſon, ſo muſt the other two. That is, his life muſt allude to the mode, ſo muſt his death, and ſo muſt his burial: And the reaſon is, becauſe baptiſm unites us to him in each of theſe. And if all theſe are to allude to the mode, I ſhould be glad to know, what kind of mode it muſt at laſt be, which is to bear a reſemblance to every one. The life of Chriſt was action, his death was a crucifixion, his burial was the incloſing of his body in a cavity of the rock. The mode, therefore, muſt be three-fold; it muſt repreſent action, crucifixion and incloſing in a rock; becauſe to purſue the notion of the Baptiſts, his life, death, and burial, muſt all have an alluſion to the mode of baptiſm.

There is no ſect, I ſhould ſuppoſe, that uſe a mode of baptiſm to which all theſe will agree. The Romaniſts uſe ſalt, oil, and ſpittle; but whether they intend an alluſion to the life of Chriſt, I cannot take upon me to affirm. Yet, as they muſt have ſome alluſion, the ſalt may allude to his life of teaching; the ſpittle to his life of miracles; and the oil to his life of munificence. The clergy of the church of England uſe the ſign of the croſs; and this is to allude to the crucifixion of Chriſt. The Baptiſts uſe immerſion; and this is to allude to the burial of Chriſt. Now, if we could unite

all these in one, we should have a tolerable allusion to our Lord's life, death, and burial; but when each is taken separately, there is a deficiency in point of allusion. The English clergy are deficient in alluding only to the crucifixion; but not to the life and burial. The Romanists are deficient in alluding only to the life and crucifixion; but not to the burial. The Baptists too are deficient in alluding to the burial only; but not to the life and crucifixion. I know not whether these different communities take their document from this part of holy writ; but certainly they have the same ground if they choose to reason in the same way. But as the Baptists avowedly do this, and are at the same time so deficient in the business of allusion, it would become them to set about a reform in the mode of their baptism; it being at present wanting in two articles, *viz.* the life and crucifixion, *i. e.* the sign of the cross, and salt, &c.

That the absurdity of supposing an allusion in this place to the mode of baptism may appear in a still stronger light, I would observe, that what the Apostle calls, in ver. 3, a being baptized into the death of Christ, he expresses in ver, 5. by being planted together in the likeness of his death. This will be evident to any one who examines the place. Now if any man is disposed, after the method of the Baptists, to pick up allusions to the mode of baptism, here are two topics ready at hand, and he may take both, or either, as he pleases. It is usual with the Baptists, when contending for the mode of baptism, to affirm that the Apostle calls baptism a burial; and hence they infer that immersion must be the mode. This, however, is affirming what is not true; for the Apostle never,

in any of his writings, calls "baptiſm a burial." But on the contrary, he does in this verſe evidently ſpeak of it under the notion of planting; and ſays, We are planted in the likeneſs of his death. Here then, upon the Baptiſt plan, are two alluſions—planting, and crucifixion. There are none, I believe, who make planting an alluſion to the mode of baptiſm; but ſhould this be attempted by any, they will have this one advantage which the Baptiſts are deſtitute of; and that is, that whereas baptiſm is no-where called a burial, it is in this place plainly called a planting. Now, if we ſuppoſe a perſon reaſoning upon the plan of the Baptiſts, he will ſay, that as the Apoſtle calls baptiſm a planting, he muſt allude to the mode in which that ordinance was adminiſtered; and every one, who is at all acquainted with the art of planting, will eaſily gueſs what kind of mode that muſt be, to which it alludes. Were this only adopted, and it may be adopted with greater advantage than the Baptiſt plan, we ſhould probably hear of ſome contention about the mode of baptiſm, between thoſe who immerſe and thoſe who only plant: And in this caſe I can clearly ſee that victory will crown the planters.

There is in the ſame way another alluſion in this verſe to the mode of baptiſm; I have mentioned it before, but do it again on account of its ſuperior evidence to that alluſion of the Baptiſts. The Apoſtle ſays, we are planted, that is, baptized, in the likeneſs of his death. Now taking this for an alluſion to the mode of baptiſm, the argument for the ſign of the croſs will be incomparably ſtronger than that of the Baptiſts for immerſion. I ſay incomparably ſtronger; for whereas it is only ſaid in

the fourth verſe, We are buried with him *by* baptiſm; it is ſaid in this verſe, We are planted [baptized] in the likeneſs of his death: there is nothing about ſimilitude mentioned in their alluſion; but here the word "likeneſs" is actually uſed. The argument, therefore, in favour of the ſign of the croſs, will, in the Baptiſt way of arguing, far outweigh that in favour of immerſion. And how much ſoever the Baptiſts may deſpiſe that ceremony, it is evidently better founded in this conteſt than their own. So that if their argument from this place be good for immerſion, the other is far better for the ſign of the croſs.—Upon the whole, the examination of this place convinces me of nothing ſo much as this, that both the Baptiſts in general, and myſelf in particular, have been carried away with the mere ſound of a word, even to the neglect of the ſenſe and ſcope of the truth of God.

2. Leaving, therefore, the whimſical interpretation of the Baptiſts to itſelf, it may be obſerved, in order that we may the better enter into the Apoſtle's deſign, that when he ſays, "we are buried with him, by baptiſm," he makes baptiſm to be the inſtrumental cauſe of burial. This will appear plain by aſking this queſtion; By what are we buried with him? The anſwer is, By baptiſm. And indeed baptiſm is made the inſtrumental cauſe in each caſe. If we aſk, How are we brought into Jeſus Chriſt? Anſwer—By baptiſm: "Baptized into Jeſus Chriſt." How are we brought into his death? Anſwer—By baptiſm: Baptized into his death. How are we brought into his burial? Anſwer—By baptiſm. "Buried with him by baptiſm." If therefore the union in life, death,

and burial, be brought about by baptism, then baptism is the instrumental cause of this union; and then the very idea of allusion is entirely lost, and they present themselves to our view under the notion of cause and effect. Baptism is made the cause, and union in the life, death, and burial, the effect.

Now this being the case, instead of hunting after allusions, by which baptism will be any thing or nothing; we must attend to that adequacy or proportion in the cause, by virtue of which this effect is to be produced. This adequacy is not formerly in outward baptism, which is an emblem, and no more than an emblem, of the baptism of the Holy Spirit; but merely in the baptism of the Holy Spirit, of which the other is an emblem. 1 Cor. xii. 13. It is, indeed, the nature and design of both to bring persons into union with Jesus Christ; but then, the union will be only of the same kind with the baptism. If the baptism be that of the Holy Spirit, it brings about an internal, vital union with Jesus Christ; but if it be only an outward baptism, the union will only be visible and external. But as the outward baptism is an emblem of the inward and vital, the judgment of charity presumes, unless there be good proof to the contrary, that they who voluntarily receive the former, are also possessed of the latter. It is according to this judgment of charity the Apostle addresses the Romans: He supposes baptized persons to be really baptized into Jesus Christ; and then, by virtue of that union, they live, they die, they are buried, they are raised again, and walk with Christ in newness of life. All which the Apostle expresses in these emphatic words;—Our

old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin—Dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord—Like as Christ was raised from the dead, by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. The scope of the Apostle is to show the vital influence of union with Christ, of which baptism is the emblem. And as soon as any one enters fairly into the Apostle's scope, the insignificant idea of allusion to the mode of baptism disappears; and, to use Mr. B.'s phrase, hides its impertinent head.—Thus much for the Baptist allusion. I shall next notice,

II. The Pædobaptist allusion. According to this, the mode of communicating the grace of the Holy Spirit to the soul, and that of applying the baptismal water to the body, are viewed as corresponding with each other. The considerations which lead to this, are such as follow:—1. They both agree in name. The influences of the Holy Spirit on the soul are called "baptism," and so likewise is the external application of water. The term baptism, when used to express the influences of the Holy Spirit, takes in both his extraordinary and saving influences, Acts, i. 5. 1 Cor. xii. 13. And as these have sometimes taken place in the same persons, the term "baptize" has been used to express both, Acts, x. 44—46, compared with Acts, xi. 16—18. 2. They are often associated in Scripture. How commonly do we read such words as these; "I indeed have baptized you with water; but he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost." The reader will find this form of speech in the following places: Matt. iii. 11. Mark, i. 8. Luke, iii. 16. John, i. 33. Acts, i.

5.—xi. 16. 3. Their mode of communication is expreſſed in the ſame way: "I baptize you, *en udati*, with water, but he ſhall baptize you *en pneumati agiō*, with the Holy Ghoſt." And this is done in all the places, only with this difference, that Luke omits the preposition in one member, and there it is underſtood.—4. Baptiſm with water, is an emblem of baptiſm with the Holy Ghoſt. The application of water to the body, as noting the putting away the filth of the fleſh, ſhadows forth the influence of the Holy Spirit, which being imparted to the ſoul, produces the anſwer of a good conſcience towards God.

Now, if theſe two paſs under the ſame name; if both are frequently united in Scripture; if the one be an emblem of the other; and, if the mode of communication in each baptiſm be expreſſed in the ſame way; then, the way to arrive at a clear view of the mode of outward baptiſm, is to obſerve in what manner the baptiſm of the Holy Spirit is deſcribed. This will lead us to conſult a lexicon of a very ſuperior kind, a lexicon worth more than five hundred; and what is more, it is the plain, unlettered man's lexicon, and its title is, "The lively oracles of God." The article we are to ſeek for is the term baptize. How does this lexicon define baptizare, to baptize? Anſwer—*Baptizare eſt ſupervenire, illabi, effundere*—plainly, to baptize is—"to come upon," Act, i. 5.—to ſhed forth, Acts, ii. 33.—to fall upon, Acts xi. 15.—to pour out, Acts, ii. 17.—x. 45. That is, in this baptiſm the grace of the Holy Spirit comes upon—falls upon—is ſhed forth—is poured out, namely, on the ſoul. This is the account this lexicon gives of the word "baptize."

Mr. Booth, instead of paying a due attention to this Lexicon, has adopted a method which, when properly adverted to, will do no credit to him or his book. His professed design is to prove that the term "baptize" means immersion, immersion only, and nothing else. But how does he do it? Why, he quotes a number of authors, who, as he himself says, understood the term to mean immersion, pouring, and sprinkling; and these quotations he calls concessions. Concessions of what? That the word meant immersion only? If so, he made them concede what they never did concede, and what they had no thought of conceding. If they made no concession, as he acknowledges they did not, that the term baptize signified immersion only, what honesty could there be in producing them at all? Mr. B.'s talent is quotation, and therefore he must quote; but, at the same time, it is a shame to abuse the living or the dead, and it is a bad cause that requires it: For what else is it but abusing an author, when he is introduced as granting that which in fact he never did grant?

But had Mr. B. consulted, as he ought, the Lexicon I am speaking of, it might have freed him from the necessity of using that little art which one cannot observe in a disputant with any degree of pleasure. The authors he has consulted, if they had been all on his side (and I question whether any one was beside the Quakers), could only have told him how men understood the word; but this Lexicon would have showed him how God himself uses it: And if we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater. I ask, What does God witness concerning the term baptize? Answer—From the passages before cited it is evident

he witneſſes this—that the term ſtrictly and properly means to waſh, to purify. What does God witneſs concerning the mode of applying the purific matter? Anſwer—It comes upon, falls upon, is ſhed forth, is poured out.—Why then, as water baptiſm is an emblem of this, and as the mode of application in both caſes is expreſſed in the ſame way, we have a witneſs on the ſide of pouring and ſprinkling in baptiſm infinitely more certain than that of all the lexicographers and critics in the world. What are Mr. B.'s eighty abuſed critics, even ſuppoſing they had all been on his ſide, though I doubt whether he had one out of the eighty; and even ſuppoſe he had eight hundred more, what, I ſay, are all theſe when compared to the all-wiſe God expounding and defining his own words? Mr. B. has a Talmud of his own, in which he ſtudies circumciſion; and ill-treated critics, with whom he impoſes on the public in the article of baptiſm; and though perhaps he may not yet be aſhamed of his Talmud, or his treatment, I believe the time will come when he will be aſhamed of both.

Notwithſtanding the Scriptures, when ſpeaking of the baptiſm of the Holy Spirit, make uſe of the phraſes—come upon—fall upon—ſhed forth—poured out, Mr. B., to evade the force of this as it reſpects the mode of baptizing, has recourſe to two miſerable ſhifts. In one caſe he would ſet aſide the alluſion to the mode, and in the other he would make it agree with immerſion; and as theſe are ſomewhat curious, I cannot very well cloſe the ſubject without taking notice of them.

1. To ſet aſide the alluſion he takes the following courſe in his anſwer to Dr. Williams. Page

341. he says, "Dr. W. argues in favour of pouring and of sprinkling from the baptism of the Holy Spirit. Thus he speaks: I scruple not to assert it, there is no object whatever in all the New Testament so frequently and so explicitly signified by baptism as these divine influences;" referring to Matt. iii. 11.; Mark, i. 8, 9.; Luke, iii 16, 21, 22.; and several other places. Mr. B., in answer, says, p. 342, "But those passages of Scripture to which he refers, regard that copious and extraordinary effusion [effusion, *i. e.* pouring out] of the Holy Spirit which was received by the Apostles and first disciples of our Lord soon after his ascension into heaven." The truth is, the term "baptize," when applied to the Holy Spirit, is used to denote both his extraordinary and ordinary influences, even those by which the mind is renewed and united to Christ; and so baptism by affusion is the most expressive emblem of the communication of these influences, more especially as the mode of application is expressed in the same way, and the one is fairly an emblem of the other.

But Mr. B. does not seem willing to admit that one baptism is an emblem of the other:—I say, "seem willing," for I protest I do not know, though I have his book before my eyes, and have looked at it half an hour, whether he means to admit or deny it. That which seems the most evident is, he wishes, by any means, to get rid of it, lose it, put it out of sight, forget it himself, and make his reader do so too; but then how is this to be done? Done! why, by the assistance of his old impartial friends the Quakers. He suggests that our viewing water baptism as an emblem of the baptism of the Holy Spirit, will ope-

rate againſt its perpetuity. To evince this he introduces the Quakers as reaſoning in the following manner: "Water baptiſm was divinely appointed, and continued in force till the death of Chriſt; but as that rite had for its object the deſcent of the Holy Spirit and his divine influences, no ſooner was the promiſed Spirit vouchſafed to our Lord's diſciples, than the obligation to regard water baptiſm entirely ceaſed. For baptiſm in water being only an emblem of the promiſed baptiſm in the Holy Spirit, why ſhould the former be continued after the latter has taken place?" This, he ſays, or ſomething like it, if he miſtake not, is the Quakers' principal argument; and, for aught he perceives, it is equally forcible with that of his opponent.

I confeſs I am not ſufficiently verſed in the Quakers' mode of reaſoning to know whether Mr. B. has done them juſtice. He firſt makes them ſay that baptiſm continued till the death of Chriſt, and then that the obligation to regard it ceaſed when the promiſed Spirit was vouchſafed: So there are two periods for the expiration of baptiſm. But I have no diſpute with the Quakers; I know they are only brought in here as a blind, that Mr. B., by getting behind them, might withdraw more eaſily. I am perſuaded he does not approve of their argument—he only wanted to get rid of the alluſion, and he has got rid of it; but it is in the ſame way as the Quakers get rid of the two ordinances: Nay, far worſe; for whereas they do this by arguments which they deem good, but Mr. B. has done it by ſuch reaſoning as he himſelf would be aſhamed to adopt. This is Mr. B.'s miſerable way of getting rid of the alluſion,

viz. by giving the reader a Quaker's argument. I will now advert to his other shift, by which,

2. He attempts to make the allusion agree with immersion. The mode, as I have before said, of communicating the influence of the Holy Spirit is in Scripture expressed by coming upon—falling upon—shedding forth—pouring out, and this mode of communication is expressly called baptizing. Now while most persons have considered the baptism of the Holy Spirit as favouring affusion, Mr. B. will undertake to show that it is expressive of that idea for which he contends, namely immersion. This is an attempt in which I could wish him much success; for if he can make it appear that pouring out, and immersing into, are the same thing, then neither will he have any reason to complain of those that pour, nor will those who pour have any reason to complain of him. I fear it will prove a hard task; let us hear him however.

In vol. i. p. 101, he speaks of "an electrical bath so called because the electrical fluid surrounds the patient." Well, and what then? "This philosophical document reminds me of the sacred historian's language, where, narrating the fact under consideration, thus he speaks: 'And when the day of Pentecost was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place. And suddenly there came a sound from Heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it FILLED ALL THE HOUSE WHERE THEY WERE SITTING. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost.' Now says he, if the language of medical electricity be just, it can-

not be abſurd, nay, it ſeems highly rational, to underſtand this language of inſpiration as expreſſive of that idea [immerſion] for which we contend. Was the Holy Spirit poured out? did the Holy Spirit fall upon the Apoſtles and others at that memorable time? It was in ſuch a manner and to ſuch a degree, that they were, like a patient in the electric bath, as if immerſed in it."

This electric bath is a pretty fancy, a happy invention for Mr. B.; it is well he did not live before it was found out, for then what a fine thought would have been loſt. Though the Holy Spirit fell upon, was poured out, yet, ſays he, it was in ſuch a manner and to ſuch a degree, that they were like a patient in the electric bath, as if immerſed in it, that is, immerſed in the Holy Spirit. Moſt perſons, I ſuppoſe, when they read of the Holy Spirit falling upon any one, underſtand it to mean the influence of that Spirit coming upon the ſoul; but Mr. B. ſpeaks as if the Holy Ghoſt, or his influence, fell on the outſide of the Apoſtles, and ſo ſurrounded their bodies like an electric bath. And to ſhew he intended this, he has put theſe words in large capitals, it 'FILLED ALL THE HOUSE WHERE THEY WERE SITTING." Then they were immerſed in ſomething which filled the houſe; I aſk, what was that ſomething? In Engliſh it is expreſſed by the pronoun "it"—it filled the houſe; the Greek has no pronoun. Well, what is the antecedent to "it?" I anſwer, the word "ſound." The ſound, which was as a ruſhing mighty wind, filled all the houſe where they were ſitting. The word in the Greek is *eechos*, an echo, a reverberating ſound. Mr. B.'s electric bath was, after all, nothing more than an

echo. He has been very silent about this electric fluid; either he did not know what it was, or he was not complaisant enough to tell us. The loss, however, is not great; we have found it out without him. It was an echo then that filled all the house; and the Apostles, being immersed in sound, were surrounded by the echo like a patient in an electric bath. This is the beauty of sticking close to the primary meaning of the term, as Mr. B. calls it; and so tenacious is he of his primary meaning, that he does not care in what people are immersed, so they are but immersed in something.

To be baptized by the Holy Spirit is to receive his influence on the heart and mind; but this baptism, according to Mr. B., is to have the body surrounded by an echo. Is then the influence of the Spirit falling upon the heart, and a reverberating sound surrounding the body, the same thing? Mr. B. is a dreadful confounder of things that differ! He said once that an obedient subject of the civil government and a complete church-member were the same thing; does he think too that the influence of the Holy Ghost is nothing more than an echo?—So much for the electric bath and the Quaker's argument! These are Mr. B.'s too miserable shifts, by which he would evade the argument from the Holy Spirit's baptism in favour of affusion; and miserable ones they are as ever made their appearance in public.

I shall now close what I mean to say on the mode, by collecting the particulars, and placing them in one view. The word *baptizō*, used for this ordinance, means washing only, but not any mode of washing: It means neither dipping, pouring, nor sprinkling; for these are only different

ways of washing, *i. e.* baptizing. They, therefore, who say that the word rantism [sprinkling] is not the same as baptism, say nothing but what is very right; for rantize differs from baptize, as the manner of doing differs from the thing done: And the same is true of immersion and pouring. Yet, at the same time, it must be observed that the word baptism is used in Scripture where pouring and sprinkling are evidently intended; while it cannot be proved that it is ever used either in the New Testament or in the Septuagint where immersion took place. The New Testament I have examined; I will here just notice the two places where it occurs in the Septuagint. 2 Kings, v. 14. *kai katebee Naiman kai ebaptisato en to Iordanee*—And Naaman went down and baptized in Jordan. The English has it "dipped," and this is the only place where baptize is translated "dip;" but whether there was an immersion of the whole body, or any part of it, is altogether uncertain. All we can be certain of is, that the prophet ordered him to wash, his servant advised him to wash, and he went down, and *ebaptisato kata to reema Elisaie*, baptized according to the word of Elisha. Now there are two reasons which induce some to think he applied water to one part of his body only: 1. As he expected the prophet to strike his hand over the place, and recover the leper, they conclude he was leprous only in one part of his body, and that the water was applied to that part. 2. The command to wash seven times, they consider as referring to that part of the law of cleansing in which the leper is ordered to be sprinkled; but, for my own part, I think it impossible to say in what manner

be baptized. The other is merely figurative, expreſſive of a ſenſe of God's anger, and occurs in Iſaiah, xxi. 4. *kai ee anomia me baptizei*—And ſin baptizes me; meaning the puniſhment due to ſin, which is expreſſed by pouring out anger, fury, &c. on a perſon. From theſe premiſes the unforced concluſion is this: That, on the one hand, as the word baptize is expreſſive of no particular mode, nothing can be concluded from it in favour of one more than another; ſo, on the other hand, as the word has certainly been uſed for pouring and ſprinkling, while there is no proof of its ever being uſed in Scripture for immerſion, it does more naturally aſſociate itſelf with affuſion and aſperſion. With regard to the circumſtances of baptiſm, they afford no certain proof on either ſide. We can do no more than preſume, and this may be done on both ſides: There is preſumption for and againſt, and fancy, as it may happen to favour any one ſide, will form the concluſion; but as the circumſtances carry us no farther than preſumption, no certain concluſion can be formed either for immerſion or againſt it. The alluſions, I obſerved, were of two kinds; the one I have called the Baptiſt alluſion, the other the Pædobaptiſt alluſion. The Baptiſt alluſion is entirely founded in miſtake, and that through a non-attention to the deſign and ſcope of the Apoſtle; for in the ſame way as the Baptiſts make an alluſion to immerſion, the context will furniſh alluſions to other modes: and diſputants, were they ſo inclined, might plead with more advantage for the ſign of the croſs, &c. than the Baptiſts can for immerſion. The Pædobaptiſts alluſion conſiſts in this; They conſider the two

baptiſms, the material and the ſpiritual, as being the one a ſhadow or figure of the other, and the mode of the material as reſembling that of the ſpiritual. And, therefore, as divine influence in ſpiritual baptiſm is ſaid to come upon—fall upon—to be ſhed forth—poured out, and as material baptiſm is to be a ſignificant emblem of this, the alluſion is decidedly in favour of pouring and ſprinkling. And that this is the true ſtate of the matter appears by this: That the Scriptures commonly join material and ſpiritual baptiſm together as counterparts of each other, and expreſs them by the ſame word, and deſcribe them, as to their mode, in the ſame way. The conſequence then is, that as the baptiſm of the Spirit is pouring, ſhedding, &c., and as the baptiſm of water is to repreſent that, and is deſcribed, as to its mode, in the ſame way, that mode muſt of neceſſity be pouring or ſprinkling.

OF THE USE OF INFANT BAPTISM.

AS I have often heard it aſked, What is the uſe of infant baptiſm? I think it neceſſary, before I conclude, to ſay ſomething in anſwer to that queſtion. With regard to the uſe of baptiſm, I conſider it in the light of a mean of grace, and I view it in the ſame way when applied to infants. I do not ſuppoſe that infants, properly ſpeaking, receive any preſent benefit by being baptized,

but that this is designed the more to engage the attention of parents and others to the rising generation. I view infants, when baptized, under the notion of persons entered into a school; and, therefore, I consider parents, pastors, deacons, and church-members, at large, as brought under an additional obligation to instruct those children who are become scholars, as they become able to learn, in the peculiar truths of the religion of Christ. Viewing the matter in this light, it assumes an importance exceedingly grand; and infant baptism is far from being that unmeaning thing, which it appears to be, when the views are extended no farther than helpless infancy.

We may illustrate this by taking a view of circumcision. Circumcision brought persons under an obligation of conforming to the revealed will of God; he who was circumcised became a debtor: And as this was the nature of the institute, the obligation devolved on all who received it. But forasmuch as persons cannot actually conform before they are brought to understand, and, in order that they may understand, they must be taught, we are, therefore, to consider circumcised infants as standing in the place of scholars or disciples to be instructed in that system to which they were bound to conform. If then circumcision brought an obligation on some to learn, it must, at the same time, bring an obligation on others to teach; because usually persons do not learn without being taught: and hence parents, priests, and people, came under their respective degrees of obligation to see the rising generation instructed in that religion into which they were initiated as scholars or disciples. When I con-

ſider this divine inſtitute as calculated to fix the attention of the people on their riſing offspring, with reſpect to their inſtruction in the things of God, I cannot ſufficiently admire that poor heatheniſh notion of circumciſion which Mr. Booth has ſomewhere picked up, or rather invented himſelf, than which, I am perſuaded, the moſt ignorant Jew never entertained a meaner.

It is for want of viewing the matter in this way, that an inſtitute, adminiſtered to an infant, appears ridiculous to any. When the attention is fixed on the infant only, whether it be a circumciſed or a baptized infant, without conſidering any thing further, we may well ſay, as the Baptiſts do, What can an infant know? What can an infant do? What uſe can it be to an infant? In ſuch a caſe, it is very true, it would be a difficult thing to diſcern any wiſdom in the adminiſtration of an inſtitute of any kind to an infant. And I remember once converſing with a Baptiſt upon infant baptiſm, who, among other things, obſerved what a ſilly thing it was to baptize an infant. As I perceived his views extended no farther than helpleſs infancy, I aſked him, whether, if he had ſeen it done, he would not have thought it a very ſilly thing to circumciſe an infant? "That I ſhould indeed," ſaid he, "indeed I ſhould;" theſe, as well as I can recollect, were his very words. But when, on the contrary, our views take in the grand deſign of engaging the attention the more fixedly to the riſing race, all the ſuppoſed ſilline ſs vaniſhes away, and it appears a plan worthy the wiſdom and kindneſs of God.

I was led more particularly to view the matter in this point of light, by considering that commission given to the Apostles by the risen Saviour respecting the Gentile nations, Matt. xxviii. 18, 19, 20. "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and, *matheeteusate*, disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; *didaskontes*, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, &c." Here we have the whole plan just as I have set it down in the case of circumcision: They are sent to make disciples [scholars]; for *discipulus* in Latin, and scholar in English, are just the same; they are to enter such as are made scholars by baptism; they are to instruct these scholars in the things of Christ, in order that they may observe them. Our blessed Lord, by making use of the words *matheeteusate*, make disciples, and *didaskontes*, teaching, carries our views immediately to *matheetai*, *discipuli*, scholars, and *didaskaloi*, *præceptores*, schoolmasters; and thus we are presented with a Christian school with scholars and masters.

According to this view of the subject, and to this our Lord's words naturally lead us, there appears not only a grandeur of design, but likewise an exact symmetry in the different dispensations of God—I mean that attention to the rising offspring, which had shown itself in a former dispensation, and, no doubt, in all. It is to be observed that our Lord uses a term, a school term, which will agree to an infant as well as an adult; for the word *matheetees*, a scholar, of which the word used by our Lord is the theme, does not necessarily intend previous learning nor present learn-

ing, but only learning in design. We call those scholars who have done learning, and so we do those who are now at their studies, and so likewise those who have not yet begun to learn, provided they are entered for that purpose; so that the idea of learning does not necessarily annex itself to the term *mathetes*, scholar, any farther than to denote a person who is entered into a school with a view to learn.

But here it may be asked, What propriety can there be in calling a person a disciple or scholar who is yet incapable of learning? I reply, he is properly so called, because he is entered with that design. *e. g.* Numbers, iii. 28. "In the number of all the males, from a month old and upwards, were eight thousand and six hundred, keeping the charge of the sanctuary." Can any body tell me how a child of six weeks old could be a keeper of the charge of the sanctuary? Certainly he could no otherwise be called a keeper but as one designed and appointed to that service. Just with the same propriety an infant, who, by circumcision or baptism, was or is publicly entered into a religious school, may be called a disciple in a religious sense. And it is a very general opinion that infants are actually so called in Acts, xv. 10. "Why tempt ye God to put a yoke on the neck of the disciples?" That infants are called disciples will appear plain if we ask, On whose neck was this yoke to have come? Every one knows, who knows the manner of Moses respecting circumcision, that it would have come on adults, but chiefly on infants; and then it is evident that as part of those, on whom the yoke would have come, were infants, it is as evident that those in-

fants were called disciples: But whether this be so or not, the word made use of by our Lord will agree to infants as well as adults.

The Apostles are to make disciples—that is all *matheeteusate* imports. But still the question is, how are they to make them? I answer, by teaching; for neither adult nor infant can be made a disciple without. And herein the Baptists are very right, and I agree with them, that adults and infants must be made disciples by teaching, or they will not be made so at all. But then how can an infant be made a disciple by teaching? I reply, not directly but indirectly; that is, the parents, being won over by teaching to embrace the truth, they present their infants to the Christian school to be trained up in the same truth; and thus they become disciples. *e. g.* Joel is to sanctify a fast, and call a solemn assembly, to gather the people, elders, children, and those that suck the breasts. But how is he to assemble them? He is to blow a trumpet in Zion. But what does a sucking child know about the sound of a trumpet? I answer, he knows nothing at all about it. How then are sucking children to be brought together by the sound of a trumpet, seeing they know nothing of the trumpet or its sound? I reply, In the same way as infants are made disciples by teaching. But how is that? Every one knows how it is who knows any thing; and this I have already explained. If the trumpet had not been sounded, the sucklings would not have been collected, and if men were not taught, infants would not become disciples: So then infants

as well as men are made disciples by teaching, as elders and sucking children are brought to the fast by the sound of a trumpet.

Viewing baptism as introducing infants into a visible state of discipleship, we are to consider others as teachers and overlookers of these disciples: And then the usefulness of such an institute will display itself before us. We see an infant baptized.—If our views terminate there, alas, what is it? Infant sprinkling only, the baptism of a baby. Things which are little in themselves, become great by their connexion with, and relation to others. We see an infant baptized.—What does it import? He is received into discipleship, *i. e.* to be a scholar in a Christian school. Now carry your views into the department of parents, pastors, deacons, and members; and listen to the silent language of this institution. "Parents, pastors, and people, pray for us; during our tender infancy, pray for us. And when matured by age, cause the doctrine which you profess, to drop upon us as the rain, to distil as dew, as the small rain upon the tender herb, and as showers upon the grass. Watch over us with united care, and bring us up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." It is a dispensation grand and merciful, which is calculated more powerfully to turn the attention of men, to the concerns of those who are rising into life, and posting into eternity.

There is one fault among others in the Baptist system, that it places the rising generation so entirely out of sight. I do not mean, that the Baptists themselves do this, for their conduct in this respect is much better than their system; but their

ſyſtem places them out of ſight. And in this, it differs from all the diſpenſations of God, of which we have any particular knowledge; which alone would lead to a preſumption, that it is not of God.

To what I have ſaid concerning the uſe of infant baptiſm, under the idea of an inſtitution ſuited to draw the attention more powerfully to the immortal concerns of the riſing generation (and he muſt be very inattentive to human nature, who does not ſee a beauty and bleſſedneſs in ſuch a contrivance); there is no objection that can be brought by a Baptiſt, but may be retorted. He may ſay, Cannot all this be done without baptizing infants? Retort: Cannot men be built up in faith and love, without either baptiſm or the Lord's ſupper?—Are not many baptized infants as deſtitute of real religion as others? Ret.—And are not many baptized adults, as deſtitute of religion as heathens? Are not many unbaptized infants brought up in Chriſtian knowledge equally as well as the baptized ones? Ret.—And are not many, who have not been baptized in adult age, as gracious and holy as thoſe who have? In this way every objection which can be brought may eaſily be retorted on the bringer.

But the truth is, that the enjoyment of ordinances is to be conſidered only as a mean of grace; they are well ſuited as ordinances to impreſs the mind; but then, it is very certain, they effect nothing, unleſs God is pleaſed to give the increaſe. The poſſeſſion of the word of God, the enjoyment of preaching, baptiſm, the Lord's ſupper, are good things in themſelves, though many are

never the better for them; but we are to eſtimate theſe things not by the advantage which ſome receive, but by their own ſuitableneſs to promote, as means, ſome great ends.

When we conſider infants under the notion of diſciples, or ſcholars, the idea ſuggeſts to us a noble kind of diſcipline in the church of God. It ſuggeſts, that all thoſe infants who are baptized, ſhould be formed, as they become capable, into ſocieties, for the purpoſe of Chriſtian inſtruction: And ſo every church ſhould have its ſchool. That there ſhould be in churches, not only *poimenai*, paſtors, but *didaſkaloi*, ſchoolmaſters, Eph. iv. 11. That the miniſter, and other fit perſons, ſhould preſide over theſe little diſciples; and parents who bring their children to baptiſm, ſhould conſider themſelves as bound in conſcience to ſee them forth-coming to this ſociety at all appointed ſeaſons. That all the members ſhould watch over them, with reſpect to their morals, and likewiſe their Chriſtian learning. In ſhort, the whole ſhould be a church buſineſs, regulated in the manner of doing according to the wiſdom of each Chriſtian ſociety. For as the infant is received by the church as a diſciple in its baptiſm, the church becomes bound to regard that infant as ſuch; and to ſee that it is treated as a ſcholar of Chriſt. To all this, it is plain, the idea of diſcipleſhip leads; and in this view it becomes greatly important, as its tendency is to draw the cares and prayers of the whole Chriſtian church towards the riſing generation.

There are many ſpecial uſes connected with this grand leading idea, which the limit of this eſſay will not permit me to mention. I cannot ſay how

far the leading idea itſelf is attended to by thoſe who adopt infant baptiſm; if it be not, it is ſo much the more to be lamented, that in this as well as in other things the ſpirit of an inſtitute is not followed up to its proper ſcope. It is ſufficient notwithſtanding to my preſent purpoſe, in ſhowing the uſefulneſs of an ordinance, if there be a natural fitneſs, in the ordinance itſelf, to promote the great end I have mentioned. And as every ſyſtem we embrace is likely to impreſs our minds according to its nature; that ſyſtem muſt be eminently good and uſeful, which is calculated moſt of all, to bring the riſing generation, and their everlaſting concerns, to our mind; to hold them up perpetually before our eyes; and to fix them habitually upon our hearts.—All this the admiſſion of infants by baptiſm to a ſtate of diſcipleſhip in the church of God, is evidently calculated to do; and herein I judge its main uſefulneſs conſiſts.

Reflections and Recommendations of the above Work, by the Engliſh Reviewers of Religious Publications.

IT is perhaps impoſſible to review a book of a controverſial nature, without giving offence to one ſide or other of the queſtion; even though the greateſt care may be taken to offend neither: And beſides, it is more than probable, that an honeſt reviewer may have an opinion of his own on the ſubject. However, keeping that out of ſight, as far as poſſible, we ſhall endeavour to give a juſt repreſentation of the reaſons here aſſigned for renouncing the principles of Antipædobaptiſm. The writer ſeems to be thoroughly acquainted with the nature and extent of his ſubject, and to have a clear view of all the conſequences that may ariſe from the various arguments urged either for or againſt infant baptiſm; and has certainly given a new turn to the controverſy, while he has brought forward ſome new, and much important matter, in ſuch a form, as undoubtedly calls for the very ſerious attention of thoſe gentlemen who oppoſe infant baptiſm. He writes with great perſpicuity, and reaſons with much force, and with no little [illegible]. He fairly ſtates thoſe intereſting points, which are equally admitted on both ſides,—ſuch as theſe; that the baptiſm of believing adults is right and proper—that every individual, who believes, may and ought to be baptized—that infants are not capable of believing. The queſtion then

is not concerning the baptism of *adults*, nor the baptism of *believers*, nor yet, whether *infants are capable of faith*; for in these matters all are agreed; but the question is solely this, Are *infants* to *be baptized*, or *not?* That our common readers, for whose benefit we chiefly write, may understand this statement of the subject, and our author's mode of reasoning, we shall set before them the following specimen. The Baptists say, The Scriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptism. Mr. Edwards says, Granted freely. The Baptists affirm, That infants have not faith or repentance. Mr. Edwards answers, Granted freely. The Baptists then urge, That infants, therefore, are not proper subjects of baptism. Mr. Edwards denies this assertion and rejects it, because no one ever urged baptism on the faith of infants, and because the faith of infants enters not at all into the question: And, were it necessary, Mr. Edwards would further illustrate the subject, in the following manner:—The Baptists attack the Jews, and say, The Scriptures required faith in order to circumcision. The Jew answers, Granted freely. Then the Baptists say, But male infants of eight days old had not faith. The Jew answers again, Granted freely. The Baptists then go on, and say, Male infants of eight days old, therefore, were not proper subjects of circumcision. The Jew answers with ardour, and justly too. I deny that assertion, because none ever rested circumcision on the faith of an infant eight days old, nor does the faith of infants at all enter into the question. Here then it evidently appears, that, if neither circumcision nor baptism was ever grounded on the faith of infants, the ar-

guments for or againſt the right of infants to theſe ordinances muſt be drawn from ſources that have nothing to do with their faith.

The queſtion therefore is, Are infants to be baptized, or not? The Baptiſts ſay, No; and then aſſign their reaſons: All of which Mr. Edwards reduces to two: Firſt, That *a perſon, who has a right to a poſitive inſtitute, muſt be expreſsly mentioned, as having that right; but infants are not ſo mentioned, and therefore have not that right.* This argument Mr. Edwards conſiders as a mere aſſumption;—as not allowed by any claſs of men,—nor owned by the Baptiſts themſelves, as of any real force, in admitting women to the Lord's Supper. Here ſome things are introduced, reſpecting the controverſy as managed by Mr. Booth, which certainly require an explicit anſwer.

Their ſecond argument is,—That *the Scriptures require faith and repentance as requiſite to baptiſm; but as infants cannot have theſe, they are not proper ſubjects of baptiſm.* That faith and repentance are required, in order to baptiſm, Mr. Edwards allows; but "I aſk," ſays he, "of whom? The anſwer muſt be—Of adults; for the Scriptures never require them of infants, in order to any thing. The argument then will be this—The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults, in order to baptiſm. Now, you ſee, infants are gone; they have nothing to do with the argument." Then Mr. Edwards goes on to ſhow that the argument is altogether fallacious, and points out wherein its fallacy conſiſts; and this, we think, he has completely done, whether he ſupports his main hypotheſis or not. The whole force of the argument, and its

conſequences, he expreſſes in a few words: "Infants," ſay the Baptiſts, "muſt not be baptized, becauſe infants have not faith. 'He that believeth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved.' Something is ſaid of baptiſm that cannot agree to infants;—faith goes before baptiſm; and as none but adults are capable of believing, ſo no others are capable of baptiſm." But "if infants muſt not be baptized," ſays Mr. Edwards, "becauſe ſomething is ſaid of baptiſm which does not agree to infants; then, by the ſame rule, infants muſt not be ſaved, becauſe ſomething is ſaid of ſalvation which does not agree to infants. As none but adults are capable of believing, ſo (by the arguments of the Baptiſts) none but adults are capable of ſalvation: For—He that believeth not, ſhall be damned." But the whole of Mr. Edwards' reaſoning, on this point, merits all attention.

However, the queſtion ſtill remains, Are infants to be baptized? Mr. Edwards ſays, Yes; and aſſigns the following reaſons: Firſt, God has conſtituted, in his church, the membership of infants, and admitted them to it by a religious rite. This is ſhown at large from the Jewiſh diſpenſation; and it is granted by the Baptiſts themſelves, that infant children were admitted members of the Jewiſh Church. Next, The church membership of infants was never ſet aſide, either by the authority of God, or of inſpired men; but continues in full force, under the ſanction of God, to the preſent day. This Mr. Edwards proves by a variety of clear and authentic arguments, which will both inſtruct and entertain the reader; while he will find that the right of infants, in this reſpect, under the

Chriſtian diſpenſation, is acknowledged both by our Lord and his Apoſtles. And to talk of their excluſion, without expreſs and poſitive language, would be very abſurd indeed, in a caſe, where ſo much ſtreſs is laid upon poſitive and expreſs language. Here Mr. Edwards puſhes home his reaſoning: "As God has conſtituted infants church members, they ſhould be received to membership, becauſe God has conſtituted it. And ſince infants muſt be received to membership, they muſt be received without baptiſm, or with it: But none muſt be received without baptiſm; and therefore, as infants muſt be received according to a divine command, they muſt of neceſſity be baptized. Hence it is clear, that, under the Goſpel, infants are ſtill continued, exactly in the ſame relation to God and his Church, in which they were originally placed under all former diſpenſations, and particularly under the Jewiſh Church."

After Mr. Edwards has cloſed his main arguments, there follows an Appendix, containing "A ſhort Method with the Baptiſts." Here it muſt be naturally expected, that ſome of the foregoing arguments will be introduced again, for the ſake of the Short Method. It would therefore be abſurd to make it an objection againſt his book, that Mr. Edwards repeats his arguments.—He does ſo, with great propriety, with deliberate deſign, and for a ſpecial end. Till thoſe arguments, which he has repeated, be clearly refuted, the pointleſs darts, thrown by feeble arms, are not worth regarding.

It has been intimated by ſome, that Mr. Edwards, in animadverting on the writings of Mr.

Booth, uſes language too ſevere and harſh, and that he has recourſe to unjuſt repreſentations. There is no accounting for the different feelings of men, in points that reſpect more things than they chooſe to own, and wherein they are much intereſted. We preſume not, therefore, to decide on charges of this kind. If Mr. Edwards has indulged himſelf in improper ſeverities, Mr. Booth's anſwer will acquire reputation by a fair and juſt ſtatement of ſuch follies. If Mr. Edwards has really ſaid any thing that is not true, or has been unjuſt in his repreſentations, Mr. Booth, ſo far as his own arguments are concerned, is obliged to him; for his taſk, in anſwering, will be rendered much eaſier, and his refutations cannot fail of being acceptable to a virtuous public. At all events, an anſwer will be expected from Mr. Booth, or ſome of his friends.

THE END.

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